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Preface
This thesis has two parts. Chapters 1 to 3 consider the role of expectations in the econ-
omy and their implications for monetary policy. Chapter 4 explores the profitability
of Germany’s capital exports. Both parts discuss topics highly relevant for economic
policy. First, central banks are increasingly using the management of expectations as
a new policy tool, but the exact effects are still little understood. Second, the size of
Germany’s current account surplus has been the topic of much debate, both inside and
outside of Germany. In this context, the profitability of the capital side of the surplus
is an important aspect, which has not yet received a lot of attention. The aim of this
thesis is to provide insights into these issues using empirical analysis, and thus help
inform the debates among economists and policy-makers.
In recent years, macroeconomists have (re-)discovered expectations, especially those
of firms and households measured in surveys. One key reason are the inflation devel-
opments since the great financial crisis in 2008. Central bankers and macroeconomists
alike were puzzled, first, by the lack of disinflation, and then by the lack of inflation
during the recovery (see e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015b). The lack of infla-
tion, in turn, has forced central banks to come up with new tools as their policy rates
hit the effective lower bound but inflation was still far below target. In addition to
asset purchase programs, forward guidance measures were introduced to influence
expectations of firms and households directly. Before delving into the details of these
developments, I will first provide an overview of the role of expectations in macroeco-
nomics in general.
Expectations are central to economics. Forward-looking behavior distinguishes hu-
mans from inanimate objects, and with that distinguishes economics from the natural
sciences.1 The importance of expectations for macroeconomics in particular was noted
early on, for example by Keynes (1936). Expectations entered models formally in the
1950s and 1960s, usually in the form of adaptive expectations. This static approach to
expectations was criticized first by Muth (1961) and then famously by Lucas (1972).
1As Bachmann (2019) puts it: “Particles, molecules, and stars do not look into the future or have their
behavior influenced by the future” (p. 65).
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These authors introduced the notion of model-consistent or rational expectations ar-
guing that agents are sufficiently sophisticated to understand economic principles and
to adapt to new developments.
Early versions of the rational expectations formulation focused on how agents use
information to form expectations, but they still allowed for limits on the amount of
information available to agents. However, over time the assumption of full informa-
tion was added to the rational expectations framework, i.e. most authors assumed that
agents are not only aware of the underlying structural relationships but are also able
to find and process all relevant information immediately (Coibion and Gorodnichenko
2012). This assumption made research, which considers what actual expectations look
like, seem unnecessary from a macroeconomic perspective. Thus, the introduction of
rational expectations led to a sustained period, in which expectations were not consid-
ered much in macroeconomic research.
Only in the early 2000s, a renewed interest into deviations from this assumption
developed, mainly on the theoretical side. This research was motivated by the dis-
crepancy between the observed inflation dynamics and those predicted by models
with nominal rigidities based on price stickiness. In particular, several papers intro-
duced information rigidities while maintaining the rational expectations assumption.2
With the introduction of these theoretical approaches, also some empirical literature
reemerged, mainly driven by Carroll (2003). However, these studies focused on time-
series data. The analysis of micro-level survey data remained very limited, in part due
to skepticism towards survey data, especially in the US (Bachmann 2019).
Then the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath left many advanced economies in
a new macroeconomic environment with sustained low inflation rates despite strong
easing monetary policy. In light of these developments, expectations came back into
focus. Central banks struggling with the effective lower bound of interest rates and
an impaired transmission mechanism, introduced forward guidance as a tool to in-
fluence the expectations of key economic actors directly. Based on earlier research on
liquidity traps (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford 2003; Krugman 1998), central bankers
and macroeconomists alike expected these policies to be quite effective, especially in
the low interest rate environment. However, it quickly became clear that the effects
were rather weak (Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson 2012), and that some of the
announcements even lowered expectations, i.e. achieved the opposite of what was
intended (Campbell, Evans, Fisher, and Justiniano 2012).
This observation initiated a careful reevaluation of how monetary policy interacts
with expectations. Campbell et al. (2012) first introduced the idea that forward guid-
2The most relevant examples are sticky information by Mankiw and Reis (2002), and noisy informa-
tion due to rational inattention (Sims 2003) and imperfect common knowledge (Woodford 2002).
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ance – and central bank communication in general – can have very different effects
depending on how it is perceived by economic agents. On the one hand, a clear an-
nouncement of a strong easing policy may lead firms and households to develop a
more positive view of economic prospects as they expect monetary policy to support
the recovery (Odyssean view). On the other hand, the same announcement may be per-
ceived as revealing that the economy is doing worse than previously thought. In this
case, firms and households will revise their expectations downwards (Delphic view).
This view of central bank communication goes back to the idea that the central bank is
better informed about the economy than other agents, turning its announcements into
a source of information about the economic outlook (Romer and Romer 2000).
These discussions of forward guidance have led to a reconsideration of how mone-
tary policy in general affects expectations. In particular, Melosi (2017) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2018) integrate the notion of Delphic effects into dynamic general equi-
librium models. In both cases, any decision or announcement by the central bank car-
ries information about the state of the economy. Following, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018), this effect is referred to as the information effect of monetary policy.
Importantly, models incorporating the information effect of monetary policy allow
for deviations from the full information assumption. They thus also led to a renewed
interest in the empirical analysis of expectations, especially of the effect of monetary
policy on expectations. However, most studies so far consider only professional fore-
casters and financial markets (see e.g., Campbell et al. 2012; Nakamura and Steinsson
2018). While these actors are relevant, we know that their expectation formation pro-
cess differs substantially from the one of firms and households, who are the ones set-
ting prices and driving demand in the economy. Therefore, Chapters 1 and 2 consider
the effects of monetary policy surprises on expectations of those two groups. Both
chapters find evidence of the information effect.
An underlying assumption of these discussions about expectations and monetary
policy is that expectations matter, i.e. that expectations reported in a survey are in-
deed relevant for economic decisions. There are different ways to test this assump-
tion. For example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015b) show that household inflation
expectations from the Michigan Survey of Consumers improve the estimation of the
Phillips curve and help solve the missing disinflation puzzle after the financial crisis.
In addition, one can consider how expectations and actions interact directly in surveys.
Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Ropele (2020) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Kumar
(2018) show that inflation expectations do affect the decisions of firms by introducing
information treatments to different surveys. In both studies, expectations are about ag-
gregate consumer price inflation, and the sample period is limited to the recent years.
Chapter 3 adds additional evidence by considering a long-run panel of firms and their
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expectations about their own production. The chapter shows that these expectations
also matter for the decisions of firms regarding prices and production.
In the following, I describe the first three chapters in more detail.3 Chapter 1 con-
siders how expectations of German firms react to monetary policy by the European
Central Bank (ECB). We find evidence of non-linear effects. After a small tightening
monetary policy surprise, i.e. an interest rate increase, firms expect their own prices
and production to fall. This response is in line with standard theory, which assumes
that higher interest rates dampen demand and lower inflation, and thus lower expec-
tations. However, for larger surprises this is not the case, instead firms do not change
expectations significantly, or even expect higher prices and higher production. The
results are symmetric for easing surprises, i.e. interest rate decreases. The observed
reaction to large surprises is in line with the information effect of monetary policy off-
setting the standard effect. Specifically, we interpret this finding as firms only paying
attention to the information component of the monetary policy announcement when
the surprise is relatively large.
The results is this chapter are obtained using data from the ifo institute’s survey
of German manufacturing firms. The key advantage of our approach is that this sur-
vey provides information on the day each firm returns its questionnaire. Therefore,
we can compare firms responding within two working days before the ECB announce-
ment to firms responding within two working days after the announcement. This tight
window reduces the likelihood that expectations change due to macroeconomic devel-
opments other than the monetary policy announcement. We measure monetary policy
using high-frequency identified surprises in interest rates. Specifically, we use changes
in overnight interest rates in a tight window around each ECB meeting to capture only
the unexpected part of the monetary policy decision.
While our interpretation of the non-linear effects as evidence that the information
effect matters more for larger surprises is compelling, we cannot directly provide evi-
dence for this interpretation with the available data. Since the non-linear response has
important implications for monetary policy, a better understanding of the information
effect is necessary. In particular, it is interesting to see whether the results are lim-
ited to the special case of the ifo firm survey. Therefore, Chapter 2 considers whether
households also respond in a similar fashion to monetary policy. In addition, this chap-
ter provides more direct evidence for the presence of information effects by analyzing
news reporting about monetary policy.
Specifically, Chapter 2 considers the effect of monetary policy on household infla-
3Chapters 1, 3 and 4 are based on joint work with coauthors. Therefore, in the text below I use
plural pronouns when discussing these chapters. The coauthors are Zeno Enders and Gernot Müller for
Chapters 1 and 3, and Moritz Schularick and Christoph Trebesch for Chapter 4.
PREFACE xvii
tion expectations in the United States. Results differ from the ones in Chapter 1 in that
the information effect dominates for US households. In particular, a tightening mone-
tary policy surprise, i.e. an interest rate increase, leads to higher inflation expectations.
In turn, an easing monetary policy surprise lowers expectations. Both results imply
that households adjust inflation in reaction to the implied information about the cur-
rent outlook for inflation, not in reaction to the effect of the changed monetary policy
stance on future inflation. The effects are robust across many different specifications.
As in Chapter 1, I measure monetary policy using high-frequency changes in in-
terest rates, this time around Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. The
data on inflation expectations is from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. The Michi-
gan Survey has a limited panel dimension – a subset of households is interviewed
twice. This allows me to control for unobserved household heterogeneity.
In order to verify that the positive response is indeed due to the information effect,
I analyze newspaper reporting after FOMC meetings. The reason for this additional
step is that we know from previous research that households do not closely follow
monetary policy news and that they do not know a lot about central banks (Binder
2017b). Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that households react so significantly and
so clearly in line with information effect to the monetary policy decision. One plausible
driver of this effect is media reporting because we know household use this as an infor-
mation source when forming expectations (D’Acunto, Malmendier, Ospina, and Weber
2019b). If newspapers report about the implications of the central bank announcement
for the economic outlook in line with the information effect, households may notice
this information and react accordingly.
I test this hypothesis by analyzing articles published in US newspapers within a
week after FOMC meetings. In particular, I use text analysis to classify articles based
on whether they refer to high or increasing inflation or whether they refer to low or de-
creasing inflation. I find that newspapers indeed report more about high or increasing
inflation after a surprise tightening announcement. The reporting in turn significantly
increases households’ inflation expectations. These results confirm that information
effects are driving the households’ response. Thus, Chapter 2 shows that US house-
holds not only change their inflation expectations significantly after monetary policy
announcements but also do so according to the information effect hypothesis. Given
that this response is potentially contrary to the one intended, central banks need to
consider the existence of these effects when designing communication strategies.
After analyzing the effect of monetary policy on expectations in the first two chap-
ters, I turn to the effect of expectations on actions in Chapter 3. This chapter shows
that, in response to their expectations for the following months, firms already change
their price and production decisions in the current month. The effect is significant both
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for firms whose expectations turn out to be correct ex-post and for firms whose expec-
tations turn out to be incorrect. The latter indicates that noisy or undue expectations
matter for firms as well. In addition, these undue expectations have a significant effect
on aggregate production and prices.
The results in this chapter are based on the same data from the ifo survey of Ger-
man manufacturing firms used in Chapter 1. In order to establish the causal effect of
expectations on actions at the firm level, we rely on propensity score matching. This
approach allows us to compare firms with the same observable characteristics but dif-
ferent expectations. Assuming we control for all joint drivers of expectations and out-
comes, the difference in outcomes between firms with different expectations is only
due to the latter. We find that optimistic firms (expecting a production increase) are
more likely to report higher production and prices in the month the expectation was
reported. Effects for pessimistic firms are symmetric for lower production and prices.
There are two reasons firms may react to their expectations in this manner. One is
that they simply know something about their future, which is not yet reflected in the
observable fundamental values, and adjust accordingly (news view). The other is, that
they are just optimistic or pessimistic for some reason unrelated to future fundamentals
and react based on this (noise view). We disentangle these two views by considering
the ex-post forecast errors of firms. Specifically, we categorize firms as correct and
incorrect based on their reported actual production in the next three months. We find
that the majority of the effect observed before is due to the correct firms. However,
also those firms, which turn out to be incorrect ex-post, are significantly more likely to
change production and prices, albeit to a smaller extent. Only incorrectly pessimistic
firms do not adjust prices.
In order to understand whether these micro-level effects have macroeconomic con-
sequences, we construct aggregate measures of what we call “undue” optimism and
pessimism, inspired by the micro-level analysis. Using local projections, we assess the
effect of these two expectations measures on industrial production and the producer
price index in Germany. We find that undue optimism indeed increases industrial pro-
duction and the producer prices significantly. Undue pessimism on the other hand,
has almost no significant effect.
In conclusion, Chapter 3 shows that expectations matter significantly for firm out-
comes, and that this effect translates to the aggregate economy, at least for positive
expectations. This highlights the importance of understanding how expectations are
formed. It also implies that the effects of monetary policy on expectations found in the
first two chapters are likely to lead to real effects.
The second part of this thesis studies the returns on foreign assets. The accumula-
PREFACE xix
tion of foreign assets is related to the current account. Mechanically, current account
surpluses are accompanied by financial account surpluses, which in turn increase the
net foreign asset position. In addition, increased trade activity is often accompanied
by investment abroad, which also increases gross flows.
In the last decade, Germany has been running an exceptionally large current ac-
count surplus: net exports worth 8% of GDP are unprecedented both compared to
Germany’s history of sustained surpluses as well as internationally. This surplus has
sparked a lot of debate, inside as well as outside of Germany. On the one hand, the
surplus results from large exports, which are linked to a high degree of competitive-
ness (see e.g., Fuest 2017; German Council of Economic Experts 2017). On the other
hand, low imports and high domestic savings are also important drivers of the surplus
as well. In this view, the surplus is an indicator of low domestic demand and excess
savings. In addition, it not only represents domestic imbalances but may also reinforce
those in the euro area (see e.g., Bernanke 2015; Krugman 2017). While criticism of the
surplus was initially rejected in Germany, the debate has now shifted towards a more
skeptical view as well (for example, Board of Academic Advisors 2019; Weidmann
2019).
One aspect largely missing from the German debate, however, are the implications
of the capital side of the surplus. Internationally, some authors have warned of the
financial implications (Bernanke 2015), but within Germany, the effects of the signif-
icant build-up of both the net and the gross foreign asset position have been mainly
ignored.4 In Chapter 4, we add evidence on this issue by comparing the return on
Germany’s foreign assets to the returns of other countries on their foreign assets.
The international comparison of gross returns is a new approach. So far, the in-
ternational finance literature has focused on comparing return differentials, i.e. the
difference between what countries earn on their foreign assets and what they pay on
their foreign liabilities. These comparisons were generally done in context of the so
called exorbitant privilege of the United States – the ability to continuously earn sub-
stantially higher returns on its assets than it is paying on its liabilities (see for example,
Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock 2013; Gourinchas and Rey 2007a; Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2003; Meissner and Taylor 2008). Instead, we compare returns on gross foreign
assets directly. The idea is that generally all advanced economies can invest in very
comparable foreign assets, while the foreign liability composition may be due to spe-
cific country characteristics. Therefore, asset returns are more informative about the
profitability of foreign investment as such.
Specifically, in Chapter 4, we compute returns on the gross foreign asset positions
4There are a few recent exceptions, in particular, Bundesbank (2018) and Fiedler, Görg, Hornok,
Jannsen, Kooths, Marchal, and Potjagailo (2018). However, they focus on a much shorter time period
and lack an international dimension.
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of Germany and a set of other advanced economies using balance of payments data.
The estimated returns reveal a significant difference between Germany and the other
countries: since the 1980s, the German return was 2 percentage points lower on av-
erage. This difference is relatively constant over time, statistically significant and can
mostly not be explained by commonly considered factors. In particular, we show that
valuation changes due to exchange rate effects are similar across countries and thus
do not contribute to the return differential. The composition regarding type of asset
is more relevant – up to 25% of the observed difference can be explained by Germany
investing more in low return categories. However, the majority of the difference be-
tween the return on foreign assets of Germany and the other countries is due to return
differences within each asset category. Geographical composition and riskiness cannot
explain these differences. We find the largest differential for foreign direct investment
and equity. German returns are 3 and 4 percentage points lower, respectively. For
the other two asset categories (debt and ‘other investment’), we find only small and
insignificant differences.
In addition, German foreign asset returns are also lower than returns earned on a
portfolio of domestic German assets. The difference was 3 percentage points on aver-
age since the 1960s, and actually widened recently. Finally, we show that Germany’s
foreign investment does not provide additional benefits, such as consumption insur-
ance and hedging against demographic risks.
In conclusion, Chapter 4 shows that German foreign asset returns have been low,
both in international and domestic comparison. Most of the difference cannot be ex-
plained by commonly considered factors. Instead, we find particularly large residual
differentials for foreign direct investment and equity. These two categories usually
earn the highest return within the foreign asset position. The results may hint a sys-
tematic failure of German foreign investment, which should be explored further using
more detailed data than available in the balance of payments.
This thesis contributes to two policy-relevant literatures. On the one hand, the
expectations of firms and households are highly important for the transmission and
effectiveness of monetary policy. On the other hand, the performance of Germany’s in-
vestment abroad adds important arguments to the debates about the current account
surplus in Germany.
Chapters 1 and 2 highlight the non-trivial effect of monetary policy on expectations.
While monetary policy indeed significantly affects expectations, the effect may often
be in the opposite direction of what was intended. This leads to important trade-offs
that central banks have to consider. On the one hand, the management of expectations
provides an additional powerful policy tool, which supports and expands the trans-
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mission of monetary policy. On the other hand, it is ex-ante difficult to predict how
private actors will perceive specific announcements and therefore how they will react
to this. More research is needed to understand how monetary policy communication
can be effective without leading to adverse effects via the information effect. Chap-
ter 3 underscores the relevance of this question by confirming that firm expectations
as reported in surveys do matter for firm decisions, and that the effects of expectations
translate to the aggregate economy.
Chapter 4 on the other hand, provides evidence that Germany’s capital exports are
not performing well abroad. In light of these results, debates about the German surplus
and the fiscal stance have to be reconsidered. Given the relatively good performance
of domestic assets, more domestic investment, both private and public, may be ben-
eficial. This will in turn potentially increase import demand and reduce the current
as well as the financial account surplus. In addition, we need a better understanding
of the reasons why German foreign investments are outperformed by those of other
countries.
I hope this thesis will spark more debate on these issues and lead to more research
to improve our understanding of the role of expectations in the economy as well as of
the determinants of foreign asset returns.
Chapter 1
Monetary Policy Announcements and
Expectations: Evidence from German
Firms*†‡
*A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 108, p. 45–63,
in December 2019, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.011.
†This chapter is based on joint work with Zeno Enders (University of Heidelberg) and Gernot Müller
(University of Tübingen).
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1.1 Introduction
Do monetary policy announcements affect firm expectations and, if so, how? In this
study, we take up the question empirically as we analyze the effect of policy announce-
ments by the European Central Bank (ECB) on expectations of German firms during
the period 2004 to 2018. We rely on the Ifo Business Survey Industry (IBS) of firm
expectations and three distinct measures of monetary policy innovations. First, we fo-
cus on the announcements of specific non-conventional policy measures in the period
since the global financial crisis. Second, more broadly, we consider monetary policy
surprises as captured by high-frequency interest rate changes around monetary policy
events. Third, we employ more structural measures of central bank information and
communication shocks. Throughout, we focus on how firm expectations of production
and prices change in response to these measures.
The main result of our analysis is twofold: we find a) that monetary policy sur-
prises do indeed affect firm expectations significantly and b) that they do so in a non-
linear way. In the first part of our analysis, we show that the announcements of non-
conventional policies by the ECB hardly affected firm expectations and, to the extent
that they did, they lowered expectations of prices and production – even though these
policies were arguably designed to be expansionary. Once we turn to monetary policy
surprises more broadly defined, we find that they affect firm expectations significantly.
Moreover, the effect is non-linear in the size of the surprise. A moderate surprise in-
crease of the interest rate reduces firm expectations, while surprise reductions raise
them – in line with conventional wisdom. The strength of the effect declines as the
size of the surprise increases, both for positive and negative surprises. Very large sur-
prises no longer affect firm expectations significantly. Lastly, we find that central bank
information shocks also affect firm expectations. Yet, they cannot account for the non-
linear effect of monetary surprises on expectations, and neither can direct central bank
communication during monetary policy events.
Our findings are consistent with the notion that monetary policy announcements
induce market participants to update their views about the economy quite generally
and not only about monetary policy. Romer and Romer (2000) argue that this is to be
expected if the information sets of the central bank and the public are not perfectly
aligned. Indeed, they show that the forecasts by the US Federal Reserve, which are
unknown to market participants in real time, are useful in predicting inflation, given
professional forecasts of inflation. More recently, Melosi (2017) puts forward and esti-
mates a model where monetary policy shocks operate via a “signaling channel” as they
induce price setters to update their belief about the state of the economy. The analy-
sis of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) also lends support to an “information effect,”
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according to which market participants update their beliefs about the natural rate in
response to monetary surprises. Finally, Jarociński and Karadi (2020) use the stock-
market reaction to monetary policy surprises in order to strip monetary surprises of
their information content. In this way, they are able to measure central bank informa-
tion shocks on which we rely in our analysis below.
Our results highlight a new margin along which the information effect may operate:
the size of the monetary surprise. According to our estimates, firm expectations adjust
to monetary policy surprises in conventional ways to the extent that the surprise is
small. The effect becomes weaker as the size of the shock increases – possibly because
in this case the information effect becomes stronger. This pattern may emerge because
the attention that firms pay to the potential information conveyed by monetary pol-
icy announcements is endogenous to the size of the policy surprise: inattentiveness
is strong for modest surprises, while firms become more attentive to the information
content as the surprise gets bigger. We stress that while we find this explanation of
our empirical results compelling, we cannot rule out other explanations based on our
analysis.
It may seem that our results are in conflict with recent findings by Kumar, Afrouzi,
Coibion, and Gorodnichenko (2015) and Coibion et al. (2018). Using survey data for
New Zealand, they find that firms tend to be inattentive to monetary policy or, more
specifically, that firm expectations about aggregate inflation are not well anchored and
widely dispersed across firms. We make three observations to reconcile our findings
with this evidence. First, our analysis concerns firm expectations about firms’ own
prices rather than about aggregate inflation. Second, we focus on the effect of interest
rate changes, which are likely more relevant for firms’ profits than aggregate infla-
tion. It may hence be more worthwhile for firms to pay closer attention to them. Last,
Coibion et al. (2018) find that inflation errors are less pervasive in the manufacturing
sector and in the case when firms face many competitors. It is therefore noteworthy
that our results are based on data from the highly competitive manufacturing sector in
Germany.
Specifically, our analysis uses survey data for a large panel of German firms. Firms
are surveyed on a monthly basis and asked about their expectations of future pro-
duction and prices. Our sample runs from July 2004 to June 2018. Crucial for our
identification strategy is the information about the specific day on which firms submit
their responses online. This allows us to distinguish between firms who responded
before a specific policy measure was announced, and those firms that have responded
afterwards. In a nutshell, the difference in expectations across the two groups of firms
provides a measure of the effect of the policy announcement. Moreover, our data set
allows us to control for a large set of firm characteristics.
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Given our sample of German firms, we focus on the policy announcements of the
ECB. First, we consider announcements of non-conventional policies, starting with the
one-year long-term refinancing operations (LTRO), announced in June 2009. The last
announcement in our sample is the termination of the expanded asset purchasing pro-
gram (APP) in June 2018. These announcements of non-conventional policies are of-
ten discussed in the context of “forward guidance” since they pertain mostly to future
policies, even though this holds to some extent for conventional policy announcements
as well (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson 2005). Still, this policy dimension has become
even more pertinent during the last decade as policy rates were constrained by the zero
lower bound. Under these circumstances, central banks relied heavily on announce-
ments in order to communicate unconventional policy measures and to manage the
expectations of the public.1
According to our estimates, the effect of the ECB’s non-conventional policy an-
nouncements on firm expectations is limited. Moreover, if there is an effect at all,
it tends to be negative. That is, the announcements of policies, which are arguably
meant to be expansionary, tend to reduce expectations of production and prices. Such
a reduction may be surprising in light of conventional wisdom but can be rationalized
through information effects. Similar effects have been observed for the US and have
brought to the fore the potentially “Delphic” nature of forward guidance (Campbell et
al. 2012).2 In this case – rather than being perceived as a commitment to a future pol-
icy as “Odyssean” forward guidance would have it – market participants update their
belief about the state of the economy. In light of the information implicitly conveyed
by the policy announcements, the outlook appears less benign to market participants
and they revise expectations accordingly.
The non-conventional policies that were announced during our sample period were
quite exceptional, in terms of both their specifics and their scope. Hence, we turn to
monetary policy surprises more broadly defined. In particular, we study the effect
of interest rate innovations around monetary policy events. We obtain these innova-
tions from the Euro Area Monetary Policy Event-Study Database (Altavilla, Brugnolini,
Gürkaynak, Motto, and Ragusa 2019). A plain-vanilla regression of firm expectations
on interest rate surprises yields a counterintuitive effect: it is weak but positive, even
as we limit our analysis to firms that respond to the ifo survey in a narrow window
around the monetary policy event. We conjecture that this result may be due to infor-
1At a theoretical level, the effectiveness of such announcements is still a subject of considerable con-
troversy. The canonical New Keynesian model predicts that “forward guidance” generates implausibly
large effects (Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian 2015; Del Negro et al. 2012; McKay, Nakamura, and Steins-
son 2016).
2Policy announcements related to non-conventional policy measures have lowered yields signifi-
cantly (Altavilla and Giannone 2017; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011), but failed to raise
expectations of inflation and output growth (Del Negro et al. 2012).
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mation effects that differ in strength depending on the size of the surprise. Indeed, once
we slice the data accordingly, we find a highly non-linear relationship between mon-
etary policy surprises and firm expectations. Moderate surprises move expectations
significantly in the expected direction, large surprises – both positive and negative –
do much less so.
To explore the role of information effects further, we turn, in a third step, to more
detailed measures of central bank information and communication. Specifically, we
rely on a measure of central bank information shocks by Jarociński and Karadi (2020).
Positive central bank information shocks capture favorable news about the economy
– revealed through monetary policy announcements. As we assess the effect of these
shocks on firm expectations, we indeed find that they raise price expectations, and
significantly so. The effect on output expectations is insignificant. However, we find
that once we control for these shocks in our baseline regression, monetary policy sur-
prises continue to have a non-linear effect on expectations. As we dissect our results
further, we find that they are driven by the news conveyed in the press releases of the
ECB, rather than in the communication during the press conference. This suggests that
the (non-linear) information effect operates directly through the policy measure, rather
than through the communication thereof.
In our view, our analysis makes two contributions. First, our results suggest that
the potential information conveyed by a monetary policy announcement may be en-
dogenous to the size of the policy change. Second, our analysis provides evidence that
monetary policy announcements affect the expectations of individual firms. In this
way, we address a certain shortcoming of existing work that has focused on the effect
of monetary policy announcements on professional forecasters (Campbell et al. 2012;
Del Negro et al. 2012). According to theory, monetary policy operates through the ex-
pectations of price setters. Hence, it is of particular interest to assess whether firms,
rather than professional forecasters, respond to monetary policy announcements. Our
results show that they do and non-linearly so.
More generally, our study relates to a number of recent contributions that provide
new evidence on expectation formation. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015a)
show that professional forecasters adjust forecasts only sluggishly to shocks. As for
evidence on price setters, Boneva, Cloyne, Weale, and Wieladek (2020) use a panel of
expectations of UK firms to estimate a version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Coibion et al. (2020) use a survey of Italian firms to estimate the causal effect of firm
expectations on firm decisions.
There is also work on expectation formation based on the ifo survey. An early
study by Nerlove (1983) finds evidence in support of an adaptive expectations model.
More recently, Bachmann and Elstner (2015) show that at most one third of the firms
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in the ifo survey systematically overpredict or underpredict their production growth
one-quarter ahead. Massenot and Pettinicchi (2018), in turn, identify various factors,
which account for forecasting errors of firms in the ifo sample. Buchheim and Link
(2017) analyze to what extent the expectation formation of firms depends on aggregate
rather than on firm-specific information. Enders, Hünnekes, and Müller (2019a) inves-
tigate the role of firm expectations on price setting and production. In a similar vein, a
number of recent papers investigate the effects of uncertainty on production and price-
setting decisions using data from the ifo survey. Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013)
show that surprise movements in uncertainty lead to significant reductions in produc-
tion, while Bachmann, Born, Elstner, and Grimme (2019) find that the frequency of
price adjustment increases in idiosyncratic business volatility.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces
our data set. In Section 1.3, we study the effect of the ECB’s announcements of non-
conventional policies on firm expectations. Section 1.4 presents results for how mon-
etary policy surprises, more broadly measured, affect firm expectations. Section 1.5
analyzes the role of central bank information and communication in more detail. A
final section offers conclusions.
1.2 Data
In what follows, we briefly describe our data set. First, we provide some details on the
survey of German firms from which we obtain a measure of firm expectations. Second,
we turn to the monetary policy announcements of the ECB, both the non-conventional
policy measures announced since 2009 and a broader set of monetary policy surprises.
1.2.1 Firm expectations
For our analysis, we use the Ifo Business Survey Industry (IBS), maintained at the
LMU-ifo Economics & Business Data Center (EBDC) in Munich (IBS-IND 2018a). The
survey contains monthly observations for several thousand German firms from the
manufacturing sector. In each month, firms report expectations regarding their pro-
duction and their prices for the next 3 months. The answers are qualitative: production
and prices may increase, not change, or decrease. In addition, the survey includes qual-
itative questions about realized production and price changes in the previous month.
The survey has broad coverage in terms of German industry. It is also used to con-
struct the ifo business climate index, a widely observed leading indicator for current
and future economic activity in Germany (Becker and Wohlrabe 2008).
The unit of observation in the IBS is either a product or a plant, depending on
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Figure 1.1: Ifo business survey, descriptive statistics
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Notes: Descriptive statistics for our sub-sample of the ifo business survey (IBS). Panel (a) shows share
of firms with a response date. Panel (b) reports response days within month. Panel (c) shows average
expectations over time. Panel (d) displays dispersion measure suggested by Bachmann et al. (2013).
Averages are arithmetic means, no weights used. Response dates are not available in the following
months: 06-2009, 12-2009, 08-2014, 11-2015, 03-2016, 05-2016, 06-2016, and 12-2016. Shaded areas mark
recession periods as defined by the German Council of Economic Experts.
the firm. As a result, some firms provide several responses per month. We conduct
our analysis at the product/plant level and do not explicitly account for whether a
product/plant is part of a multi-product firm. In our analysis below, we refer to the
individual observation as a “firm” in order to simplify the exposition.
The IBS starts in 1980. However, only since 2004 can firms respond online to the sur-
vey. By now, the majority of firms use this option, as shown in panel (a) of Figure 1.1.
Whenever firms answer online, the time and date of their response is recorded. The
majority of firms respond in the first 10 days of the month. Panel (b) of Figure 1.1
displays the distribution of answers across the days of the month. We rely on the re-
sponse date in our econometric strategy as explained below. For this reason, we limit
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our analysis to those firms for which the response date is available. Our sample runs
from July 2004 to June 2018. During this period, some 2300 firms fill out the survey in
each month on average. Unfortunately, for a few months during our sample period no
response time was recorded in the database. As a result, we have to drop eight months
from our analysis below.3
In our analysis, we focus on expectations regarding the change in production and
prices. The questions are as follows (our translation):
Q1 Expectations for the next 3 months: Taking changes of terms and conditions into
account, our domestic sales prices (net) for product XY will probably increase [1],
not change [0], or decrease [-1].
Q2 Expectations for the next 3 months: Our domestic production activity regarding
good XY will probably increase [1], not change [0], or decrease [-1].
Note that these questions ask for qualitative answers and permit three realizations
only: prices and production may increase, decrease, or remain unchanged. Conse-
quently, whenever a firm reports to expect an increase in the previous period, the
change in expectations cannot be larger than zero, and conversely for pessimistic firms.
When estimating how expectations change in response to monetary policy announce-
ments, we therefore control for the lags of expectations. Last, note that the IBS does
not provide fixed-event forecasts (for instance, expectations regarding June 2009) but
fixed-horizon forecast (for instance, expectations for the next 3 months going forward).
The change in expectations is thus not a forecast revision in a strict sense, as the two
forecasts do not pertain to the exact same period.
Panel (c) of Figure 1.1 displays the average responses to these questions for the
months in our sample. The average expectation across firms fluctuates considerably
over time, both for prices and production. The two time series tend to co-move, with
some exceptions. For example, the pronounced downturn during the financial cri-
sis was larger for production expectations than for price expectations, reflecting the
“missing disinflation” (Hall 2011). More generally, we also observe that over time pro-
duction expectations are more volatile than price expectations.
Panel (d) shows the dispersion of price and production expectations within each
month.4 The dispersion is generally larger for production expectations. During the
crisis, the dispersion in both variables increased. After the crisis, however, it remained
3Specifically, we omit the following months: 06-2009, 12-2009, 08-2014, 11-2015, 03-2016, 05-2016,
06-2016, and 12-2016.
4Dispersion of expectations based on qualitative survey data is measured as√
frac+ + frac− −
(
frac+ − frac−
)2, where frac+ and frac− are the fraction of positive and nega-
tive responses in each month, respectively. This measure is also used by Bachmann et al. (2013).
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at a higher level for production expectations only. Finally, dispersion is more volatile
over time for price expectations compared to production expectations.
In addition, we use answers to further survey questions as control variables. These
include questions on past production, prices, and demand, as well as current orders
and current capacity utilization. All questions, except for the one on capacity utiliza-
tion, ask for qualitative answers with a similar answer structure as the price and pro-
duction expectations questions. In each case, there are three possible answers: posi-
tive, neutral, and negative. Accordingly, we code the answers in a similar fashion as
the price and production expectations. Table A.1 in Appendix A1 provides details on
all questions.
Finally, our econometric strategy requires information about the day the firm re-
sponded to the survey. As discussed above, this date is available only for a subset of
firms. We know that responses of the full sample of the IBS are useful indicators for
the German economy. Therefore, we want to make sure that our subset of firms is not
too different from the full sample. For this purpose, we compare the mean and stan-
dard deviation of all variables used. We find that firms responding online do not differ
much from the full sample regarding their average responses. This is despite the fact
that the sub-sample includes a larger share of firms from more recent years, since the
share of firms with a response date increased over time. However, firms in our subset
are slightly larger: the average number of employees in the full sample is 489 with a
standard deviation of 3560, compared to 548 employees on average in our subset of
firms, with a standard deviation of 3770. Table A.2 in Appendix A1 provides details
on the descriptive statistics in both samples.
1.2.2 Monetary policy announcements
In our analysis, we use three distinct measures of monetary policy surprises, which are
due to monetary policy announcements. First, we consider directly the announcements
of unconventional policies by the ECB in the wake of the financial crisis. Second, we
employ high-frequency changes in overnight-index-swap (OIS) interest rates around
monetary policy events. Last, we rely on a decomposition of monetary policy surprises
due to Jarociński and Karadi (2020). We briefly discuss these measures in what follows.
First, we identify 16 announcements of non-conventional policies by the ECB be-
tween May 2009 and June 2018, such as the announcement of the first long-term refi-
nancing operations (LTROs), the different asset purchase programs, and the first for-
ward guidance announcements. Our list of events largely follows Dedola, Georgiadis,
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Gräb, and Mehl (2018).5 Table A.3 in Appendix A1 provides an overview. These policy
measures differ along a number of dimensions and we allow for different effects of
each announcement in our analysis below. An aspect common to most measures is –
with the notable exception of the OMT – that they brought about an expansion of the
ECB’s balance sheet. The ECB engaged, in other words, in “quantitative easing.”
Additionally, we obtain a broader measure of monetary policy surprises from the
Euro Area Monetary Policy Event-Study Database (EA-MPD) compiled by Altavilla et
al. (2019). It records high-frequency changes of interest rates in a small window around
monetary policy events. Given the small window size, these changes are likely to
capture the surprise component of the monetary policy announcement relative to what
market participants had expected prior to the event. The EA-MPD is a rich resource
in that it provides data on changes of various interest rates and exchange rates for
monetary policy events in the euro area. For each event, there are three event windows:
W1 Press-Release Window: change in the median quote during the interval from
13:25-13:35 before the press release to the median quote during the interval 14:00-
14:15 after it.
W2 Press-Conference Window: change in the median quote during the interval from
14:15-14:25 before the press conference to the median quote for the interval from
15:40-15:50 after it.
W3 Monetary-Event Window: change in the median quote during the interval from
13:25-13:35 before the press release to the median quote for the interval 15:40-
15:50 after it.
In our baseline analysis, we rely on the full Monetary-Event Window (W3) in order
to capture the joint effect of the press release and the press conference. In Section 1.5,
we consider the monetary policy surprise for each window in isolation. In the EA-
MPD, interest rate surprises are measured by the change in the OIS rate for different
maturities. In our analysis, we use 1-month OIS rates.
In our sample period, around 90% of the observed changes are smaller than 3 basis
points in absolute terms, while 50% lie within -0.55 and 0.3 basis points, see Figure 1.2.
For what follows, we stress that a surprise by 1 basis point is a relatively large surprise.
The largest surprises are close to 20 basis points. We use dashed lines to indicate the
surprises on the announcement dates of non-conventional policies. Roughly speaking,
only half of them bring about a reduction of interest rates, the other half induces the
5Dedola et al. (2018) analyze the effect of quantitative easing measures and hence consider only poli-
cies that affect the ECB’s balance sheet. Our focus is broader, such that we include additional announce-
ments like the first forward guidance communication or the announcement of the Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT).
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Figure 1.2: Monetary policy surprises, 2004 to 2018
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Notes: Changes in the 1-month OIS rate around ECB meetings, as pro-
vided by Altavilla et al. (2019). Days with unconventional announce-
ments are indicated by dashed lines.
OIS rate to rise. In terms of size, some of the surprises associated with the announce-
ments of non-conventional policies are particularly large, but we also note that some
of the announcements brought about almost no change in OIS rates.
As discussed in the introduction, interest rate surprises are not necessarily pure
monetary policy shocks. Monetary policy events may also induce a change in interest
rates to the extent that central bank announcements relate news about the state of the
economy to market participants. In our analysis below, we seek to account for this
possibility in various ways. One strategy that we pursue is to rely on a decomposition
of monetary policy surprises by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). They disentangle pure
monetary policy shocks from unexpected information contained in the ECB’s com-
munication during the policy announcements based on high-frequency data and sign
restrictions. First, they use high-frequency data to measure monetary policy surprises
around monetary policy events, similar to those recorded in the EA-MPD. They also
include 9 speeches of the ECB’s president in their analysis. Based on this data set, the
authors measure the reaction of stock prices (Euro Stoxx 50) and interest rates (3-month
Eonia interest swaps) in a window from 10 minutes before to 20 minutes after the an-
nouncement. Next, they use sign restrictions to distinguish central bank information
shocks from monetary policy shocks. They classify the shocks that move interest rates
and stock prices in opposite directions as monetary policy shocks, in line with the re-
ceived wisdom. Shocks that move both variables in the same direction are classified as
central bank information shocks. The intuition is straightforward: because pure mon-
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etary policy shocks should push interest rates and stock prices in opposite directions,
any positive co-movement due to monetary policy surprises reflects new information
about the economy released during the monetary policy event in question.
We now proceed in three steps. First, we investigate the effects of the specific non-
conventional policy announcements of the ECB on firm expectations. We then consider
how monetary policy surprises more broadly defined affect firm expectations. Last,
we assess the role of monetary policy and central bank information shocks identified
by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) as well as possible differences between the surprises
measured during the press-release window (W1) and the press-conference window
(W2).
1.3 Non-conventional monetary policy announcements
We now assess the response of firm expectations to the announcements of non-conven-
tional monetary policies by the ECB. For this purpose, we compute the change in ex-
pectations in the month of the announcement relative to the previous month. To iso-
late the effect of an announcement, we consider a four-working-day window centered
around the announcement and compare firms that reply within two working days after
an announcement to firms that reply two days prior to the announcement.6
Our empirical strategy largely follows Del Negro et al. (2012). In contrast to their
analysis, however, we focus directly on firms rather than on professional forecasters.
Moreover, we are better able to capture the effect of an announcement because we have
information about the timing of a firm’s response. This allows us to focus our analysis
on the expectations of those firms that respond within a narrow window around the
announcement and, as a result, it is less likely that expectations change due to macroe-
conomic developments other than the monetary policy announcement. We assume
throughout that the timing of a firm’s response is unrelated to the announcement.
We pool the observations of firm responses between January 2009 and June 2018
and estimate the following model:
∆ f (y)i,t = α + ∑
m
βmDi,m + δ1 f (y)i,t−1 + δ2Zi,t−1 + ui,t.
Here, f (y)i,t are expectations of firm i regarding variable y in the next 3 months re-
ported in month t (production or prices), and ∆ f (y)i,t = f (y)i,t− f (y)i,t−1 is the change
of the expectation between the current and the previous month. Zi,t−1 is a vector of
6Since all ECB announcements occur on Thursday and almost no firm responds on the weekend,
we consider all firms which answer between Friday and Monday following the announcement as being
subjected to the announcement “shock”.
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control variables. It includes lagged realizations of expectations and several variables
capturing economic activity at the firm level, such as the state of orders or capacity
utilization.
We use the index m to refer to the announcements of the ECB. Di,m is a dummy
variable that indicates whether expectations of firm i have potentially been affected by
announcement m. We set Di,m = 1 for those firms that respond within two working
days after announcement m. Correspondingly, we set Di,m = 0 for firms which respond
two working days before the announcement. For example, the dummy variable for the
introduction of 12-months LTROs, which was announced on May 7, 2009, is 1 for firms
responding between May 8 and May 11, and 0 for firms responding on May 5 and May
6. We drop all firm observations on the day of the event as well as those outside the
four-working-day window of an announcement in the month of the announcement,
but include firm-month observations for those months without an announcement in
order to enlarge the “control group.” In this case, we set the dummy variable to zero.
Our sample includes 16 announcements of non-conventional policies by the ECB. In
what follows, we focus on 12 of these events, since 4 announcements either occur too
early or too late in the month. In this case there are too few observations in the four-
working-day window around the announcement, see Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.
Table 1.1 reports our estimates. Columns (1) to (3) display results for price expecta-
tions, columns (4) to (6) for production expectations. Consider first the results without
time fixed effects, shown in columns (1), (2), (4), and (5). Here, we find that several
announcements alter firm expectations significantly. When including the full set of
controls (columns (2) and (5)), three announcements significantly affect price and pro-
duction expectations. The announcement of 12-month LTROs in May 2009, one of the
first measures with a large effect on the ECB’s balance sheet (Dedola et al. 2018), lowered
expectations regarding prices. Similarly, the announcement of 12/13-month LTROs in
October 2011 reduced both price and production expectations. The announcement of
the details of the OMT program also lowered production expectations, but there is no
effect on price expectations. The 36-month LTROs announcement in December 2012 is
an exception in that it raised price expectations.
In the specification with time fixed effects, shown in columns (3) and (6), we can
no longer study the effect of four specific events since the announcement happened so
early in each month that there are no observations in the first part of the event window.
The remaining announcements are insignificant for price expectations, see column (3),
but some announcements continue to have a significant negative effect on production
expectations, see column (6).
These results are broadly consistent with earlier findings based on US data (Camp-
bell et al. 2012; Del Negro et al. 2012). However, these studies assess the effect of an-
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Table 1.1: Effect of unconventional monetary policy on firm expectations
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Further Time FE Baseline Further Time FE
controls controls
12-month LTROs -0.156*** -0.101*** -0.005 -0.140*** -0.066 -0.056
(0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051)
6-month LTROs -0.036 -0.034 -0.043 -0.046 -0.015 -0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041)
12/13-month LTROs -0.029 -0.064** -0.041 -0.136*** -0.153*** -0.080*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.040) (0.044)
36-month LTROs 0.070** 0.086** 0.056 -0.003 0.027 0.070
(0.035) (0.035) (0.046) (0.042) (0.040) (0.056)
OMT details -0.054** -0.038 -0.034 -0.192*** -0.135*** -0.123***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044)
Forward Guidance -0.030** -0.019 -0.005 0.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018)
TLTROs -0.070 -0.055 -0.023 -0.042 0.010 0.048
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.067) (0.069) (0.074)
ABSPP+CBPP3 -0.011 -0.006 -0.036* 0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
APP details 0.006 -0.003 0.028 0.030
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027)
PSPP share limit -0.027 -0.019 0.064** 0.101***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.033)
APP end 0.034 0.028 -0.006 -0.013 -0.011 -0.055
(0.028) (0.033) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045) (0.067)
Expectation, t-1 X X X X X X
Further Controls X X X X
Monthly time FE X X
Observations 236635 201212 201212 230028 197239 197239
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.33
Notes: Results from regression of changes in expectations on dummy variables indicating mone-
tary policy announcements. Only firms responding within a four-working-day window around
the respective events are included. Firms from months without events are included as additional
control observations. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Further controls included but
not shown. For details, see Table A.8 in Appendix A2. Robust standard errors displayed in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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nouncements of non-conventional policies in the US based on the predictions of pro-
fessional forecasters, rather than on the expectations of price setters. For the sake of
comparability, we also turn briefly to professional forecasters’ expectations in the euro
area. Specifically, we focus on the revisions of forecasts for the HICP inflation and for
real GDP growth in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) run by the ECB. The
survey is conducted only at quarterly frequency during a number of specific days. The
ECB publishes the time at which the participants receive the questionnaire as well as
the deadline for handing it in. We use this information to create a dummy variable
for each event. Specifically, only responses from the survey round directly following
the announcement are allowed to be affected by the announcement.7 Otherwise, our
econometric specification follows Del Negro et al. (2012): to ensure that we do not cap-
ture other macroeconomic news revealed between two surveys, we control for a large
set of macroeconomic surprises.8 Overall, we find that professional forecasters in the
euro area, just like firms in the German manufacturing sector, often reduced their fore-
casts in response to the announcements of non-conventional policies by the ECB. We
report results in the appendix, see Table A.4.
In sum, there is little evidence that announcements of non-conventional monetary
policies by the ECB raised firm expectations of production and prices, and similarly for
professional forecasters. Remarkably, however, there are some instances where the an-
nouncements reduced expectations. To account for this observation, we note that some
of the announcements of the ECB may have revealed bad news about non-monetary
fundamentals. As discussed above, Campbell et al. (2012) obtain similar results for the
US and rationalize these results based on the notion of “Delphic” forward guidance.
Delphic forward guidance, as opposed to “Odyssean” forward guidance, does not in-
volve a commitment about future policies but rather reveals information about the
likely path of future policies given the policy maker’s estimate of current and future
non-monetary fundamentals.9 Hence, the central idea that underlies Delphic forward
guidance is the information effect of monetary policy surprises discussed in the intro-
duction.
In concluding this section, we stress that the findings above have to be taken with
a grain of salt due to two caveats. First, the announcements of the ECB may have
7For example, for the first 12-month LTROs announcement on May 07, 2009 the associated survey
round is 2009Q3 which was conducted between July 15, 2009 and July 17, 2009. We provide a full list of
the SPF rounds associated with each announcement in Appendix A1, see Table A.3.
8Macroeconomic surprises are measured as the difference between a macroeconomic release and the
respective Reuters poll forecast before the release. Here our data source is Thomson Reuters Datastream.
9Just like us, Campbell et al. (2012) consider non-conventional policy announcements that have a
flavor of forward guidance. The non-conventional policy measures which have been announced by the
ECB do not qualify as forward guidance in a narrow sense (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003). Still, to the
extent that quantitative easing operates through a signaling channel, it contains an element of forward
guidance (Bauer and Rudebusch 2014).
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been to some extent anticipated. As a result, the actual announcements of specific non-
conventional measures may have fallen short of the expectations about their scope and
strength entertained by market participants prior to the announcements. Indeed, in
line with this conjecture, we observe positive interest rate surprises around some of
the announcements, see Figure 1.2. In order to address this concern, we directly study
the effect of interest rate surprises on firm expectations in our analysis below.
As a second caveat, note that we seek to capture the effect of a single monetary
announcement on firm expectations within a four-working-day window. Our data set
is unique in that it allows us to capture the effect of macroeconomic policy announce-
ments on firm expectations in such a narrow window. It is nevertheless possible that
expectations are also subject to other shocks within this window. As such, our es-
timates are potentially contaminated by noise. We run some placebo regressions to
assess this hypothesis and find indeed some significant announcement effects for days
where no announcements occurred.10 In the next section, we will address this short-
coming, as we estimate the effect not of individual policy announcements but of a
generic interest rate surprise of which there are many in our sample. This will allow
us to estimate the effect of monetary policy announcements more precisely.
1.4 Monetary policy surprises
We now take a broader perspective on how monetary policy announcements affect
firm expectations. We no longer focus on the effect of specific non-conventional pol-
icy measures, but assess how firm expectations respond to monetary policy surprises
in general. For this purpose, we rely on the Euro Area Monetary Policy Event-Study
Database (EA-MPD) provided by Altavilla et al. (2019). As explained in Subsection 1.2.2,
it provides measures of monetary policy surprises that are constructed using high-
frequency data. In our baseline specification, we measure monetary policy surprises
as the change of the 1-month OIS rate in the window that spans both the press release
and the press conference.
1.4.1 Linear effects
Our sample runs from July 2004 to June 2018. Within this period, there are 155 mon-
etary events, that is, 155 meetings of the governing council of the ECB, followed by a
press release and press conference. For 136 events, sufficiently many firms submit their
survey response in the four-working-day window around the event. Other events are
taking place during the first days or the last days of the month. In this case, we lack a
10Results are available on request.
CHAPTER 1. MONETARY POLICY AND FIRM EXPECTATIONS 17
sufficient number of firm responses within the four-working-day window around the
event.11 Furthermore, in some months no response dates are available for any firm,
as discussed in Subsection 1.2.1. As before, in order to measure their effect on firm
expectations, we contrast the responses of firms, which responded in the two working
days after the event to those which answered in the two working days preceding it.
We again use ∆ f (y)i,t to denote the change in expectations regarding either prices or
production reported by firm i at time t. Time is measured in months and there may be
several monetary events within a month.12 We use εm to denote the monetary surprise,
measured by the change of the 1-month OIS rate at the event date in basis points. Di,m
is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if firm i responded in the two working days after
the monetary event m and 0 if it responded during the two working days prior to the
event. We do not consider firms outside the windows. We pool observations across
monetary events and estimate the following model:
∆ f (y)i,t = α + βDi,mεm + δ1 f (y)i,t−1 + δ2Zi,t−1 + ui,t. (1.1)
Vector Zi,t−1 includes additional control variables, such as the lagged dependent vari-
able and the average state of business across all firms in the previous month to capture
the state of the business cycle. Furthermore, we include additional variables to control
for the firm’s current situation. These are changes in prices or production and demand
in the previous two months, the state of domestic and foreign orders in the previous
month, as well as the capacity utilization in the previous month. All variables are
coded on an ordinal scale with three outcomes, with the exception of capacity utiliza-
tion, which is reported in percent. Table A.1 in Appendix A1 provides a detailed list of
all questions.
Table 1.2 reports the results for price expectations in columns (1) and (2) and for
production expectations in columns (3) and (4). The columns refer to alternative speci-
fications in terms of control variables. The effect of monetary surprises on expectations
is positive, but weak in the sense that the effect is only marginally significant. Never-
theless, taken at face value, this result implies that a surprise increase of interest rates
raises price and production expectations, while a surprise reduction lowers expecta-
tions. This result conflicts with the received wisdom about the monetary transmission
mechanism, but is in line with what we have established in the previous section re-
garding the effect of announcements of expansionary, non-conventional policies.
11See again panel (b) of Figure 1.1 for the average distribution of responses over the month.
12In our sample this happens only twice. In this case, we consider two windows per month.
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Table 1.2: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate
Dependent var.: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Further Baseline Further
controls controls
OIS, 1-month 0.0007 0.001* 0.002* 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.454*** -0.578***
(0.004) (0.006)
Expected production, t-1 -0.495*** -0.622***
(0.004) (0.005)
Average state of business, t-1 0.134*** 0.077*** 0.133*** 0.092***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Further controls X X
Observations 65003 58779 62968 57379
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.33
Observations before 31978 28761 30960 28058
Observations after 33025 30018 32008 29321
Notes: Results for regression of changes in expectations on monetary policy surprises
in four-working-day windows around the respective events. Firm expectations are
obtained from IBS. Monetary policy surprises are measured using high-frequency
interest rate changes, taken from Altavilla et al. (2019). Further controls included but
not shown. For details, see Table A.9 in Appendix A2. Robust standard errors displayed
in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
1.4.2 Non-linear effects
The announcements of non-conventional policies had a relatively large effect on the
1-month OIS rate. On average, the changes of the OIS rate were twice as large as for
conventional monetary policy events.13 More generally, the size of the surprise varies
considerably across monetary events. Against this background, it appears possible that
the linear estimate of the response of expectations to monetary surprises masks some
non-trivial heterogeneity. Specifically, large monetary policy surprises may induce a
larger information effect that offsets the conventional effects of monetary surprises.
Smaller monetary surprises may instead induce more conventional effects.
To assess this hypothesis formally, we rely on a modified version of equation (1.1).
Specifically, we now sort monetary surprises prior to estimation according to their size.
Next, we discretize the space of monetary surprises based on the distribution of interest
rate changes over our sample.
13To see this please refer to Figure 1.2.
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In particular, we estimate the following model with 7 bins, b = 1, ..., 7:
∆ f (y)i,t = α +
7
∑
b=1
βbDi,mεm,b + δ1 f (y)i,t−1 + δ2Zi,t−1 + ui,t. (1.2)
Here, εm,b assumes the value of the monetary surprise εm in case it falls into bin b.
Otherwise, it is zero.
Figure 1.3 shows the results. In the top row, we display the effect of monetary pol-
icy surprises on expectations conditional on the size of the surprise. In Panel (a), we
consider the effect on price expectations, in Panel (b) the effect on production expec-
tations. In each panel, the horizontal axis indicates the bins (in basis points of interest
rate changes) for which the estimates of βb are displayed along the vertical axis. Each
bin contains at least 5 different events, and several thousand firm observations. Re-
call that at high frequency, monetary policy surprises appear as somewhat moderate
changes in the interest rate, with few changes exceeding ± 2 basis points (around 15%,
see Subsection 1.2.2). In both panels, the horizontal line indicates the estimate that we
obtain if we do not condition on the size of monetary surprises, reported in columns
(2) and (4) of Table 1.2, with shaded area indicating 90% confidence bounds.
Our main result is that the effect of monetary policy surprises on firm expectations
is now in line with the received wisdom, if the surprise is moderate. The estimated
coefficients display a U-shaped pattern. A small surprise increase of the short-term
interest rate lowers price expectations significantly. This may be because fewer firms
expect price increases or because more firms expect price declines, or both. Below,
we disentangle the effect using a binarized outcome variable. Note also that a small
surprise reduction of short-term interest rates increases price expectations, according
to our estimates. Importantly, however, we find that for large surprises, both negative
and positive, the effect on expectations is no longer significantly negative and, at times,
even positive. A very similar pattern emerges for production expectations, shown in
Panel (b) of Figure 1.3. They respond significantly only to small monetary surprises.
In sum, we find that monetary policy affects firm expectations as conventional wis-
dom suggests. Interest rate increases (reductions) lower (raise) price and production
expectations – but only for as long as the surprise is moderate. Larger surprises fail to
affect firm expectations. This pattern is consistent with the notion that larger monetary
policy surprises tend to trigger larger information effects. Consider a large surprise
reduction of the monetary policy rate. While such a surprise should raise price and
production expectations in the absence of information frictions, it may fail to do so if
it induces firms to revise their assessment of the economy downward, because they
realize that the central bank holds a more pessimistic view about the prospects of the
economy than they did prior to the monetary announcement. Likewise, a large sur-
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Figure 1.3: Effect of monetary policy surprises on firm expectations
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Notes: Effects estimated in four-working-day windows around monetary events. Effects are allowed to
vary for different sizes of the surprise. Upper panels display estimates of 7 separate bins of surprise
sizes. Horizontal line represents estimate based on linear specification. Bottom panels display kernel
estimates, excluding largest/smallest OIS changes. Degree: 3. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS.
Monetary policy surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al.
(2019).
prise increase of interest rates may convey a benign assessment of the economy by the
central bank. As a result, it may not lower production and price expectations as a full
information rational expectations model would predict.
Earlier work highlights the importance of information effects in accounting for
monetary policy transmission (Jarociński and Karadi 2020; Melosi 2017; Nakamura
and Steinsson 2018). Our results suggest a new margin along which the information
effect may operate: the attention that firms pay to the potential information content of
monetary policy announcements might be endogenous to the size of the policy change.
Firms may pay little attention to the information content of a monetary announcement
if the surprise is moderate. In a sense, firms operate in a business-as-usual regime –
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they simply incorporate the direct effect of the interest rate change in their forecasts.
As the surprise becomes bigger, however, firms might gradually pay more attention
and reassess their views about non-monetary fundamentals in light of the monetary
policy announcement.14 In fact, our estimates suggest that the information effect can
completely offset the conventional interest rate effect if the surprise is sufficiently large.
To investigate further the non-linear relationship between interest rate surprises
and firm expectations, we also rely on a non-parametric approach. Specifically, in
a first step, to control for factors other than monetary policy surprises, we estimate
equation (1.1), except that we no longer include the interest rate surprise. We compute
the residuals from this regression and estimate a kernel, which relates these residuals
to the monetary policy surprises in a fully non-linear way. In doing so we employ an
Epanechnikov kernel.
Figure 1.3 shows the results for price and production expectations in the bottom
panels. Note that the kernel estimates in Panels (c) and (d) provide a direct measure
of the effect of monetary policy surprises on expectations, rather than the coefficient es-
timates shown in Panels (a) and (b). That is, Panels (c) and (d) account for the fact
that the monetary impulse increases as we move from the middle of the spectrum to
the outer region in terms of the size of the monetary surprise. In the middle of the
spectrum, the effect of monetary policy surprises is in line with conventional wisdom:
positive interest rate surprises lower expectations and, conversely, rate reductions raise
expectations. However, once we consider large surprises, the effect becomes weaker
and even starts to reverse its sign for very large surprises. Again, this pattern is con-
sistent with the notion that large monetary policy innovations trigger an information
effect, which counteracts the direct interest effect.
In order to obtain a comprehensive measure of the non-linear relationship that char-
acterizes the data, we estimate yet another model. For this purpose, we include a cubic
term in equation (1.1). In this way, we can test for the significance of the non-linearity
while economizing on the degrees of freedom. Specifically, we estimate the following
model:
∆ f (y)i,t = α + βDi,mεm + γDi,mε3m + δ1 f (y)i,t−1 + δ2Zi,t−1 + ui,t. (1.3)
Table 1.3 reports the estimates for this model, for price expectations in columns (1)
to (3) and for output expectations in columns (4) to (6). For the specifications with the
full set of control variables (columns (2) and (4)), we obtain a significant effect of the
14This notion is closely related to rational inattention as formalized by Sims (1998) and Maćkowiak
and Wiederholt (2009, 2015). It is, however, distinct from these models as the attention is split between
the “routine” monetary-policy part and the information content of interest rate changes. The former
is more or less constantly monitored, the latter only during unusual episodes, see Nimark (2014) for a
related setup.
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Table 1.3: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, with cubic changes
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Further Ex. lar- Baseline Further Ex. lar-
controls gest OIS controls gest OIS
OIS, 1-month -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0035** -0.0018 -0.0038** -0.0039*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0017) (0.002) (0.0015) (0.002)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.074 0.114* 1.024*** 0.210*** 0.242*** 1.005***
(coeff. & s.e.×10−4) (0.065) (0.067) (0.273) (0.078) (0.077) (0.371)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.454*** -0.577*** -0.576***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Expected prod., t-1 -0.495*** -0.622*** -0.622***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Average state of 0.135*** 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.134*** 0.094*** 0.095***
business, t-1 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Further controls X X X X
Observations 65003 58779 56491 62968 57379 55155
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.33 0.33
Observ. before 31978 28761 27395 30960 28058 26731
Observ. after 33025 30018 29096 32008 29321 28424
Excl. largest OIS X X
changes
Notes: Results for regression of changes in expectations on monetary policy surprises and sur-
prises cubed in four-working-day windows around the respective events. Firm expectations are
obtained from IBS. Monetary policy surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate
changes from Altavilla et al. (2019). In columns (3) and (6) the largest four surprises are excluded
(absolute value larger 10 basis points). Further controls included but not shown. For details, see
Table A.10 in Appendix A2. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
cubic term. For production we now also obtain a significant estimate of the coefficient
β, which captures the linear effect.15 The opposite sign of the linear and the cubic term
imply that, as before, small positive interest rate surprises reduce expectations. For
larger surprises, instead, the cubic term dominates and counteracts the conventional
effect.
We also make sure that outliers do not drive our results: in columns (3) and (6), we
report results for a sample excluding the four largest surprises (which exceed 10 basis
points in absolute value). We find that the coefficients on the cubic terms are larger and
in the case of prices also more significant.
Figure 1.4 visualizes the results reported in Table 1.3. We plot a straight line that
15If firms are weighted with the number of employees, all coefficients are highly significant.
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Figure 1.4: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, with cubic changes
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Notes: Graphical representation of results from the regression of changes in expectations on monetary
policy surprises and surprises cubed in four-working-day windows around the respective events (Ta-
ble 1.3, columns (2) and (5)). Straight line represents estimate of linear term. Shaded area indicates 90%
confidence interval around the cubic component. Horizontal axis measures interest rate changes (bp),
vertical axis measures change in expectations. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy
surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019).
represents the linear effect, based on our estimate of β, see equation (1.3). In addition,
we plot the total effect of monetary surprises, that is, the sum of the linear and the
cubic terms, based on the estimate of β and γ, respectively. The shaded area indicates
the 90% confidence intervals regarding our estimate γ. In this way, we can easily assess
for which size a monetary surprise induces an effect that is significantly different from
a linear response. We find this to be the case for monetary surprises larger than 4
basis points in absolute value for production expectations. For price expectations, the
difference is only marginally significant.
In order to interpret the quantitative effect of monetary surprises on firm expecta-
tions, it is important to note that our dependent variable is measured on an ordinal
scale with more than two possible answers. Hence, expectations may decline because
fewer firms expect an increase or because more firms expect price declines, or both.
To disentangle these effects, we proceed as follows. We create two new binary vari-
ables, which separately measure whether there was an upward or downward revision
of expectations. In each case, the variable takes a value of 1 if there was a revision of
expectations and 0 otherwise. We then estimate equation (1.3) again for both binary
variables separately. The new models are linear probability models and the estimated
coefficients correspond to the increase of the probability of an upward/downward re-
vision in expectations following a monetary policy surprise by 1 basis point.
Table 1.4 shows the results for prices in columns (1) and (2), and for production
in columns (3) and (4). It turns out that the change in expectations is driven more by
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Table 1.4: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, binarized dependent variable
Dependent var.: change in the expectations for
Prices Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Upward rev. Downward rev. Upward rev. Downward rev.
OIS, 1-month 0.0001 0.0008 -0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.022 -0.101** 0.066 -0.158***
(coeff. & s.e.×10−4) (0.037) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054)
Controls X X X X
Observations 58779 58779 57379 57379
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.21
Observations before 28761 28761 28058 28058
Observations after 30018 30018 29321 29321
Notes: Results based on regression of changes in expectations on monetary policy surprises and
surprises cubed in four-working-day windows around the respective events. Changes in
expectations are binarized, i.e., two new variables separately indicate upward and downward
revisions. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy surprises are measured
using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019). Control variables included
but not shown. For details, see Table A.11 in Appendix A2. Robust standard errors displayed in
parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
changes in downward revisions than upward revisions. Accounting for both the linear
and cubic term, a monetary policy surprise of +1 basis point (bp) raises the probability
by 0.08 percentage points (pp) that a given firm lowers its price expectations. For a
surprise of +5bp the corresponding number is 0.27pp, while for a surprise of +10bp, it
is -0.22pp. For production expectations the effects are larger: a surprise of +1bp yields
a 0.22pp increase in the probability of a downward revision, a surprise of +5bp a 0.93pp
increase, and a surprise of +10bp an increase of merely 0.66pp.
So far, we have been concerned with the response of firm expectations to mone-
tary policy announcements. This response is of particular interest to the extent that
firm expectations matter for firm actions. We take up the issue in related work as we
investigate systematically the effect of firm expectations on firm actions as well as on
aggregate outcomes (Enders et al. 2019a). The analysis uses the same data set as this
chapter. We establish evidence that expectations do indeed matter strongly, both for
firm actions and for aggregate outcomes.16 However, in Enders et al. (2019a) we do
not condition on monetary policy surprises. Therefore, we briefly take up the issue in
the context of the present study. Specifically, we use the survey questions regarding
16In a related study, Balleer and Zorn (2019) investigate the effect of monetary policy on price-setting
behavior of firms in the ifo panel. They also use the shocks identified by Jarociński and Karadi (2020).
The authors furthermore analyze whether firm heterogeneity, for example regarding credit constraints,
matters for the price-setting response.
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realized changes in prices and production.17 We replace the dependent variable in our
baseline regression from equation (1.3) with the actual change of prices and production
between the period of the monetary event and the following one. We find the same pat-
tern as for expectations: positive (negative) interest rate changes lead to significantly
lower (higher) prices and production, but in a non-linear way. The cubic term turns
out to be positive and significant, see Table A.5 in Appendix A1.18
In a last experiment, we assess whether monetary policy announcements also af-
fect firms’ views on current business conditions. This may be expected if information
effects play a major role. For this purpose, we focus on the current state of business
as a dependent variable (Q9 in Table A.1). We find no significant effect of the interest
rate surprises, neither linear nor non-linear. This suggests that the effect of mone-
tary policy actions is delayed and that the information revealed by monetary policy
announcements pertains to future realizations of non-monetary fundamentals rather
than current ones. We do find, however, that firms’ assessment of the current stock
of inventories (Q12 in Table A.1) changes in response to monetary announcements in
line with the response of expectations, although the effect of the cubic term is only
marginally significant. We also report these results in Appendix A1, see Table A.6.
1.4.3 Robustness checks
Our results are robust to various alternative specifications. Table 1.5 reports estimates
for a number of sensitivity analyses. It displays the results for prices in the upper panel,
and those for production in the bottom panel. In order to streamline the exposition, we
omit the estimated coefficients of the additional control variables in the table.
First check, we increase the window around the monetary policy event from two
working days before and after the event to four working days before and after. Col-
umn (1) of Table 1.5 shows that this does not change our results much. Also, once
we employ the “full window” and consider the responses of all firms that have been
submitted after an event (prior to the next event), we still find a highly significant ef-
fect of the cubic term and all linear terms are highly significant as well. Column (2) of
Table 1.5 shows the results.
Columns (3) to (5) report the estimates once we control for distinct features of the
macroeconomic environment. First, we exclude the period where monetary policy in
the euro area was close to the zero lower bound on interest rates from our sample. That
is, we estimate our model on observations for the period from 2004 to 2011 only.
17These questions are listed in Table A.1 as Q3 and Q4 in the appendix. They are also qualitative in
nature.
18Note that monetary events affect all firms, independently of whether they answer before or after the
event, because all firms may adjust production and prices afterwards.
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Table 1.5: Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
8-working-day Full window 2004-2011 Crisis dummy Uncertainty Firm fixed effects Std. errors Only firms expecting
window clustered by firm no change in t-1
Panel (a): Dependent variable: change in the expectations for prices
OIS, 1-month -0.0008 -0.0016*** -0.0009 -0.0008 0.000004 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.138** 0.080*** 0.121 0.129 0.175* 0.100 0.114* 0.172***
(coeff. & s.e.×10−4) (0.067) (0.021) (0.085) (0.085) (0.090) (0.069) (0.067) (0.057)
OIS, 1-month -0.0006
× crisis dummy (0.002)
OIS, 1-month -0.002
× uncertainty dummy (0.002)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 72013 188211 24329 58779 58779 58779 58779 45258
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.10
Observations before 41939 13905 28761 28761 28761 28761 22209
Observations after 30074 10424 30018 30018 30018 30018 23049
Panel (b): Dependent variable: change in the expectations for production
OIS, 1-month -0.004** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.224*** 0.342*** 0.448*** 0.506*** 0.453*** 0.237*** 0.242*** 0.149*
(coeff. & s.e.×10−4) (0.075) (0.025) (0.094) (0.104) (0.102) (0.077) (0.077) (0.082)
OIS, 1-month -0.011***
× crisis dummy (0.003)
OIS, 1-month -0.008***
× uncertainty dummy (0.003)
Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 70239 184184 23827 57379 57379 57379 57379 37627
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.12
Observations before 40864 13625 28058 28058 28058 28058 18247
Observations after 29375 10202 29321 29321 29321 29321 19380
Notes: Table shows several robustness checks for the non-linear effects of monetary policy surprises on firm expectations. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Monetary
policy surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019). In columns (1) and (2) window size varies. In columns (3) to (8) we use
the four-working-day window. “Crisis dummy” is 1 from 01/2008 to 04/2009 and 0 otherwise, based on data from the German Council of Economic Experts. “Uncertainty
dummy” is 1 if VSTOXXt−1 is larger than its sample mean plus one standard deviation, and 0 otherwise. The volatility series is the V2TX series from www.stoxx.com. Full set
of control variables included but not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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We find that the effects for production are larger and more significant in this case,
while the effects for prices are roughly unchanged but turn insignificant. In column (4)
we show results based on a specification which features a dummy variable to account
for the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. Again, we find that results for prices are weaker
than in the baseline, while effects for production are strong, in terms of both size and
significance. Finally, we also control for economic uncertainty as measured by a stock
market volatility index (VSTOXX). Specifically, we capture periods of high uncertainty
by a dummy variable, which equals one whenever the volatility index exceeds the
sample mean plus one standard deviation. We interact the linear change in the OIS
with this dummy variable. We find that our results regarding the cubic term are robust
to accounting for economic uncertainty and conclude that the non-linear effect of our
baseline specification is not merely capturing increased uncertainty or other features
of the macroeconomic environment.
In the last three columns of Table 1.5, we provide results for additional robustness
checks. First, we include firm fixed effects and report results in column (6). We find our
estimates largely unchanged relative to the baseline, but the cubic term for prices be-
comes insignificant. Still, results for production remain highly significant. Column (7)
shows results for a specification where we cluster standard errors at the firm level in
order to account for potential correlation within firms over time. It turns out that this is
not consequential for the precision of our estimates. Finally, we want to make sure that
the qualitative nature of our dependent variables does not drive the results. One issue
in this regard is that the responses of firms which expect an increase (or decrease) in
the previous period are constrained in that they cannot report an even more optimistic
(or pessimistic) outlook. Therefore, we estimate a specification in which we only in-
clude firms that expected no change in the previous month. The results in column (8)
are fairly close to the baseline.
We further explore the relevance of working with qualitative variables as we turn
to an additional variable. The ifo survey also features a question on the expected state
of business of the responding firm. This question is answered twice using different
measures. Once, firms simply choose from the qualitative answers as for the other
questions (improve/stay the same/worsen). The second time, firms choose a scalar
value between 0 and 100 by moving a slider, but without seeing the full scale. Instead,
they only see marks at 0, 50, and 100, as well as that these values indicate “worsen”,
“stay the same”, and “improve”, respectively. We estimate a version of our model
with this variable and find that results for expectations regarding the expected state of
business expectations are very similar to production expectations. We provide details
in Table A.6 in Appendix A1. We conclude that the qualitative nature of the data does
not drive our results for the baseline case.
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1.5 Central bank information and communication
The analysis in the previous section shows that firm expectations respond to mon-
etary policy surprises. Moreover, the response depends on the size of the surprise.
Building on earlier work that has established the information effect of monetary pol-
icy surprises, we put forward the following hypothesis to account for our finding: the
extent of attention that firms pay to the potential information content of monetary pol-
icy announcements increases in the size of the policy change. As a result, the direct
effect of a monetary surprise may be partially offset by the information effect, or even
completely, if the surprise is very large. In what follows, we shed further light on the
relationship between monetary policy surprises and firm expectations. In particular,
we assess whether available measures of central bank information and communication
can account for the observed effects. In a first step, we rely on the series of central bank
information shocks by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). In a second step, we use the infor-
mation in the Euro Area Monetary Policy Event-Study Database (EA-MPD) about the
timing of information releases by the central bank to disentangle effects of monetary
policy decisions as such and central bank communication.
1.5.1 Central bank information shocks
Under our maintained hypothesis, central bank information is crucial to account for
our findings. We thus investigate whether a more direct measure of central bank in-
formation has a bearing on the expectation formation of the firms in our sample. Jaro-
ciński and Karadi (2020) propose such a measure by decomposing monetary policy sur-
prises into monetary policy shocks and central bank information shocks, as explained
in Subsection 1.2.2 above. We use these measures rather than overall monetary policy
surprises and estimate the following variant of equation (1.1):
∆ f (y)i,t = α + βDi,mεMPm + γDi,mε
CBI
m + δ1 f (y)i,t−1 + δ2Zi,t−1 + ui,t. (1.4)
Here, εMPm and εCBIm denote monetary policy and central bank information shocks, as
identified by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). These shocks are generated regressors. Still,
as pointed out by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015a), the standard errors on the gen-
erated regressors are asymptotically valid under the null hypothesis that the coefficient
is zero (Pagan 1984). The dummy variable Di,m is specified as in the previous section:
it captures whether a firm has filed response to the survey two working days before or
after the monetary event.
Our sample runs from June 2004 to November 2016. For this period, Jarociński and
Karadi (2020) identify 182 shocks. We keep these shocks in our sample to the extent
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Table 1.6: Effect of 1-month OIS changes and Jarociński-Karadi shocks
Dep. var.: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CBI CBI+MP CBI CBI+MP
OIS, 1-month -0.002 -0.003* -0.005*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.002)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.137** 0.157** 0.261*** 0.226***
(coeff. & s.e.×10−4) (0.069) (0.071) (0.079) (0.082)
Central bank information shock (CBI) 0.004* 0.006** 0.003 0.0005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Monetary policy shock (MP) 0.004 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.004)
Controls X X X X
Observations 56109 56109 54754 54754
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33
Observations before 26706 26706 26046 26046
Observations after 29403 29403 28708 28708
Notes: Results based on regression of changes in expectations on monetary policy surprises
and monetary policy shocks (standardized) provided by Jarociński and Karadi (2020).
Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy surprises are measured using
high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019). Control variables included
but not shown. For details, see Table A.12 in Appendix A2. Robust standard errors
displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
that we are able to define a four-working-day window around each shock.19 As we
estimate equation (1.4), we use, as before, the change in expectations regarding future
prices and production as the dependent variable. We find that monetary policy shocks
do not affect price and production expectations significantly. Central bank information
shocks, instead, raise price and production expectations. Table A.7 in Appendix A1
shows the results.
Against this background, we explore whether central bank information shocks can
explain the non-linear effect of monetary policy surprises on expectations, documented
in Section 1.4 above. To this end, we include the identified shocks of Jarociński and
Karadi (2020) as additional regressors in equation (1.3). Table 1.6 reports the results.
We find that, while the central bank information shock has a significant and positive
effect on price expectations, the cubic term capturing the monetary surprise as such
19There are more events in total despite the shorter sample period compared to the EA-MPD because
Jarociński and Karadi (2020) also include speeches in addition to governing council meetings. For 159
of these events, we have sufficiently many firms responding in the four-working-days window around
the event. For 127 events we have both OIS surprises from the EA-MPD as well as the shocks provided
by Jarociński and Karadi (2020).
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remains nevertheless highly significant. To illustrate this result further, we again plot
the non-linear effects. The effects are very similar to the baseline case, as can be seen
in Figure A.1 in Appendix A1.
We conclude that, while central bank information shocks play an important role
for firm expectations, they cannot explain why the effect of monetary policy surprises
on firm expectations depends on the size of the surprise. This might be a result of
the identifying assumption maintained by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). Recall that
their decomposition assumes that monetary policy shocks and central bank informa-
tion shocks are orthogonal. Our results, instead, suggest that the amount of attention
that firms pay to new information depends on the size of the monetary surprise. Under
this hypothesis, we would expect a systematic link between monetary policy shocks
and central bank information shocks. Jarociński and Karadi (2020) ruled out such a
link.20
1.5.2 Central bank communication shocks
The EA-MPD provides distinct measures for interest rate surprises for each monetary
policy event: one for a window around the press release and one for a window around
the press conference of the ECB. The press release contains little more than the mon-
etary policy decision as such. The market reaction in response to the press release
thus provides a natural measure of the monetary policy surprise. Instead, the surprise
captured by the interest rate change within the press conference window should more
directly reflect the effect of central bank communication, net of the effect of the pure
interest rate change (since this has been released earlier).
In principle, a systematically different communication in the press conferences after
large surprises in central bank rates could explain the non-linear effects of monetary
policy surprises on firm expectations. To give an example, if the ECB regularly justi-
fied large reductions in interest rates with a gloomy view on the economy, this would
counteract the stimulating effects of the rate cuts. To explore this hypothesis system-
atically, we run the regression from equation (1.3) again but for different monetary
policy windows. The first regression includes the change (linear and cubic term) in the
1-month OIS rate that occurs during the time window around the press release, while
the second regression features the change in the same variable in the window around
the press conference.
Table 1.7 shows the results for price and production expectations. Columns (1) and
(3) report results for the press release, columns (2) and (4) for the press conference.
20In fact, we find that while monetary policy and central bank information shocks are uncorrelated by
construction, they turn out to be correlated in a non-linear way: the correlation between the monetary
policy shock cubed and the central bank information shock cubed is 0.68 and significant at the 1% level.
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Table 1.7: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, press release and
press conference window separately
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Release Conference Release Conference
OIS, 1-month -0.002 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.0003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.169** 2.980*** 0.363*** 1.110
(coeff. & s.e.×10−4) (0.077) (0.881) (0.088) (1.139)
Controls X X X X
Observations 58779 58779 57379 57379
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33
Observations before 28761 28761 28058 28058
Observations after 30018 30018 29321 29321
Notes: Results for regression of changes in expectations on monetary policy sur-
prises and surprises cubed in four-working-day windows around the respective
events, separately for surprises from windows around ECB press releases and
ECB press conferences. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy
surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla
et al. (2019). Control variables included but not shown. For details, see Table A.13 in
Appendix A2. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
The cubic term remains significantly positive in all specifications, except for produc-
tion expectations in the case of the conference window. We also provide a graphical
illustration in Appendix A1, see Figure A.2. The responses to the press release ex-
hibit a very similar pattern as in our baseline findings, shown in Figure 1.4 above. In
contrast, the information released during the press conference seems to trigger quite
distinct reactions.21 These results suggest that the information effect of monetary pol-
icy surprises is not confined to the press conference. Instead, it appears that monetary
surprises as such may induce an information effect to the extent that they are large.
1.6 Conclusion
We have asked whether monetary policy announcements affect firm expectations and,
if so, how. This issue is of particular importance because for policy announcements to
be effective, theory requires them to affect expectations of price setters, that is, firms.
21Conrad and Lamla (2010) show that for a given monetary policy tightening or easing, financial-
market reactions, as measured by the exchange-rate response, depend on the specific topic of commu-
nication during the ECB press conference. This might explain why we do not find a clear pattern for the
conference window.
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Yet, most evidence regarding the effect of monetary policy on expectations is confined
to professional forecasters. In this analysis, we focus directly on firm expectations
using a uniquely suited data set. It contains survey responses of several thousand firms
in the German manufacturing sector. Our sample runs from 2004 to 2018. Observations
are monthly, but we also know the calendar date at which firms file their responses.
Our empirical strategy relies on this specific feature of the data set.
In a first step, we conduct an event study: we estimate the effects of the announce-
ments of non-conventional policies by the ECB since the crisis. We compare the re-
sponses of firms in a four-working-day window around the announcement and find
no significant effects on firms’ price and production expectations, except for a few
instances where expectations are revised downwards. Taken at face value, this result
is surprising. However, similar findings for professional forecasters in the US have
been rationalized on the ground that monetary policy announcements by the Fed-
eral Reserve may have revealed bad news about the economy. In the context of non-
conventional policy announcements, this phenomenon has given rise to the notion of
“Delphic” forward guidance, as opposed to “Odyssean” forward guidance. Delphic
forward guidance, in turn, relates to the broader concept of information effects, which
may at times offset the conventional effect of monetary policy measures.
In a second step, we explore this issue further as we rely on a broader measure of
monetary policy surprises, compiled using of high-frequency data and available in the
Euro Area Monetary Policy Event-Study Database. We estimate the responses of firms’
expectations to monetary policy surprises and find that they affect firm expectations
significantly. A second important finding is that the effect of policy surprises depends
on their size. Moderate surprises affect firm expectations in line with standard theory:
interest rate increases lower price and production expectations, while interest rate re-
ductions raise them. Large changes, however, have no significant effect. This finding is
consistent with information effects, provided that such effects operate along a specific
margin, namely the size of the monetary policy surprise.
In the last part of our analysis, we shed more light on this possibility and investi-
gate the effect of central bank information and communication on firm expectations.
First, we consider the time series of central bank information shocks computed by Jaro-
ciński and Karadi (2020). We find that firms revise their price expectations upward in
response to positive shocks, even if they appear in the context of surprise tightenings
of the policy rate. However, once we include central bank information shocks in our
baseline model as an additional control variable, the non-linear relationship between
the size of a monetary policy surprise and its effect on firm expectations remains intact.
Second, we distinguish between monetary surprises due to the ECB’s press releases
and the ECB’s press conferences. We find that our main result continues to hold once
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we consider only monetary policy surprises around the press release window.
Our results are likely to have a bearing on actual policy design. First, they suggest
that it may be beneficial to separate interest rate decisions from central bank communi-
cation about the state of the economy as much as possible. Wiederholt (2015) provides
a recent analysis of the effectiveness of central bank communication in an environment
with dispersed information and conventional monetary policy constrained by the zero
lower bound. Second, our results also underscore the specific challenges for the con-
duct of monetary policy in the presence of information frictions. Jia (2019) performs a
model-based analysis and finds that stabilizing the economy becomes more difficult for
monetary policy if private agents extract information about non-monetary fundamen-
tals from policy decisions. Our results point in the same direction. Central banks may
face a specific dilemma in the presence of information frictions: there might simply
be no way to justify drastic policy measures without generating attention for the non-
monetary fundamentals, which motivate the policy, rendering large policy changes
ineffective. However, we stress that at this point our results are based on a purely em-
pirical analysis and call for a further empirical and model-based analysis before they
can inform actual policy making in a reliable manner.
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Appendices to Chapter 1
A1 Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, with Jarociński-Karadi shocks
(a) Price expectations
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(b) Production expectations
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Interest-rate change in basis points
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
Notes: Graphical representation of results from the regression of changes in expectations on monetary
policy surprises, surprises cubed, and the central bank information shock provided by Jarociński and
Karadi (2020) in four-working-day windows around monetary events (see Table 1.6). Straight line repre-
sents estimate of linear term for changes in the 1-month OIS rate. Shaded area indicates 90% confidence
interval around the cubic component. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy sur-
prises are measured using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019).
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Figure A.2: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, press release vs. press conference
window
(a) Price expectations, Press Release
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(b) Production expectations, Press Release
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(c) Price expectations, Press Conference
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(d) Production expectations, Press Conference
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Notes: Graphical representation of results from the regression of changes in expectations on monetary
policy surprises and surprises cubed in four-working-day windows around the events, separately for
the press release and the press conference window (see Table 1.7). Straight line represents estimate of
linear term. Shaded area indicates 90% confidence interval around the cubic component. Firm expecta-
tions are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate
changes from Altavilla et al. (2019).
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Table A.1: All questions from the IBS used in the estimations
Label Name Question Possible answers
Q1 expected prices Expectations for the next 3 months: Tak-
ing changes of terms and conditions into
account, our domestic sales prices (net) for
product XY will probably . . .
increase [1]
not change [0]
decrease [-1]
Q2 expected pro-
duction
Expectations for the next 3 months: Our do-
mestic production activity regarding good
XY will probably . . .
increase [1]
not change [0]
decrease [-1]
Q3 prices Tendencies in the previous month: Taking
changes of terms and conditions into ac-
count, our domestic sales prices (net) for
product XY have . . .
increased [1]
not changed [0]
decreased [-1]
Q4 production Tendencies in the previous month: Our do-
mestic production activities with respect to
product XY have . . .
increased [1]
not changed [0]
decreased [-1]
Q5 demand Tendencies in the previous month: The de-
mand situation with respect to product XY
is . . .
better [1]
not changed [0]
worse [-1]
Q6 orders We consider our order backlog to be . . . relatively high [1]
sufficient [0]
too small [-1]
Q7 foreign orders We consider our order backlog for exports
to be . . .
relatively high [1]
sufficient [0]
too small [-1]
Q8 capacity utiliza-
tion
The current utilization of our capacities for
producing XY (standard utilization = 100%)
is currently x%.
x is a value between 30
and 100 divisible by 10 OR
if value > 100, firms can
write this value down
Q9 state of business
(ordinal)
Current situation: We evaluate our state of
business for XY to be. . .
good [1]
satisfactory [0]
bad [-1]
Q10 expected state
of business
(ordinal)
Expectations for the next 6 months: Our
state of business for XY will . . .
improve [1]
stay the same [0]
worsen [-1]
Q11 expected state
of business
(scale)
Expectations for the next 6 months: Our
state of business for XY will x . . .
x is a scalar between 0
and 100 chosen by mov-
ing a slider; the follow-
ing values are labeled: 0–
worsen, 50–stay the same,
100–improve
Q12 inventories Current situation: we assess our stock of
unsold amounts of good XY to be . . .
too low [1]
sufficient (for the season) [0]
too large [-1]
Notes: Authors’ translation of the most recent formulation of the question in German according to the
EBDC Questionnaire manual. We only show those answer possibilities that we consider. Specifically,
we exclude “no production” or similar answers which indicate that the question does not apply to the
firm.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
Full sample Sample with part. date
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Employees in production 489 3563.26 428790 548 3771.49 232267
Expected production, t 0.04 0.57 414486 0.06 0.58 224473
Expected prices, t 0.08 0.47 426451 0.08 0.47 231031
Production, t-1 -0.00 0.58 413784 0.01 0.58 224232
Prices, t-1 0.03 0.44 426706 0.04 0.43 231021
Demand, t-1 0.02 0.65 428220 0.03 0.66 231851
Orders, t -0.14 0.65 426175 -0.12 0.66 231498
Foreign orders, t -0.16 0.58 422043 -0.14 0.60 229778
Capacity utilization, t 81.08 16.57 366987 81.63 16.19 208385
State of business (ordinal), t 0.12 0.68 428291 0.15 0.69 231959
Exp. state of business (ordinal), t 0.02 0.60 427022 0.02 0.60 231297
Exp. state of business (scale), t 52.47 16.46 243925 52.64 16.44 213926
Inventories, t -0.11 0.48 294251 -0.09 0.48 159477
Notes: Comparison of mean and variance for all variables we consider between the full sample
and our sub-sample. Data from the IBS.
Table A.3: Important ECB announcements and SPF rounds
Associated SPF survey
Date Announcement Round Start End
05/07/2009 12-month Longer-term Refinancing Operations
(LTROs) + other measures
2009Q3 07/15/2009 07/17/2009
08/04/2011 6-month LTROs + other measures 2011Q4 10/14/2011 10/18/2011
10/06/2011 12 and 13-month LTROs 2011Q4 10/14/2011 10/18/2011
12/08/2011 36-month LTROs 2012Q1 01/17/2012 01/20/2012
08/02/2012 Announcement of the Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OMT) program
2012Q4 10/16/2012 10/22/2012
09/06/2012 OMT implementation details 2012Q4 10/16/2012 10/22/2012
07/04/2013 First forward guidance announcement 2013Q3 07/16/2013 07/19/2013
06/05/2014 Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations
(TLTROs)
2014Q3 07/17/2014 07/24/2014
09/04/2014 Announcement of the Asset-backed Securities
Purchase Program (ABSPP) and the new Cov-
ered Bonds Purchase Program (CBPP3)
2014Q4 10/16/2014 10/23/2014
01/22/2015 Announcement of the expanded Asset Purchase
Program (APP)
2015Q2 03/31/2015 04/07/2015
03/05/2015 APP implementation details 2015Q2 03/31/2015 04/07/2015
09/03/2015 Increase in public sector purchase program
(PSPP) share limit
2015Q4 09/30/2015 10/06/2015
03/10/2016 Announcement of Corporate Sector Purchase
Program (CSPP)
2016Q2 03/31/2016 04/06/2016
12/08/2016 First extension of the APP 2017Q1 01/04/2017 01/10/2017
10/26/2017 Second extension of the APP 2018Q1 01/08/2018 01/11/2018
06/14/2018 Announcement of the end of the APP 2018Q3 07/02/2018 07/06/2018
Notes: Dates are an extended version of the list provided by Dedola et al. (2018). We also show which
round of the survey of professional forecasters (SPF) conducted by the ECB is associated with the
events. This is needed for the robustness check using the SPF expectations, shown in Table A.4.
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Table A.4: Effect of unconventional monetary policy on SPF expectations
Current year Next year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP growth HICP inflation GDP growth HICP inflation
12-month SLTROs -1.4795*** -0.5590*** -0.4456*** -0.2903**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
12/13-month SLTROs 0.0005 0.1564*** -0.6040*** 0.0589
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
36-month SLTROs 0.2275** 0.1927** -0.0812 -0.0195
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
OMT -0.1390*** 0.0950* -0.4834*** 0.1906***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Forward Guidance 0.0868 0.0051 -0.0054 -0.2196***
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
ABSPP+CBPP3 -0.1606*** -0.0061 -0.3764*** -0.2639***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
APP announcement+details 0.5741*** -0.2066** 0.3985*** -0.0956
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)
PSPP share limit -0.0246 0.2727*** -0.2805*** -0.2714***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
CSPP 0.0708 -0.4221*** 0.0271 -0.1864***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
First APP extension -0.0256 0.1893*** -0.0960* 0.0272
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Second APP extension 0.2579*** -0.0494 0.2859*** 0.0624
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
APP end -0.3658*** -0.0622* 0.1254*** 0.0810**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Previous SPF forecast for GDP growth in t -0.0154*
(0.01)
Previous SPF forecast for HICP inflation in t -0.0188
(0.01)
Previous SPF forecast for GDP growth in t+1 -0.1730***
(0.03)
Previous SPF forecast for HICP inflation in t+1 -0.2300***
(0.04)
Revision of expected oil price, 0.0028*** 0.0142*** 0.0024** 0.0043***
average next 4 quarters (SPF) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Revision of expected USD/EUR exchange rate, 0.4114** -0.2342 0.5644*** -0.1602
average next 4 quarters (SPF) (0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.11)
Revision of expected main refinancing rate, 0.1195* 0.1599*** 0.0702 0.1196*
average next 4 quarters (SPF) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Survey in first quarter -0.2136*** 0.0649* -0.1855*** -0.0464
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Survey in second quarter -0.1168*** 0.1629*** -0.0995*** 0.0093
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Survey in third quarter -0.0272 0.1220*** -0.1663*** 0.0011
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.0337 -0.0352 0.2928*** 0.3528***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Observations 1217 1211 1170 1166
Within R2 0.77 0.58 0.49 0.26
No. forecasters 50 50 49 49
Avg. obs/forecaster 24.3 24.2 23.9 23.8
Min. obs/forecaster 10 10 10 10
Incl. Reuters surprises Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results from regression of changes in the forecasts in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by
the ECB on dummy variables indicating different monetary policy announcements. Forecasts are made for the current
year and the next year. HICP inflation is measured as the year-on-year change in the HICP price index. GDP growth
is measured as the annual real GDP growth rate. The timing of the announcements and the survey rounds is shown in
Table A.3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: Effect on realized prices and production
Dependent variable:
Prices, t Prices, t+1 Production, t Production, t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OIS, 1-month -0.004228*** -0.006543*** -0.013134*** -0.012782***
(0.00107) (0.00122) (0.00168) (0.00184)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.000009* 0.000024*** 0.000028*** 0.000040***
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
OIS, 1-month × after event 0.001812 0.002651 0.004510* 0.002126
(0.00151) (0.00169) (0.00234) (0.00250)
OIS, 1-month, cubic × after event -0.000000 -0.000002 0.000005 0.000018
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Further Controls X X X X
Observations 55666 55199 54241 53820
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.24 0.27 0.18
Observations before 27252 27004 26516 26304
Observations after 28414 28195 27725 27516
Notes: Results for regression of realized changes in prices and production on monetary policy sur-
prises and surprises cubed for firms which responded in four-working-day windows around
monetary events. Interactions with a dummy indicating whether response was recorded after an
event are included. Firm responses are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy surprises are measured
using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019). Full set of additional control
variables included but not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table A.6: Robustness checks, different dependent variables
Dependent variable: change in
state of business inventories exp. state of business, exp. state of business,
ordinal measure scale measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OIS, 1-month 0.000358 -0.001707 -0.004467*** -0.080802**
(0.00120) (0.00139) (0.00155) (0.03264)
OIS, 1-month, cubic -0.000002 0.000016* 0.000040*** 0.000404**
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00019)
Further Controls X X X X
Observations 55327 36617 56989 52905
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.52 0.31 0.17
Observations before 27102 17907 27916 27139
Observations after 28225 18710 29073 25766
Notes: Results for regression of changes in different dependent variables on monetary policy surprises
and surprises cubed in four-working-day windows around the respective events. Answers in col-
umn (4) are measured on a scale from 0-100. Firm responses are obtained from IBS. Monetary policy
surprises are measured using high-frequency interest rate changes from Altavilla et al. (2019). Full
set of additional control variables included but not shown. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.7: Effect of Jarociński-Karadi monetary policy shocks
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
Prices Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Further Baseline Further
controls controls
Monetary policy shock 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Central bank information shock 0.0068*** 0.0061*** 0.0072*** -0.0014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.4531*** -0.5801***
(0.004) (0.005)
Expected production, t-1 -0.4936*** -0.6207***
(0.004) (0.005)
Average state of business, t-1 0.1447*** 0.0838*** 0.1449*** 0.0936***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Prices, t-1 0.2573***
(0.006)
Prices, t-2 0.0159***
(0.006)
Production, t-1 0.0868***
(0.006)
Production, t-2 0.0097*
(0.005)
Demand, t-1 0.0507*** 0.2198***
(0.003) (0.004)
Demand, t-2 -0.0046* -0.0129***
(0.003) (0.004)
Orders, t-1 0.0117*** 0.0084*
(0.004) (0.005)
Foreign orders, t-1 -0.0021 0.0276***
(0.004) (0.005)
Capacity, t-1 -0.0001 -0.0006***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0176*** 0.0361*** -0.0017 0.0654***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.012)
Observations 69121 62641 66931 61150
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.33
Observations before 32571 29465 31535 28767
Observations after 36550 33176 35396 32383
Notes: Results based on regression of changes in expectations on monetary policy shocks
provided by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) in four-working-day windows around monetary
events. Monetary policy shocks are standardized. Firm expectations are obtained from IBS.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01.
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A2 Detailed versions of the main tables
Table A.8: Effect of unconventional monetary policy on firm expecta-
tions, detail
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Further Time FE Baseline Further Time FE
controls controls
12-month LTROs -0.1558*** -0.1010*** -0.0052 -0.1401*** -0.0661 -0.0561
(0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051)
6-month LTROs -0.0361 -0.0336 -0.0431 -0.0462 -0.0150 -0.0249
(0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041)
12/13-month LTROs -0.0292 -0.0639** -0.0409 -0.1362*** -0.1528*** -0.0798*
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.040) (0.044)
36-month LTROs 0.0699** 0.0859** 0.0562 -0.0027 0.0268 0.0696
(0.035) (0.035) (0.046) (0.042) (0.040) (0.056)
OMT details -0.0537** -0.0379 -0.0344 -0.1921*** -0.1345*** -0.1226***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044)
Forward Guidance -0.0298** -0.0187 -0.0047 0.0011
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018)
TLTROs -0.0702 -0.0552 -0.0227 -0.0423 0.0098 0.0482
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.067) (0.069) (0.074)
ABSPP+CBPP3 -0.0107 -0.0062 -0.0364* 0.0075
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021)
APP details 0.0058 -0.0031 0.0279 0.0303
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.027)
PSPP share limit -0.0267 -0.0190 0.0641** 0.1010***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.033)
APP end 0.0337 0.0279 -0.0060 -0.0134 -0.0106 -0.0552
(0.028) (0.033) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045) (0.067)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.4389*** -0.5763*** -0.5818***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Expected production, t-1 -0.4930*** -0.6072*** -0.6120***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Prices, t-1 0.2664*** 0.2617***
(0.004) (0.004)
Prices, t-2 0.0028 0.0020
(0.003) (0.003)
Production, t-1 0.0661*** 0.0681***
(0.003) (0.003)
Production, t-2 0.0114*** 0.0108***
(0.003) (0.003)
Demand, t-1 0.0490*** 0.0455*** 0.2021*** 0.1980***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Demand, t-2 -0.0026* -0.0058*** -0.0096*** -0.0131***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Orders, t-1 0.0088*** 0.0066*** 0.0079*** 0.0044
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Foreign orders, t-1 0.0013 -0.0012 0.0244*** 0.0212***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Capacity utilization, t-1 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0293*** 0.0319*** -0.0270** 0.0228*** 0.0561*** -0.0085
(0.001) (0.005) (0.011) (0.001) (0.006) (0.014)
Observations 236635 201212 201212 230028 197239 197239
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.33
Monthly time FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Detailed version of Table 1.1 in the main body, showing all control variables. Robust standard
errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.9: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, detail
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Further Baseline Further
controls controls
OIS, 1-month 0.000712 0.001180* 0.001737* 0.000109
(0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00093) (0.00092)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.453926*** -0.577462***
(0.00442) (0.00556)
Expected production, t-1 -0.494913*** -0.621993***
(0.00401) (0.00493)
Average state of business, t-1 0.133941*** 0.077335*** 0.132691*** 0.091695***
(0.00847) (0.00873) (0.01141) (0.01159)
Prices, t-1 0.255370***
(0.00656)
Prices, t-2 0.012252**
(0.00571)
Production, t-1 0.086247***
(0.00588)
Production, t-2 0.010418*
(0.00543)
Demand, t-1 0.049109*** 0.220692***
(0.00270) (0.00455)
Demand, t-2 -0.004271 -0.013500***
(0.00281) (0.00447)
Orders, t-1 0.011549*** 0.008696*
(0.00384) (0.00512)
Foreign orders, t-1 -0.003217 0.027333***
(0.00385) (0.00496)
Capacity utilization, t-1 -0.000096 -0.000619***
(0.00011) (0.00014)
Constant 0.019802*** 0.036120*** 0.004984* 0.066913***
(0.00189) (0.00905) (0.00256) (0.01227)
Observations 65003 58779 62968 57379
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.28 0.24 0.33
Observations before 31978 28761 30960 28058
Observations after 33025 30018 32008 29321
Notes: Detailed version of Table 1.2 in the main body, showing all control variables and
more digits for the coefficients. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.10: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, with cubic changes, detail
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Further Ex. largest Baseline Further Ex. largest
controls OIS changes controls OIS changes
OIS, 1-month -0.000516 -0.000683 -0.003538** -0.001756 -0.003842** -0.003887*
(0.00116) (0.00119) (0.00171) (0.00154) (0.00152) (0.00223)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.000007 0.000011* 0.000102*** 0.000021*** 0.000024*** 0.000100***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00004)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.453915*** -0.577454*** -0.575872***
(0.00442) (0.00556) (0.00565)
Expected production, t-1 -0.495059*** -0.622135*** -0.622122***
(0.00401) (0.00493) (0.00502)
Average state of business, t-1 0.134514*** 0.078224*** 0.082531*** 0.134375*** 0.093574*** 0.094782***
(0.00849) (0.00875) (0.00889) (0.01143) (0.01161) (0.01177)
Prices, t-1 0.255362*** 0.252039***
(0.00656) (0.00668)
Prices, t-2 0.012275** 0.012791**
(0.00571) (0.00582)
Production, t-1 0.086450*** 0.084561***
(0.00588) (0.00598)
Production, t-2 0.010438* 0.011266**
(0.00543) (0.00552)
Demand, t-1 0.049103*** 0.048136*** 0.220601*** 0.216653***
(0.00270) (0.00276) (0.00455) (0.00464)
Demand, t-2 -0.004357 -0.005429* -0.013671*** -0.015195***
(0.00281) (0.00287) (0.00447) (0.00456)
Orders, t-1 0.011548*** 0.012220*** 0.008706* 0.011403**
(0.00384) (0.00391) (0.00512) (0.00521)
Foreign orders, t-1 -0.003237 -0.002813 0.027275*** 0.026387***
(0.00385) (0.00392) (0.00496) (0.00505)
Capacity -0.000094 -0.000065 -0.000615*** -0.000621***
utilization, t-1 (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00014) (0.00015)
Constant 0.019678*** 0.035749*** 0.034343*** 0.004634* 0.066216*** 0.072745***
(0.00190) (0.00905) (0.00918) (0.00256) (0.01227) (0.01247)
Observations 65003 58779 56491 62968 57379 55155
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.33 0.33
Observations before 31978 28761 27395 30960 28058 26731
Observations after 33025 30018 29096 32008 29321 28424
Excl. largest surprises X X
Notes: Detailed version of Table 1.3 in the main body, showing all control variables and more digits for the coefficients.
Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.11: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, binarized dependent
variable, detail
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Upward Downward Upward Downward
revision revision revision revision
OIS, 1-month 0.000139 0.000796 -0.001248 0.002247**
(0.00078) (0.00086) (0.00097) (0.00105)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.000002 -0.000010** 0.000007 -0.000016***
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.233636*** 0.320257***
(0.00352) (0.00425)
Expected production, t-1 -0.262166*** 0.305374***
(0.00295) (0.00325)
Average state of business, t-1 0.034385*** -0.036316*** 0.013427* -0.075074***
(0.00623) (0.00620) (0.00786) (0.00758)
Prices, t-1 0.129232*** -0.109666***
(0.00420) (0.00486)
Prices, t-2 -0.014247*** -0.033737***
(0.00377) (0.00416)
Production, t-1 0.037697*** -0.045633***
(0.00377) (0.00367)
Production, t-2 0.003718 -0.001646
(0.00344) (0.00360)
Demand, t-1 0.021587*** -0.026210*** 0.095279*** -0.106071***
(0.00192) (0.00187) (0.00292) (0.00296)
Demand, t-2 -0.005468*** -0.001109 -0.010343*** 0.000381
(0.00201) (0.00194) (0.00291) (0.00296)
Orders, t-1 0.006674** -0.003678 -0.001640 -0.010240***
(0.00272) (0.00268) (0.00329) (0.00342)
Foreign orders, t-1 -0.005283* -0.003187 0.009878*** -0.015610***
(0.00274) (0.00267) (0.00323) (0.00328)
Capacity utilization, t-1 -0.000185** -0.000106 -0.000672*** -0.000046
(0.00008) (0.00007) (0.00010) (0.00009)
Constant 0.117578*** 0.083770*** 0.208047*** 0.146019***
(0.00656) (0.00627) (0.00814) (0.00787)
Observations 58779 58779 57379 57379
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.21
Observations before 28761 28761 28058 28058
Observations after 30018 30018 29321 29321
Notes: Detailed version of Table 1.4 in the main body, showing all control variables and
more digits for the coefficients. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.12: Effect of 1-month OIS changes and Jarociński-Karadi shocks, detail
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CBI CBI+MP CBI CBI+MP
OIS, 1-month -0.001607 -0.002871* -0.004620*** -0.002371
(0.00130) (0.00164) (0.00166) (0.00207)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.000014** 0.000016** 0.000026*** 0.000023***
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
Central bank information shock (CBI) 0.004250* 0.005834** 0.003364 0.000541
(0.00229) (0.00267) (0.00294) (0.00328)
Monetary policy shock (MP) 0.003620 -0.006430*
(0.00299) (0.00362)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.577985*** -0.578014***
(0.00571) (0.00571)
Expected production, t-1 -0.622090*** -0.622083***
(0.00505) (0.00505)
Average state of business, t-1 0.078967*** 0.078520*** 0.091358*** 0.092153***
(0.00915) (0.00916) (0.01209) (0.01209)
Prices, t-1 0.254644*** 0.254637***
(0.00673) (0.00673)
Prices, t-2 0.014408** 0.014392**
(0.00588) (0.00588)
Production, t-1 0.087733*** 0.087714***
(0.00601) (0.00601)
Production, t-2 0.011033** 0.011058**
(0.00556) (0.00556)
Demand, t-1 0.050929*** 0.050972*** 0.219238*** 0.219172***
(0.00277) (0.00277) (0.00465) (0.00465)
Demand, t-2 -0.005250* -0.005253* -0.014850*** -0.014851***
(0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00457) (0.00458)
Orders, t-1 0.011596*** 0.011589*** 0.007719 0.007738
(0.00396) (0.00396) (0.00526) (0.00526)
Foreign orders, t-1 -0.002459 -0.002447 0.029101*** 0.029080***
(0.00397) (0.00397) (0.00510) (0.00510)
Capacity utilization, t-1 -0.000130 -0.000130 -0.000596*** -0.000595***
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00015) (0.00015)
Constant 0.039176*** 0.039209*** 0.064532*** 0.064498***
(0.00926) (0.00926) (0.01254) (0.01254)
Observations 56109 56109 54754 54754
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33
Observations before 26706 26706 26046 26046
Observations after 29403 29403 28708 28708
Notes: Detailed version of Table 1.6 in the main body, showing all control variables and more
digits for the coefficients. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table A.13: Effect of changes in the 1-month OIS rate, press release and
press conference window separately, detail
Dependent variable: change in the expectations for
prices production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Release Conference Release Conference
OIS, 1-month -0.002156 -0.006632** -0.007207*** -0.000271
(0.00154) (0.00278) (0.00191) (0.00350)
OIS, 1-month, cubic 0.000017** 0.000298*** 0.000036*** 0.000111
(0.00001) (0.00009) (0.00001) (0.00011)
Expected prices, t-1 -0.577428*** -0.577458***
(0.00556) (0.00556)
Expected production, t-1 -0.622094*** -0.621948***
(0.00493) (0.00493)
Average state of business, t-1 0.077271*** 0.082035*** 0.089637*** 0.092029***
(0.00874) (0.00896) (0.01161) (0.01181)
Prices, t-1 0.255341*** 0.255253***
(0.00656) (0.00656)
Prices, t-2 0.012268** 0.012191**
(0.00571) (0.00571)
Production, t-1 0.086461*** 0.086208***
(0.00588) (0.00588)
Production, t-2 0.010366* 0.010427*
(0.00543) (0.00543)
Demand, t-1 0.049070*** 0.049115*** 0.220432*** 0.220665***
(0.00270) (0.00270) (0.00455) (0.00455)
Demand, t-2 -0.004426 -0.004175 -0.013855*** -0.013532***
(0.00281) (0.00281) (0.00447) (0.00447)
Orders, t-1 0.011570*** 0.011543*** 0.008783* 0.008717*
(0.00384) (0.00384) (0.00512) (0.00512)
Foreign orders, t-1 -0.003247 -0.003259 0.027256*** 0.027320***
(0.00385) (0.00385) (0.00496) (0.00496)
Capacity utilization, t-1 -0.000094 -0.000097 -0.000614*** -0.000619***
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00014) (0.00014)
Constant 0.035939*** 0.035265*** 0.067156*** 0.067040***
(0.00905) (0.00906) (0.01227) (0.01227)
Observations 58779 58779 57379 57379
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.33
Observations before 28761 28761 28058 28058
Observations after 30018 30018 29321 29321
Notes: Detailed version of Table 1.7 in the main body, showing all control variables and
more digits for the coefficients. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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2.1 Introduction
In recent years, central banks have increasingly focused on managing firm and house-
hold expectations. This is mainly due to the constraints of the effective lower bound
forcing central banks to rely on additional instruments (den Haan 2013). Given the
central banks’ focus on price stability, inflation expectations are particularly relevant.
Inflation expectations are a key transmission channel from monetary policy to infla-
tion, both directly and indirectly through the real interest rate. It is therefore important
to understand how monetary policy affects inflation expectations of all actors in the
economy. Given the scarce empirical evidence so far, this chapter focuses on the role
of monetary policy for households’ inflation expectations.
I show that US households’ quantitative inflation expectations increase after a sur-
prise tightening of monetary policy, i.e. a surprise increase in interest rates after a
federal open market committee (FOMC) announcement. For the inflation expectations
I use data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. Monetary policy surprises are
measured using the high-frequency identified changes in interest rates in a small win-
dow around FOMC announcements provided by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). The
effect is robust to controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity and to using
different measures of monetary policy. The results are not driven by outlier observa-
tions or special episodes of US monetary policy. They are also robust across different
demographic groups. In addition, results do not change when including other eco-
nomic news released in the same month, in which the monetary policy announcement
occurred.
The positive response to surprise increases is in line with a Delphic interpretation
of monetary policy announcements (Campbell et al. 2012) or the information effect of
monetary policy (Nakamura and Steinsson 2018). These theories propose that agents
in the economy focus on the implication of the monetary policy announcement for the
current inflation outlook, not on the effect of the changed monetary policy stance on
the future development of inflation. This view of monetary policy goes back to the
argument by Romer and Romer (2000) that the central banks may be (perceived to
be) better informed about the future state of the economy than households and other
economic agents. Because agents are aware of this informational advantage, they look
to central bank announcements not only for information about the decision but also
for information about the current economic outlook.
In order to verify that indeed this information effect is at play here, I analyze news-
paper reporting after FOMC meetings. By now, it is commonly understood that most
households do not directly follow monetary policy announcements (Binder 2017b).
However, in order to form expectations, households rely on various information sources
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including media reporting (D’Acunto et al. 2019b). I therefore use text analysis tools
to classify articles published in US newspapers after monetary policy announcements
into articles referring to high or increasing inflation and articles referring to low or de-
creasing inflation. After tightening monetary policy surprises more articles referring
to high or increasing inflation are published. Articles usually refer to high or increas-
ing inflation as the explanation for the decision made. The newspaper reporting in
turn influences inflation expectations. I conclude that newspaper reporting provides a
transmission channel of the information effect from the central bank to households.
This chapter relates to different strands of the literature studying expectations,
namely studies of expectation formation generally, of the interaction between expec-
tations and news reporting as well as monetary policy, and studies of the effect of
expectations on outcomes. In the following, I discuss the most important papers from
these strands.
The study of expectations has been quickly expanding in recent years with a focus
on using micro level data. In part, this is due to the central banks’ increased focus on
expectations management. Another reason for the increased interest are the missing
disinflation puzzle after the financial crisis and the missing inflation puzzle during the
recovery (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015b). While earlier work already emphasized
that the full information, rational expectations hypothesis is not in line with the em-
pirical evidence (see e.g., Carroll 2003), it focused on time series data. More recently,
an emphasis is put on micro-level data and constructing moments from these data to
inform models (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2012, 2015a). Furthermore, the literature
now goes beyond testing for rationality or specific models of deviation from rationality.
Among others, Binder (2017a) and Das, Kuhnen, and Nagel (2020) show that expec-
tations depend on demographic factors and the socio-economic status of households.
Using a Finnish data set, D’Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita, and Weber (2019a) show that
the IQ of a person has significant effects on their expectations, beyond education and
income. In addition, individuals’ experiences matter. Malmendier and Nagel (2016)
find that households extrapolate from their own experiences over their lifetime when
forming expectations. Therefore younger people react more strongly to new informa-
tion arriving (because their accumulated experiences are shorter), and older people
who experienced the high inflation periods in the US, generally have higher inflation
expectations. Recent research using a novel data set of scanner data by D’Acunto et al.
(2019b) highlights the importance of prices of frequently purchased goods. Their work
indicates that observed price changes of groceries are one major source of information
for inflation expectations. Previous literature already showed that inflation expecta-
tions react strongly to aggregate changes in food and gas prices (see e.g., Coibion and
Gorodnichenko 2015b). I will take the evidence on household heterogeneity into ac-
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count by considering whether different households react differently to monetary pol-
icy announcements. In addition, I control for current developments in food and gas
price inflation given the relevance of these particular prices for households.
Another strand of literature analyzes whether news reporting affects the expecta-
tion formation process. Most work on this is related to tests of the epidemiological
model of inflation expectations introduced by Carroll (2003). While earlier research
focused on whether there are any effects of news, more recent contributions look at
the determinants of these effects. Ehrmann, Pfajfar, and Santoro (2017) show that more
pessimistic households have a larger initial bias in inflation expectations but also react
more strongly to news. The content of news also matters. Lamla and Lein (2014) and
Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) show that households react more strongly to news with a
positive tone.1 Lamla and Maag (2012) find that households respond more strongly
to news when it is about higher prices or inflation. Generally, hearing news about
inflation reduces the bias in inflation expectations.2 This chapter provides additional
evidence on the role of news by classifying articles based on their information about
inflation. Furthermore, I add a new dimension to the analysis by also considering how
monetary policy affects news reporting, and how monetary policy is transmitted to
expectations via news.
The relevance of analyzing survey expectations of course depends on the assump-
tion that expectations reported in surveys are actually relevant for households’ deci-
sions. Due to a lack of data on the individual level and general skepticism towards
surveys, this has been difficult to do empirically for a long time. Early work by Bach-
mann, Berg, and Sims (2015) found only a weak relationship between inflation ex-
pectations and the willingness to spend on durable goods in the Michigan Survey of
Consumers. Using the new and more detailed New York Fed Survey of Consumer
Expectations, Crump, Eusepi, Tambalotti, and Topa (2015) find higher inflation ex-
pectations lower expected consumption in the future, in line with the Euler equation.
Ichiue and Nishiguchi (2015) show that Japanese households increase current spend-
ing and lower future spending in response to higher inflation expectations. Dräger and
Nghiem (2020) find a similar effect in Germany. Combining survey data with adminis-
trative data in the Netherlands, Vellekoop and Wiederholt (2019) show that households
with higher inflation expectations lower their net worth, i.e. save less, and are more
likely to purchase a car, as a proxy for spending on durable goods.
However, these studies may still suffer from endogeneity issues due to omitted
variables. Therefore, several authors have explored natural experiments. D’Acunto,
1The tone is determined by hand coding articles based on methodologies from media analysis.
2The bias is usually measured by computing the difference between households’ inflation expecta-
tions and some benchmark expectations series (such as professional forecasters) or realized inflation in
the forecasting period.
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Hoang, and Weber (2018) show that the announcement of a VAT increase in Germany
led to an increase in inflation expectations and an increase in spending before the VAT
increase took place. Carrillo and Emran (2012) exploit an error in reporting of inflation
in Ecuador. Officially reported inflation rates were higher than actual inflation, which
led households to increase inflation expectations and lower savings at the same time.
Other authors have introduced exogenous variation into survey expectations. Coibion,
Georgarakos, Gorodnichenko, and van Rooij (2019a) provide information treatments to
households in a Dutch survey, which change the households’ inflation expectations. In
reaction to higher inflation expectations induced by the information treatment, house-
holds slightly increase their non-durable spending, but decrease their durable spend-
ing, so that overall spending falls. This reaction is due to households expecting their
real income to fall when inflation increases, i.e. they associate higher inflation with
worse economic outcomes. In a related study, Kamdar (2019) argues consumers’ expec-
tations can be explained by a single factor, which she labels sentiment. If households
are generally optimistic about the future, they expect the economy to expand but infla-
tion to decline. This result is in line with households expecting less real income when
their inflation expectations increase. The recent evidence from survey experiments and
natural experiments shows that expectations (also as reported in surveys) do matter for
actions. Thus, the analysis of micro-level survey data can indeed provide insights into
‘actual’ behavior of agents in the economy.
Finally, regarding the empirical relationship between monetary policy and expec-
tations, much of the literature so far has focused on the perception of central banks in
general as well as the consistency of expectations with certain relationships deemed
relevant for monetary policy. For a detailed discussion of the studies, see Binder
(2017b). In addition, some authors have compared different communication channels
and tools. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2019b) set up a randomized control
trial within a survey of consumers where they provide different information treat-
ments, ranging from information about actual inflation to newspaper articles about
FOMC meetings and actual FOMC statements. The authors find households update
inflation expectations most strongly in response to being provided with actual figures
and with FOMC statements. Bholat, Broughton, Ter Meer, and Walczak (2019) show
that simplifying text and relating information to people’s experiences in central bank
communication improves comprehension of the information and increases trust in the
central bank.
The direct effects of monetary policy on household expectations are now being con-
sidered as well. Lamla and Vinogradov (2019) conduct an online survey within a few
days around several FOMC meetings in 2016 and 2017 asking people about their infla-
tion expectations, among other things. They find only weak effects of monetary policy
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announcements on inflation expectations, largely related to increased news coverage
around FOMC meetings. However, the study lacks a panel dimension so the effect
may be due to differences between the households interviewed before and after the
announcements. In contrast to this result, Lewis, Makridis, and Mertens (2019) find a
significant and negative effect of tightening monetary policy surprises on expectations
about the general economic situation. The authors also have access to daily expecta-
tions data but for a much longer time period than Lamla and Vinogradov (2019). In
addition, they use high-frequency identified monetary policy surprises to quantify the
announcement beyond the announced target rate change. Finally, Claus and Nguyen
(2020) use aggregate Australian survey data and a latent factor model to identify the
effects monetary policy. They find inflation expectations increase both after easing and
tightening announcements.3 The initial response depends on the income level: richer
households respond immediately while poorer households respond only a few months
after the announcements.
This chapter directly relates to the set of papers discussed in the last paragraph.
Similar to Lewis et al. (2019), I study the effect of monetary policy using high-frequency
changes in interest rates. However, I focus on inflation expectations instead of the eco-
nomic outlook. While I lack the detailed information on the timing of the responses
as available to Lamla and Vinogradov (2019) and Lewis et al. (2019), I cover a much
larger sample of monetary policy announcements, namely all meetings since 1994. In
addition, I can control for individual-specific effects using the panel dimension in my
household data. I also explicitly control for the role of news by analyzing actual re-
porting after monetary policy announcements. For the analysis of news or other text
data in this context, the papers I am aware of, have so far relied on human coding or
a general method of tone analysis to distinguish different types of reporting. In this
chapter, I develop a new approach to classify newspaper articles about inflation based
on a dictionary method.
To summarize, this chapter is the first to consider the direct effects of quantitative
monetary policy surprises on households’ inflation expectations in a large micro-level
sample with a long time dimension as well as a panel dimension. Additionally, it is the
first to systematically link the effects of monetary policy and its transmission via news
reporting for households.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes
the data used. Section 2.3 describes the main results for the effect of monetary policy
on expectations. Section 2.4 presents the text analysis approach and the results for
the transmission of monetary policy to households via news reporting. Section 2.5
concludes.
3The authors distinguish announcements based on the announced target rate change.
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2.2 Data
This study relies on three different types of data: expectations data from the Michigan
Survey of Consumers (MSC), monetary policy surprises, and articles published by US
newspapers. This section briefly describes the data sources and adjustments to the
data.
2.2.1 Expectations data
The MSC is a regular survey of US consumers, which is representative for the US pop-
ulation,4 and has been running since 1946. Since 1978, the survey is conducted at a
monthly frequency. In each month, at least 500 households are interviewed via tele-
phone.5 In addition, about one half of the households is interviewed again after six
months. In this study, I will exploit this limited panel dimension in order to control for
idiosyncratic household effects. The analysis will therefore be limited to households
responding to all questions needed for the estimation in both interviews.
The sample in the baseline case starts in January 1994. I choose this starting point
due to the changes, which occurred in monetary policy communication over time.
Since I am interested in the transmission via newspaper reporting, it makes sense to
consider only the period since the FOMC regularly publishes press statements. Before
1994, this was not common practice and the release of a statement may have indicated
that this meeting was different from a standard policy meeting (Binder 2017b). The
communication practices since 1994 are also more in line with the way monetary pol-
icy is conducted nowadays. However, for robustness I also consider earlier periods as
far as the measures of monetary policy allow. The baseline sample ends in December
2016 due to the availability of the monetary policy surprise series.
In total 85, 146 different households responded to the survey between January 1994
and December 2016. 54, 165 households in this period were interviewed twice and
30, 981 were only interviewed once. This yields 139, 311 observations in total and
108, 333 observations with a panel dimension. On average, the number of observations
per month is 505 in the full sample and 400 in the panel sample. The latter reflects that
on average 200 respondents are being re-interviewed in each month.6
4Except for Hawaii and Alaska.
5Since the 1970s sampling was based on landline phones. Since 2014 the MSC has completely shifted
to cell phones (Curtin and Dechaux 2015).
6I interchangeably use the terms household and respondent due to the mixed manner in which the
MSC treats its respondents. The sampling is focused on representing US households and many question
refer to household level variables. At the same time the expectations and perceptions questions of course
focus on the individual responding to the survey. For details on the sampling see Curtin (1982) and more
recently Curtin and Dechaux (2015).
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The focus of this chapter are inflation expectations. In the MSC, inflation expec-
tations are elicited in a two-step manner.7 First, the respondents are asked about the
direction of the expected change in prices:
Q1 During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, or go
down, or stay where they are now?
If the respondents answer ‘stay where they are’, they will be asked whether they
actually mean constant prices or whether they mean a constant inflation rate. If they
confirm that they mean constant prices, their answer is recorded as 0. In case they
mean a constant inflation rate, they are asked the same follow-up question as those
respondents who are expecting a change, namely:
Q2 By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, dur-
ing the next 12 months?
Whether the questions mentions up or down depends on the answer in Q1. Answers
are recorded as integer values. If the households provide an answer larger than 5% in
either case, they are prompted to confirm this answer. If they say, that they do not
know in response to Q2, they are asked again referring to ‘cents on the dollar’ instead
of percent. Appendix B2.1 shows the detailed set-up of the questions.
From now on, I focus on the subset of households relevant for my analysis, namely
those who are interviewed twice and report quantitative inflation expectations in both
interviews: around 85% of all households with a panel dimension (45, 874) in fact re-
port inflation expectations twice. Table 2.1 shows summary statistics for these inflation
expectations. I consider both the full sample as well as a breakdown by demographic
groups. The average over the full sample is 3.4% and the median response is 3%.8
These values are substantially higher than actual CPI inflation in the United States,
which was around 2.2% during the sample period. Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 shows that
the difference has grown larger since the financial crisis. This observation has been
linked to energy prices and used to explain the missing disinflation puzzle (Coibion
and Gorodnichenko 2015b). Panel (b) highlights the strong correlation between con-
sumers’ expected inflation and the level occurring in the following six months. De-
spite the level difference, inflation expectations and actual inflation co-move not only
contemporaneously but also for leads of inflation. The strong contemporaneous corre-
lation is in line with the fact that households extrapolate from observed price changes
(D’Acunto et al. 2019b), while the correlation with future actual inflation indicates
some predictive power of these expectations.
7The full questionnaire is available at https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/fetchdoc.php?docid=
24776.
8Remember the MSC only reports integer values.
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Table 2.1: Inflation expectations, balanced sample, 1994 to 2016
Observ. Share Mean Std.Dev. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
All 91748 3.40 4.08 0 1 3 5 9
Gender
Male 46014 0.50 3.05 3.59 0 1 3 5 7
Female 45734 0.50 3.74 4.50 0 1 3 5 10
Renter/owner
Owns home 72846 0.80 3.35 3.93 0 1 3 5 8
Rents home 18684 0.20 3.55 4.63 0 1 3 5 10
Cohorts
Born before 1970 75848 0.83 3.42 4.05 0 1 3 5 9
Born 1970 and later 15574 0.17 3.27 4.23 0 1 3 5 9
Age
18-39 years 26047 0.28 3.29 4.29 0 1 3 5 8
40-59 years 37197 0.41 3.38 3.96 0 1 3 5 8
60 years and older 28179 0.31 3.52 4.04 0 1 3 5 10
Education
High school or less 27063 0.30 3.85 4.67 0 1 3 5 10
Some college, no degree 24058 0.26 3.56 4.24 0 1 3 5 10
College degree 23770 0.26 3.05 3.59 0 1 3 5 6
Graduate studies 16667 0.18 2.90 3.32 0 1 3 4 5
Income
Bottom 33% 19938 0.23 4.08 4.89 0 1 3 5 10
Middle 33% 30287 0.35 3.47 4.04 0 1 3 5 10
Top 33% 36456 0.42 2.93 3.48 0 1 3 4 6
Stock market participation
No stocks 24696 0.37 3.76 4.34 0 1 3 5 10
Investment in bottom 33% 11673 0.18 3.49 4.00 0 1 3 5 10
Investment in middle 33% 13555 0.21 3.22 3.73 0 1 3 5 8
Investment in top 33% 16178 0.24 2.85 3.21 0 1 3 4 5
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for inflation for the balanced sample of households, i.e. those
reporting quantitative inflation expectations (Q2) in both interviews. The first row shows all households
in the balanced sample. The remaining rows show statistics for different demographic groups. The sec-
ond column (‘Share’) shows how the demographic traits are distributed within the sample by providing
the share in all observations for the respective subgroup. The distribution of demographic groups in
the balanced sample differs slightly from the full sample, as shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B1.
In addition to the aggregate time series, I also consider the cross sectional hetero-
geneity of reported expectations. Table 2.1 shows that the interquartile range is 1% to
5%, and the bottom and top 10 percent responses are 0% and 9%, respectively. Further-
more, 83% of all answers fall within -2% and 5%, which is the range of actual inflation
in the sample period. However, Figure B.1 in Appendix B1 shows that some house-
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Figure 2.1: One-year ahead inflation expectations and actual inflation, 1994 to 2016
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Notes: Expectations are measured as the mean of all answers in each month from the MSC (only house-
holds who provided expectations in both their interviews). Actual inflation is the seasonally adjusted
year-on-year change in the CPI for All Urban Consumers taken from the FRED database. All data are
monthly.
holds also report very large numbers, up to -50% and +50%. In addition, bunching at
multiples of five is noticeable. Rounding to multiples of five or ten is considered to
indicate uncertainty about the forecast (Binder 2017c). I will take both the rounding
and the very large responses into account in the analysis later on.
The remainder of Table 2.1 shows some details on the demographic composition
of the sample, and inflation expectations by the different groups.9 The variables dis-
played are those used later on to analyze potential heterogeneity of the effects. I select
them based on what previous literature showed to be relevant for expectation forma-
tion.10
The genders are fully balanced in the sample. In line with previous findings, women
have higher inflation expectations than men. This difference has recently been linked to
differences in the contribution to grocery shopping at the household level (D’Acunto,
Malmendier, and Weber 2020). The vast majority of households (80%) owns a house.
There is again a slight difference is expectations: renters have somewhat higher expec-
tations than owners. Only 17% of all respondents were born after 1970, which means
they did not experience the high inflation periods in the 1970s. In line with the results
by Malmendier and Nagel (2016), they report lower expectations than households born
earlier. All respondents in the MSC are at least 18 years old. They can be split into
9The questionnaire provided by the MSC does no contain the questions about the demographic vari-
ables, in particular not the one about income, only the questions about home and stock ownership are
shown. Details on these can be found in Appendix B2.2.
10Note that the shares of the different groups are computed only for household reporting inflation
expectations and responding to two interviews. This sample differs slightly from the full MSC sample,
as shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B1.
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roughly equal groups by choosing 40 years and 60 years as cut-off points. Inflation
expectations increase with age. Education levels are recorded in the MSC at a detailed
grade level. To achieve roughly equal sized groups for the analysis later on, I reclassify
this data into four categories: high school degree or less, some college but no degree,
undergraduate college degree, and graduate studies. For education, we see a strong
decrease in inflation expectations with the length of education. The negative correla-
tion is in line with results on the role of the socio-economic status for expectations by
authors such as Das et al. (2020).
Finally, the MSC collects information on household income and stock market par-
ticipation. For income, I consider the tercile split.11 For stock market participation, I
separate those who invest from those who do not. The former are then further split into
terciles based on the amount they invest. In total only 63% of all respondents invest in
the stock market. Also for income and stock ownership inflation expectations decrease
with higher levels of income and investment, in line with the results for education.
2.2.2 Monetary policy measures
The main measure of monetary policy surprises I use are high-frequency changes in
the 3-months fed funds futures provided by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). Their data
is an updated version of the dataset by Gürkaynak et al. (2005). The changes are com-
puted by taking the difference between the interest rate 10 minutes before the respec-
tive FOMC announcement and 30 minutes after.12 Jarociński and Karadi (2020) use
3-months fed funds futures to measure monetary policy surprises because they cap-
ture both current changes in the policy stance as well as very short run forward guid-
ance. In addition, they are not affected by ‘timing surprises’ if the Fed postpones the
expected rate decision by one meeting (Jarociński and Karadi 2020).
The monetary surprises are available from January 1990 to December 2016. The sur-
prises are generally small, with a mean of -0.91 basis points and a standard deviation
of only 5 basis points. The majority of shocks is smaller than 10 basis points in absolute
value. About one quarter of surprises is actually exactly zero. There are, however, also
some very large surprises, as can be seen from the histograms in Figure 2.2. The his-
tograms also show that over the sample period more negative than positive surprises
occurred and that most very large surprises were negative.
Jarociński and Karadi (2020) also provide a split of the monetary policy surprises
into a pure monetary policy shock and an information shock. This split is based on the
11The terciles are defined every month to ensure comparability over time.
12Between 1994 and 2016, the announcement is usually the press release. Before 1994 it is usually the
first open market operations after the meeting which informed market participants about the decision
taken (Jarociński and Karadi 2020).
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Figure 2.2: Monetary policy surprises, 1994 to 2016
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Notes: Histograms show all monetary policy surprises between January 1994 and December 2016 as
provided by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). Monetary policy surprises are difference between the 3-
months fed fund futures measured in a 10-minutes window before the respective FOMC announcement
and a 30-minutes window after.
direction of change of the interest rate and the stock market in the tight window around
the meeting. A pure monetary policy surprise moves interest rates and stock markets
in opposite directions, and a central bank information shock moves both variables in
the same direction.
The main part of my analysis focuses on the observed surprises in fed fund futures
without considering the split provided by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). I choose to
use the total surprises because households’ may interpret the observed surprises dif-
ferently than financial markets. However, as a robustness check I use the two separate
shocks. The results confirm the finding of an information effect.
In addition, I use monetary policy surprises provided by Wieland and Yang (2020)
which is an extension of the series by Romer and Romer (2004) for robustness checks.
These surprises are derived by comparing the intended fed funds target from before a
FOMC meeting to the one decided at the meeting. The targets are constructed using a
narrative approach based on materials provided by the Fed. In a second step, the dif-
ference between the intended and the actual target is regressed on the Fed’s forecasts
of inflation, unemployment and real output growth. The residuals from this regres-
sion are estimates of monetary policy surprises purged of anticipatory actions by the
Fed. Since the Fed releases its forecasts only with a long lag, private agents may still
perceive theses surprises as containing information about the Fed’s economic outlook.
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Figure 2.3: Average number of articles per day with key-
words around FOMC meetings, 1994 to 2016
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Av
er
ag
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f a
rti
cl
es
 p
er
 d
ay
-2 weeks-1 week t-4,t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3,t+4 +1 week+2 weeks
Mean
95%-confidence interval
distance from meeting on day t
Notes: Average number of articles per day found around monetary pol-
icy meetings by searching the LexisNexis database for all articles pub-
lished in US newspapers containing the three keywords ‘inflation’, ‘cen-
tral bank’ and ‘fed’.
2.2.3 News data
The primary source of news data are newspaper articles published in the United States.
The articles are downloaded from the LexisNexis database, which contains a large set
of US newspapers. Since I use the newspaper articles to verify the information effect
hypothesis, they should be about monetary policy and inflation. Therefore, I focus only
on articles, which contain the following three keywords: ‘inflation’, ‘central bank’ and
‘fed’. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of articles around FOMC meeting dates. There
are clear spikes on the day of the meeting and the day after indicating that the search
terms indeed yield relevant articles. In the analysis later on, I focus only on articles
published within seven days following the meeting. I exclude the day of the meeting
because most articles, especially before online reporting became more relevant, will
be about what to expect from the meeting instead of the actual outcome. I limit my
analysis to seven days because most articles are published within in this period and
articles published later should not contain much more additional information. This
also lowers the computational burden for the text analysis. Details on the text analysis
approach are described in Section 2.4.
In total, the analyzed articles are from 69 different local and national newspapers.
Table B.2 lists these newspapers. The most common are The New York Times and The
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Washington Post13. The remaining top 10 newspapers are all local. Unfortunately, the
LexisNexis database does not include other important local newspapers such as the
Los Angeles Times or the Chicago Tribune. Generally, the resulting newspaper cov-
erage depends both on how strongly the newspaper is represented in the LexisNexis
database and on how often it publishes articles about monetary policy and inflation.
Finally, Table B.2 shows that the total number of articles included in the analysis for
the period from January 1994 to December 2016 is 3750. Given there are 191 meetings
in the sample period, the average number of articles per meeting is about 20.
In addition to the actual newspaper articles, I also rely on the self-reported news
heard by respondents in the Michigan survey. The survey asks respondents whether
they heard any favorable or unfavorable news about business conditions. If they heard
news, they can report what they heard in an open format. Two of these answers are
provided to the researcher by classifying them based on a large set of categories (for
details see questions Q5 and Q5a in Appendix B2.2). Based on the categories, I gener-
ate three measures of news heard, which relate more directly to monetary policy: news
about the economic situation (good/better or bad/worse),14 news about inflation (in-
creasing/more or decreasing/low) and news about interest rates (increasing/high or
decreasing/low). Table B.7 and Table B.8 in Appendix B2 show the mapping between
the MSC categories and my categories.
Beyond these main data, I also use information on CPI inflation, food price inflation
and gas price inflation as well as the federal funds target. All these are obtained from
the FRED database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
2.3 Effect of monetary policy on expectations
The focus of this chapter is the analysis of how monetary policy affects households’
inflation expectations. We know that there is a lot of heterogeneity in these expecta-
tions. Therefore, I exploit the panel dimension of the MSC to control for unobserved id-
iosyncratic heterogeneity. In addition, observed price changes of frequently purchased
goods are an important driver of inflation expectations (Coibion and Gorodnichenko
2015b; D’Acunto et al. 2019b). To take this into account, I include the current month-
on-month inflation rate for food and gasoline. Specifically, I estimate the following
model using the fixed effects (within) estimator:
πei,t = αi + βε
m
t−1 + δZt + uit, (2.1)
13Together with the online articles from WashingtonPost.com which is listed separately, The Washing-
ton Post has 485 articles.
14If both items reported fall into this group but refer to opposite directions of change, the households
are classified as reporting ‘contradicting’ news.
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where πei,t is the expected rate of inflation over the next 12 months reported by house-
hold i in month t measured in percent, εmt−1 is the monetary policy surprise in the pre-
vious month in percentage points,15 and Zt are control variables (food and gas price
inflation in the baseline specification). αi is the individual specific effect which is re-
moved by the within transformation.16 The error terms uit are clustered at the individ-
ual level and robust to heteroscedasticity.
The coefficient of interest is β, which captures how the monetary policy surprise
last month affects inflation expectations in the current month. I chose this timing be-
cause no information on the timing of the interviews for the MSC in is available. Using
the previous month’s surprise ensures that the households respond after the respec-
tive meeting. The drawback is that the surprise may affect other variables which than
affect expectations. However, most variables except for expectations and interest rates
respond slowly to monetary policy surprises. Therefore, this should not affect results
strongly.17 In addition, I show in Appendix B3 that other news released in the same
month do not affect results.
2.3.1 Results
Table 2.2 displays the results of estimating the model from equation (2.1) for different
samples. In all cases, positive monetary policy surprises, i.e. interest rate increases, sig-
nificantly increase inflation expectations. However, the magnitude of the effect differs
depending on the sample. Columns (1) and (2) include all observations with a panel
dimension from January 1994 to December 2016. Comparing columns (1) and (2) high-
lights the importance of including current inflation rates as control variables. Both
inflation measures are highly significant, and their inclusion increases the estimated
effect of monetary policy on expectations.
In column (3), I exclude the largest and smallest 1% of reported inflation expecta-
tions in each month. To exclude outlier observations is standard practice when analyz-
ing inflation expectations (see e.g., Pfajfar and Santoro 2013).18 This exclusion does not
affect results much.
15In months with several meetings, I use the one that was scheduled or the one that was not a confer-
ence call because those are usually the regular meetings.
16For simplicity, I combine the aggregate constant effect with the constant individual specific effect.
17In Enders, Hünnekes, and Müller (2019b), we have data on the day of response for a survey of
German firms. We exploit this timing to only focus on firms responding closely around monetary policy
meetings. However, we also show results using all firms responding in the month following the meeting
and find qualitatively similar results.
18I prefer to exclude observations based on the distribution in each month instead of excluding fixed
values because changes over time may make values which were previously considered unrealistic more
plausible. In addition, using relative cut-offs implies that in each month roughly the same number of
households are excluded which does not affect the overall sample as much.
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Table 2.2: Baseline results, monetary policy and inflation expectations
Dependent variable: inflation expectations in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Add infl. Ex. largest Ex. largest Ex. largest Ex. 01/2009
exp. neg. FF pos. FF
FF surprise, t-1 1.14*** 1.96*** 2.07*** 3.66*** 3.59*** 1.00**
(0.43) (0.43) (0.38) (0.53) (0.54) (0.50)
Gas price 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
inflation, t (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.63***
inflation, t (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 91748 91748 89964 88612 87630 86988
Households 45874 45874 44982 44306 43815 43494
Within R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC meetings.
Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer to the next 12 months.
Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in the price level for food and gasoline
products, respectively. Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
Columns (4) to (6) consider the effect of excluding large monetary policy surprises.
The exclusion of the largest two negative surprises leads to a significant increase in
the effect.19 Excluding the largest two positive surprises does not have a big effect,
as shown in column (5). However, one relatively large negative surprise has a large
effect on the estimation. In column (6), I exclude the surprise from December 2008,
i.e. survey observations from January 2009. This is the month the Fed first reached
the zero lower bound (ZLB) and changed to a target range. The measured surprise in
this month is -0.185 percentage points. Excluding it reduces the estimated coefficient
from 3.59 to 1.00. This change highlights the importance of controlling for outliers.
Therefore, I choose the specification from column (6) as the baseline.
Quantitatively the results imply a positive monetary policy surprise leads to a one
for one increase in inflation expectations, i.e. a one standard deviation surprise (5 basis
points or 0.05 percentage points) increases inflation expectations by 0.05 percentage
points. This is a small effect, which is not surprising given the size of the observed
surprises. However, the fact that these small surprises measured in a small window
around the meetings impact expectations significantly at all is meaningful as such. In
addition, the observed effect is probably a mixture of effects from households who
do not react at all and those that do react. In Subsection 2.3.2, I further analyze the
effects for different demographic groups. In fact, the effect is about twice as large as
19The largest two negative surprises -0.37 percentage points in April 2004 and -0.25 percentage points
in October 1998.
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the baseline effect for some of these groups.
The sign of the effect implies that a surprise policy tightening leads households to
revise their inflation expectations upward, not downward as the standard channel of
monetary policy would imply. This result is in line with households reacting more
strongly to the perceived information content of the announcement than to the effect
of the announced policy: if the central bank announces a policy that is more tighten-
ing than expected by financial markets, this implies that inflation may increase more
than previously thought. Therefore, households revise their inflation expectations up-
wards. They thus pay less attention to the fact that higher interest rates should lower
inflation in the future in line with standard monetary policy transmission. I support
this interpretation by showing that also newspaper articles refer to high or increasing
inflation more frequently after tightening surprises in Section 2.4.
In addition to considering outlier observations regarding the size of surprises, it is
useful to control for special episodes of monetary policy over the course of the sample.
Table 2.3 shows estimations allowing for different effects at the ZLB, during the great
financial crisis of 2008/09, due to unconventional policies and given the level of the
current federal funds target. In addition, I check for possible non-linearities due to the
sign of the surprise as well as for the effects of rounding.
The first three columns highlight that the effects are weaker at the ZLB. At the ZLB,
a positive surprise actually lowers inflation expectations. The same is true for the pe-
riod of the financial crisis. Given these two periods partially overlap, this is plausible.
However, the fact that at the ZLB information effects are less relevant seems some-
what surprising. This may partially be due to many different types of announcements
falling into this period. Column (3) highlights that meetings with a quantitative easing
(QE) announcement have very different effects compared to meetings with a forward
guidance announcement (dates from Swanson 2017). In particular, forward guidance
announcements have much stronger information effects. Given that most Fed forward
guidance announcements can be considered Delphic (see e.g., Moessner, Jansen, and
de Haan 2017), this is not surprising. Delphic forward guidance announcements reveal
additional information about the future and therefore lead to positive co-movement of
monetary policy and inflation expectations (Campbell et al. 2012). Beyond the simple
dummy indicator for the ZLB, one can also control for the level of the federal funds
rate in general. In column (4), the current fed funds target level and as well as an inter-
action between the fed funds target and the monetary policy surprise are included.20
These results show that generally a lower fed funds target is associated with slightly
lower inflation expectations while the reaction to the surprise is stronger the lower the
20For the period in which the Fed is using a target range, the midpoint of the range is used.
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Table 2.3: Financial crisis, unconventional policy and state dependence
Dependent variable: inflation expectations in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZLB Fin. crisis QE+FG State dep. Sign Rounding
FF surprise, t-1 1.14** 1.51*** 1.04** 4.68*** 0.80 1.81***
(0.51) (0.57) (0.50) (1.34) (0.64) (0.53)
ZLB × -6.30**
FF surprise, t-1 (2.56)
GFC × -3.21*
FF surprise, t-1 (1.79)
Post GFC × -0.63
FF surprise, t-1 (2.45)
QE × -15.07*
FF surprise, t-1 (9.05)
Forward Guidance × 22.08***
FF surprise, t-1 (7.83)
FF target, t-1 × -0.95***
FF surprise, t-1 (0.31)
FF target, t-1 -0.03***
(0.01)
Pos. FF surprise × 0.71
FF surprise, t-1 (1.27)
Exp. multiple of 5 × -1.94*
FF surprise, t-1 (1.05)
Gas price 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
inflation, t (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.66*** 0.62*** 0.63***
inflation, t (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 86988 86988 86988 86988 86988 86988
Households 43494 43494 43494 43494 43494 43494
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC meetings.
Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer to the next 12
months. Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in the price level for
food and gasoline products, respectively. ZLB: 12/2008-11/2015. GFC = great financial crisis:
01/2008-06/2009. QE and FG dates from Swanson (2017). Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
target. The coefficients imply that at the ZLB with a target of 0.125%,21 a one standard
deviation monetary policy surprise leads to a 0.23 percentage point increase in infla-
tion expectations, compared to an increase of only 0.09 percentage points at a target
21The midpoint of the 0-0.25% range the Fed used at ZLB.
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level of 3%.22
Finally, Table 2.3 explores two additional non-linearities. Column (5) shows that
the sign of the surprise does not lead to significantly different effects. Column (6)
shows that households who report a multiple of five as their inflation expectation do
not respond to the monetary policy surprise (the sum of the two coefficients is not sig-
nificantly different from zero). Reporting a multiple of five is considered to indicate a
high degree of uncertainty about the forecast (Binder 2017c). It is plausible that indi-
viduals who are uncertain about their forecast are also individuals who are not aware
of monetary policy announcements or do not pay attention to them, and thus do not
react to them.23
An additional issue to consider is other economic news being released in the same
month, which may be correlated with the surprise in monetary policy. While the small
window around the meeting ensures that the interest rate surprise does not pick up
any information beyond the one revealed by the central bank announcements, it is still
possible that the surprise correlates with other economic news. One way to control for
this is to include measures of other economic news surprises in the analysis explicitly
(see e.g., Del Negro et al. 2012). Because data availability is limited on these data, I
refer this additional check to the appendix. Table B.9 shows that the inclusion of other
economic news does not affect results much. See Appendix B3 for details.
2.3.2 Heterogeneity
In a next step, I explore the heterogeneity across households in more detail. The choice
of variables largely follows other authors who considered household heterogeneity in
expectations (Binder 2017a; Coibion et al. 2019b; Das et al. 2020; Dräger and Lamla
2018). Table 2.4 displays the effect of monetary policy surprises on household inflation
expectations for different demographic groups. There are no significant differences
between any of the groups considered. However, the coefficients differ in the expected
direction. Male respondents react more strongly than female respondents (column (1)).
Households in the upper two terciles of the income distribution react more strongly
than the bottom third. The effect is largest for the middle tercile though, with 1.76
(significant at the 10% level). For education, results are more mixed: respondents with
at least a college degree react more strongly than those with no degree. However, those
with only high school or less show the largest response (1.89 also significant at the 10%
22A one standard deviation surprise is 0.05 percentage points. Thus the effects are 4.68 · 0.05− 0.95 ·
0.05 · 0.125 = 0.23 and 4.68 · 0.05− 0.95 · 0.05 · 3 = 0.09
23Binder (2017c) shows that rounding behavior for inflation expectations is a bit more complex and
goes on to develop an uncertainty index based on time varying rounding behavior. However, for the
purpose of this study the multiples of five should provide a sufficient proxy. This is supported by the
fact that most extreme values are also multiples of five (see Figure B.1).
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Table 2.4: Effects for different demographic groups
Dependent variable: inflation expectations in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender Income Education Homeowner Stockowner
FF surprise, t-1 1.15* 0.55 0.82 1.37** 1.70
(0.61) (0.70) (0.94) (0.56) (1.20)
Female × -0.30
FF surprise, t-1 (1.01)
Income, bottom 33% × -0.29
FF surprise, t-1 (1.49)
Income, middle 33% × 1.21
FF surprise, t-1 (1.16)
HS degree or less × 1.07
FF surprise, t-1 (1.39)
Some college, no degree × -1.14
FF surprise, t-1 (1.34)
College degree × 0.32
FF surprise, t-1 (1.30)
Rent × -1.91
FF surprise, t-1 (1.28)
No stocks × 0.12
FF surprise, t-1 (1.64)
Stocks, bottom 33% × -1.11
FF surprise, t-1 (2.05)
Stocks, middle 33% × 1.12
FF surprise, t-1 (1.81)
Gas price inflation, t 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price inflation, t 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.89***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Observations 86988 80152 86672 86594 56614
Households 43494 40076 43336 43297 28307
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC meetings.
Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer to the next 12 months.
Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in the price level for food and
gasoline products, respectively. Baseline categories for the demographic variables are (1) male, (2)
income in top 33%, (3) graduate degree, (4) homeowner, (5) stockowner with inv. amount in top
33%. Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
level).24
24I compute the coefficients for the subgroups as the sum of the the average effect and the interac-
tion effect of the subgroup. The significance level is obtained using the two standard errors and the
covariance of the estimated coefficients.
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In addition, I differentiate based on home ownership and stock ownership. These
two variables are of course correlated with the income and education levels. Home-
owners significantly increase expectations after a tightening surprise while renters do
no react. Furthermore, stockowners with an investment amount in the top tercile react
more strongly than those with investment in the bottom tercile. Similar to the income
result the middle tercile reacts even more strongly than the top (coefficient of 2.82,
significant at the 5% level).
These results are in line with male, richer and more educated respondents being
more informed in general. Table B.3 in Appendix B1 shows that indeed these house-
holds are more likely to report to have heard news about the economy and inflation
in particular.25 Homeowners and stockowners are more likely to report hearing news
as well. In addition to these demographic variables, individual experiences over time
may also matter (Malmendier and Nagel 2016). Therefore, Table B.4 in Appendix B1
provides results by age groups and cohort (following Dräger and Lamla (2018) sim-
ply split based on whether they experienced the high inflation episodes in the 1970s).
Difference between the groups are relatively small. For completeness, the table also
reports some joint specifications with all demographic variables.
2.3.3 Other monetary policy measures
So far, all results are based on one measure of monetary policy and on a sample starting
in 1994. Table 2.5 shows results focusing on a longer sample and additional measures.
In columns (1) and (2), I extend the sample to 1990 but still use the high-frequency
surprises in the 3-months federal funds futures from Jarociński and Karadi (2020).26 In
the years 1990 to 1993, the effect is also positive but not significant. In the full sample
from 1990 to 2016, the effect is very similar to the baseline case (1.10 compared to 1.00,
see Table 2.2).
In the next two columns, monetary policy surprises are split into the pure monetary
policy (MP) shock and the central bank information (CBI) shock, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2. Jarociński and Karadi (2020) provide two ways of splitting the surprises into
these two shocks: in one case, they implement sign restrictions in a VAR. This approach
allows for both types of shocks to occur at once. In the second case, they simply call the
interest rate surprise a MP shock if interest rates and the stock market move in opposite
directions. If they move in the same direction, the surprise is called CBI shock. This ap-
proach is labeled the ‘poor man’s identification’. Both shocks resulting from the VAR
with sign restrictions significantly increase expectations (column (3)). When using the
25The results are obtained by estimating a probit estimation for the dummy variables indicating
whether the hosuehold heard news about the topic specified.
26The data for the monetary policy surprises is not available before 1990.
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Table 2.5: Different samples and monetary policy measures
Dependent variable: inflation expectations in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1990- 1990- JK JK Romer, Romer, Romer,
1993 2016 sign poor man 1994-2016 1980-1993 1980-2016
FF surprise, t-1 0.99 1.10**
(1.02) (0.49)
MP, sign, t-1 1.18***
(0.44)
CBI, sign, t-1 1.25*
(0.65)
MP, poor 0.79
man, t-1 (0.48)
CBI, poor 2.31***
man, t-1 (0.80)
Romer, t-1 0.34*** 0.19 0.21*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11)
Gas price 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.04***
inflation, t (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Food price 0.03 0.24*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.06 0.01 0.06
inflation, t (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 69204 158068 86988 86988 53762 69956 127662
Households 34602 79034 43494 43494 26881 34978 63831
Within R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC meetings.
Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer to the next 12 months.
Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in the price level for food and gasoline
products, respectively. MP: monetary policy shock from Jarociński and Karadi (2020). CBI: central
bank information shock from Jarociński and Karadi (2020). ‘sign’ and ‘poor man’ refer to the different
identification strategies. Romer: monetary policy shocks from Wieland and Yang (2020), based on
Romer and Romer (2004). Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
shocks based on the sign of the changes in interest rates and the stock market (poor
man’s identification, column (4)), only the CBI shock has a significant effect, although
both coefficients are positive. The CBI shocks is precisely constructed to measure in-
formation provided by the central bank. In particular, a positive CBI shock implies
information about more expansionary economic developments, i.e. more growth and
higher inflation. This supports the interpretation that the overall response to the mon-
etary policy surprise is due to information effects. In addition, the positive coefficient
of the MP shock and the difference in the results with the two shock versions points
to potential differences in how financial markets and other actors perceive monetary
policy surprises.
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The last three columns of Table 2.5 show results using the monetary policy sur-
prises provided by Wieland and Yang (2020) based on Romer and Romer (2004). For
the baseline sample in column (5), a positive, i.e. tightening, Romer shock also has a
positive and significant effect on inflation expectations. This in line with the response
to the high-frequency monetary policy surprises. The magnitude cannot be compared
directly because the Romer shocks are residual measures. One way to think about
magnitudes is to compare the effect of a one standard deviation change. In the baseline
sample the standard deviation of the Romer shocks is 0.16 percentage points, implying
an effect of 0.34 · 0.16 = 0.054 percentage points. This is very close to the effect of a
one standard deviation high-frequency surprise, which is 0.05 percentage points (see
above). The Romer shock series only measures surprise movements by the Fed based
on the Fed’s internal forecasts (for details see Subsection 2.2.2). However, these fore-
casts are not available to the general public at the time. Therefore, it is plausible that
households also react to these surprises.
The Romer series is available since 1969. It therefore allows for an estimation with
a longer time dimension than the data by Jarociński and Karadi (2020). Since the panel
dimension of MSC data starts in July 1980, columns (6) and (7) show results for samples
from July 1980 to December 1993 and December 2016 respectively. Effects are weaker
and less significant when including these earlier observations indicating that informa-
tion effects were less strong before 1994. This result makes sense in light of the less
frequent and more opaque communication by the Fed in this earlier period.
To summarize, the results in this section show that monetary policy surprises in-
crease inflation expectations of US households. The size of the effect depends on the
sample and on current conditions. However, the direction is quite robust to various
specifications. I interpret this finding as evidence for the information effect being
present for households. Similar findings already exist for financial markets and pro-
fessional forecasters (Campbell et al. 2012; Nakamura and Steinsson 2018) and firms
(Enders et al. 2019b). In the following section, I will use information about actual
newspaper reporting around monetary policy meetings to corroborate this interpreta-
tion.
2.4 Transmission via newspaper reporting
So far, we have seen that monetary policy surprises increase inflation expectations.
However, it is commonly understood that most households do not know a lot about
central banks and do not follow monetary policy decisions closely (Binder 2017b). In-
stead, they use other sources of information such as shopping experiences but also
media reporting when forming expectations (D’Acunto et al. 2019b). Therefore, one
CHAPTER 2. MONETARY POLICY AND HOUSEHOLD EXPECTATIONS 71
potential transmission channel of monetary policy to households is reporting by news-
papers.
The basic idea is that households may not actively follow Federal Reserve policy
but do regularly read newspapers. After central bank decisions, newspapers report
about the decision and, in particular, report the perceived view of the central bank on
inflation. Specifically, after decisions, which were more tightening than expected, the
articles refer more to the risk or expectation of high inflation. When seeing these arti-
cles, households notice the information about current and future inflation but may not
pay much attention to the implied effects of monetary policy on future inflation. If this
is the case, the information will lead them to increase their own inflation expectations
after tightening announcements and vice versa after easing announcements. In this
section, I will provide evidence for this channel.
2.4.1 Text analysis
In order to analyze how newspaper reporting transmits monetary policy surprises to
households, I first need to develop an appropriate measure of reporting. Since the fo-
cus of this chapter are inflation expectations, I will use a simple text analysis method,
called dictionary or lexicon method, to classify articles into those referring to high or
increasing inflation versus those referring to low or decreasing inflation. No off-the-
shelf dictionary is available for this kind of classification. Therefore, I develop my own
dictionary.27 For this purpose, I first separate all articles published within a week of
the FOMC meeting and selected based on the keywords described in Subsection 2.2.3,
into sentences.28 Then I locate all instances of the word ‘inflation’ and tabulate all
words occurring close to this keyword. From this list, I choose words indicating ei-
ther high/increasing inflation or low/decreasing inflation. Table B.10 in Appendix B4
shows the resulting lists. In a final step, I classify each sentence to refer to one of the two
categories if one of the keywords occurs within five words before or after ‘inflation’.
The choice of five words is based on preliminary analysis weighting the probability of
creating false positives and false negatives. Five words allow sufficiently many words
to be considered to capture language that is more complex but ensure the keyword
still refers to ‘inflation’. In addition, I adjust for negations and conjunctions as well
as some recurring phrases. I also manually check the classification of the sentences
27There are several dictionaries for classifying text into positive and negative based on the sentiment
expressed therein (see Shapiro, Sudhof, and Wilson 2019, for an overview and discussion). Picault and
Renault (2017) develop a dictionary for classifying all ECB statements into hawkish, dovish or neutral
by manually classifying sentences within statements and the searching for phrases and words which
best predict the human coding.
28Before separating articles into sentences, I use the LexisNexisTools package provided by Johannes
Gruber at https://github.com/JBGruber/LexisNexisTools to convert the articles downloaded from
LexisNexis into a format suitable for text analysis.
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Table 2.6: News classification at the article level
Group of articles considered:
‘up’ only ‘down’ only ‘up’+‘down’ neither all
Number of articles 1018 627 475 1630 3750
Share in all articles 0.271 0.167 0.127 0.435 1
Avg. share of ‘up’ sentences 0.054 0 0.055 0 0.021
Avg. share of ‘down’ sentences 0 0.049 0.049 0 0.014
Avg. diff. in sentence shares 0.054 -0.049 0.006 0 0.007
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the different news reporting measures. Based on articles from Lex-
isNexis database published in US newspapers within seven days of FOMC meetings in the sample
period, and containing the three keywords ‘inflation’, ‘central bank’ and ‘fed’. ‘up’ means sen-
tence/article refers to high or increasing inflation. ‘down’ means sentence/article refers to low or
decreasing inflation. Different columns refer to classification at the article level.
for randomly drawn subsets. For details on the procedure and the checks, please see
Appendix B4.
This procedure provides me with a count of sentences about high/increasing infla-
tion and low/decreasing inflation for each article. There are different ways to aggre-
gate this measure to the frequency of the FOMC meetings. I use two different types
of measures. The first is constructed at the article level. I define two binary indicators
for each article: an article is defined to be an ‘up’ article if it includes at least one sen-
tence referring to high or increasing inflation, and it is defined to be a ‘down’ article
if it includes at least one sentence referring to low or decreasing inflation. This means
articles can also be part of both categories. Table 2.6 shows the resulting distribution
for all articles published within seven days after the FOMC meetings. In total 39.8%
of all articles are classified as ‘up’: 27.1% are only ‘up’ and another 12.7% are both
‘up’ and ‘down’. ‘Down’ articles are less frequent: in total 29.4% are ‘down’ articles,
and 16.7% are only ‘down’. Finally, these measures can be aggregated to the meeting
level by simply computing the share of each article type in all articles published after
the meeting. In addition, I also construct a difference measure by subtracting the total
share of ‘down’ articles from the total share of ‘up’ articles for each meeting.
The second measure is constructed at the sentence level. For this, I simply compute
the share of ‘up’ sentences (i.e. referring to high or increasing inflation) in all sentences
of each article, and the share of ‘down’ sentences in all sentences. I can again construct
a difference measure by subtracting the two shares. Table 2.6 displays the resulting
shares. The average share of ‘up’ sentences is 2.1% for all articles and 5.4% for articles
with at least one ‘up’ sentence. The average share of ‘down’ sentences is slightly lower
in the full sample with 1.4%. This is partially due to fewer articles containing any
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Table 2.7: Newspaper reporting and monetary policy
Dependent variable: news reporting index,
sentence-based measure article-based measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
‘up’ ‘down’ diff. ‘up’ ‘down’ diff.
FF surprise, t 0.027** 0.004 0.023 0.356** 0.188 0.168
(0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.161) (0.214) (0.271)
Constant 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.393*** 0.314*** 0.079***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023)
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188
Adjusted R2 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around
FOMC meetings. ‘up’ means sentence/article refers to high or increasing inflation.
‘down’ means sentence/article refers to low or decreasing inflation. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
‘down’ sentences and partially due to a lower share of ‘down’ sentences in articles,
which do contain ‘down’ sentences (4.9%). Finally, the last row of Table 2.6 shows
the difference measure at the sentence level. In case of the ‘up only’ and ‘down only’
articles it simply equals the share of the respective group (with a negative sign for
‘down’ articles). In the case of the categories where both ‘up’ and ‘down’ articles exists,
it equals the difference between the shares. For all articles, the difference measure
equals 0.7 percentage points. For the group of articles, which contain both types of
sentences it is 0.6 percentage points. To get a measure at the meeting level, I again
average over all articles published after each meeting.
2.4.2 Results
In order to establish how news reporting transmits monetary policy to households, I
proceed in two steps. First, I show that a tightening monetary policy surprise increases
the amount of reporting referring to high or increasing inflation. In a second step, I
analyze how monetary policy and news reporting jointly affect inflation expectations.
Table 2.7 shows how monetary policy surprises affect newspaper reporting. I obtain
the results by simply regressing the different measures of news reporting for articles
published after a FOMC meeting on the high-frequency identified monetary policy
surprises of the respective meeting.29 The effect is only significant for the measures of
reporting about high or increasing inflation (‘up’ measure). The coefficient is positive,
both for the sentence-based and the article-based measure. This result is in line with
the hypothesis that after tightening surprises reporting about high inflation increases.
29The regression model is a simple OLS model with robust standard errors.
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However, the effect is insignificant for the measures of ‘down’ sentences as well as
the difference measures. This indicates possible problems with the relatively simple
text analysis methodology. A more complex approach such as proposed by Shapiro
et al. (2019) or Picault and Renault (2017) may provide results that are more precise.
However, this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
To support the results found, I also rely on the self-reported news from the Michi-
gan Survey. The advantage of this measure is that we can be sure households actually
heard the news. The drawback is the relatively low coverage. As already discussed
above, only two news items are recorded per household, limiting the total number of
specific news items reported. Nevertheless, Table B.5 in Appendix B1 shows that tight-
ening surprises increase the probability of households hearing news about increasing
inflation and higher interest rates.30 These results are in line with the effect on actual
reporting.
Finally, I want to understand how reporting affects inflation expectations and how
much of the overall effect of monetary policy is due to reporting. For this purpose, I
resort to a simple form of mediation analysis as used in Das et al. (2020). This simple
approach relies on jointly estimating the effect of the explanatory variables (monetary
policy in this case) and the mediator (news reporting). I therefore estimate the model
from equation (2.1) again, but now also include the different measures of newspaper
reporting. The timing is the same as before. I include the reporting associated with
the monetary policy surprise from the previous month. The sample is the same as the
baseline sample in Table 2.2.
Table 2.8 displays the results. In columns (1) and (3), I jointly include the two ‘up’
and ‘down’ measures due to the overlap between ‘up’ and ‘down’ articles for some
meetings. As expected, more reporting about high or increasing inflation increases
inflation expectations while reporting about low or decreasing inflation significantly
lowers expectations. Interestingly, the effect of reporting about low inflation is almost
twice as large as the effect of reporting about more inflation. This may be related to the
fact that reporting about low inflation is more infrequent so it might be more noticeable
when it does occur. The effects are independent of the measure used. The quantitative
difference between the coefficients is related to the different quantitative levels of the
two measures. Finally, the difference measures both increase inflation expectations,
which is no surprise given the effects of the two separate measures.31
Based on these results one can discuss the direct and indirect effects of monetary
30The dependent variables are dummies whether the household heard something about higher
prices/increasing inflation vs. lower prices/decreasing inflation and higher interest rates vs. lower
interest rates respectively. Details on these questions can be found in Appendix B2.
31For completeness, Table B.6 in the appendix provides similar results using the self-reported news
again. The direction of the effects is in line with results found for actual reporting.
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Table 2.8: Expectations, monetary policy and newspaper reporting
Dependent variable: inflation expectations in t
Sentence-based measure Article-based measure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
‘up’/‘down’ diff. ‘up’/‘down’ diff.
FF surprise, t-1 0.84* 0.95* 1.14** 1.22**
(0.51) (0.50) (0.51) (0.50)
Share of ‘up’ sentences, t-1 4.04***
(1.06)
Share of ‘down’ sentences, t-1 -7.07***
(1.14)
Diff. in sentences shares, t-1 5.37***
(0.87)
Share of ‘up’ articles, t-1 0.28***
(0.07)
Share of ‘down’ articles, t-1 -0.50***
(0.07)
Diff. in articles shares, t-1 0.38***
(0.06)
Gas price inflation, t 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price inflation, t 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.62***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 86988 86988 86988 86988
Households 43494 43494 43494 43494
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC
meetings. Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer to
the next 12 months. Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in the
price level for food and gasoline products, respectively. ‘up’ means sentence/article refers
to high or increasing inflation. ‘down’ means sentence/article refers to low or decreasing
inflation. Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
policy. When including the sentence-based measures, the direct effect of monetary pol-
icy is somewhat smaller than without news reporting (0.84 and 0.95 compared to 1.00
in Table 2.2). When including the article-based measure, the effect actually increases
slightly. The indirect effect of monetary policy on expectations can be computed by
combining the effect of monetary policy on reporting from Table 2.7 with the effect of
reporting on expectations in Table 2.8. For the case of the share of ‘up’ sentences, the in-
direct effect of monetary policy on inflation expectations is 0.027 · 4.04 = 0.11, i.e. 11%
of the total effect in the baseline specification. Using the article-based ‘up’ measure it
is: 0.356 · 0.28 = 0.10 or 10% of the total effect.
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Quantitatively the news reporting measures thus explain only a small share of the
overall effect of monetary policy. This may be due to several reasons. We have already
seen above that the measures derived here may be imprecise. In addition, the news-
paper coverage is limited and does not include all major (regional) US newspapers.
Finally, households also depend on other media such as TV and radio for informa-
tion on expectations (D’Acunto et al. 2019b). Therefore, the derived measures of news
reporting may not fully cover all the news households are exposed to. A more compre-
hensive analysis of all types of reporting with a more complex text analysis approach
may lead to quantitatively more relevant and more precise results.
Generally, however the results support the hypothesis that surprise tightening an-
nouncements increase inflation expectations due to the information effect. After sur-
prise tightenings, newspapers report more about high or increasing inflation, which
in turn influences household inflation expectations. They thereby provide a potential
transmission channel from the central bank to the households.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter shows that monetary policy directly affects households’ inflation expec-
tations in the US. A surprise tightening of monetary policy increases inflation expecta-
tions. The effect is quantitatively small, also due to the small size of the high-frequency
surprises used to quantify monetary policy announcements. However, the direction of
the effect is significant and robust to different specifications. The results support the
hypothesis that agents in the economy look to central bank decisions to learn some-
thing about the current outlook for the economy. This interpretation is supported by
the fact that news reported and news heard react in a similar way. After surprise tight-
ening announcements more articles mention high or increasing inflation and house-
holds report more frequently that they heard news about high or increasing inflation.
The results have important implications for monetary policy. First, they highlight
that monetary policy does have a direct effect on expectations. This is in line with
other recent analyses such as Lewis et al. (2019) and Enders et al. (2019b). At the same
time, it is not necessarily contradicting evidence that households are not very informed
about central banks (Binder 2017b). Evidence by D’Acunto et al. (2019b), among others,
shows that households do update their expectation if they are directly confronted with
news about inflation or the central bank. Thus, my results indicate that after monetary
policy meetings a sufficiently large amount of people reads the news about inflation
and reacts accordingly. Given the effects of direct information treatments in survey
experiments, this implies quantitative effects should increase when central bank com-
munication reaches more people.
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The second implication is that more and better communication has non-trivial ef-
fects on the economy. The information effect highlighted here leads to updating in the
opposite direction of the one intended by the policy change. If the central bank is more
worried about inflation than previously thought and accordingly raises interest rates in
order to reduce inflation pressures, an increase in household inflation expectations lim-
its the effectiveness of this policy. This is especially relevant when conventional policy
is constrained due to the effective lower bound. Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) ar-
gue that in normal times providing additional information is likely welfare improving
even with an offsetting information effect because the central bank can always counter-
act with additional policy changes. In addition, it is likely that the information would
have been revealed to households anyway, only with a delay. In this case, the early
revelation of the information by central banks does not alter the path of the economy
much. However, at the effective lower bound negative spirals are possible. In that case,
it may be useful to withhold negative information (Nakamura and Steinsson 2018).
Wiederholt (2015) models the effects of more communication by the central bank
explicitly in a simple New Keynesian model with information frictions. The author
shows that there is one central trade-off central banks face. Generally, more informa-
tion can be considered welfare improving because it allows agents to make efficient de-
cisions and because it reduces dispersion across households. However, incomplete in-
formation on the part of some agents provides an insurance mechanism against shocks
hitting the economy, as some agents are not aware of how bad (good) the current state
is. If the economy is at the effective lower bound and more people learn about this
due to central bank communication, this may make the situation worse as they reduce
consumption further.
In light of these potentially problematic consequences of central bank communi-
cation, additional research on the effects and transmission mechanisms is needed. In
particular, the results of this study should be confirmed with more detailed survey
data, especially regarding the timing of the responses. In addition, the measure of
news reporting about monetary policy could be improved in terms of media covered,
topics considered (beyond inflation) and the text analysis approach used. In light of
the monetary policy response to the next crisis, these are highly relevant topics – espe-
cially, given the fact that the ECB is still at the effective lower bound and the Fed just
moved back to it in March 2020.
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Appendices to Chapter 2
B1 Additional tables and figures
Figure B.1: Cross-sectional distribution of inflation expectations
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Notes: Histograms how quantitative inflation expectations for the next 12 months from the Michigan
Survey of Consumers, from January 1994 to December 2016.
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Table B.1: Demographic distribution in different samples
All With Base- All With Base-
exp. line exp. line
Gender Education
Male 0.47 0.49 0.50 High school or less 0.34 0.32 0.30
Female 0.53 0.51 0.50 Some college, no degree 0.26 0.27 0.26
Renter/owner College degree 0.24 0.25 0.26
Owns home 0.76 0.77 0.80 Graduate studies 0.16 0.17 0.18
Rents home 0.24 0.23 0.20 Income
Cohort bottom 33% 0.27 0.25 0.23
Born before 1970 0.81 0.80 0.83 middle 33% 0.34 0.35 0.35
Born 1970 and later 0.19 0.20 0.17 top 33% 0.38 0.40 0.42
Age Investment
18-39 years 0.30 0.30 0.28 No stocks 0.44 0.41 0.37
40-59 years 0.39 0.40 0.41 Inv. in bottom 33% 0.17 0.17 0.18
60 years and older 0.31 0.30 0.31 Inv. in middle 33% 0.18 0.19 0.21
Inv. in top 33% 0.20 0.22 0.24
Notes: ‘With exp.’ refers to households who provided an answer to the question on quantitative inflation
expectations for the next 12 months (Q2). ‘Baseline’ refers to sample of household responding twice to
the survey and reporting inflation expectations both times. Specific household types are more likely
not to respond to the inflation expectations question, and not to respond to the second interview. This
leads to differences in the shares in both samples. Generally, women and households with a lower
socio-economic status are less likely to respond twice and to respond to inflation expectations.
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Table B.2: List of newspaper included and number of articles
Newspaper No. art. Newspaper No. art.
1 The New York Times 678 36 San Gabriel Valley Tribune 18
2 The Washington Post 417 37 The Hill 14
3 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 243 38 Inland Valley Daily Bulletin 13
4 Charleston Gazette 207 39 The Detroit News 11
5 St.Louis Post-Dispatch 169 40 The New York Sun 9
6 Telegraph Herald 164 41 Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette 8
7 Deseret Morning News 155 42 San Bernardino Sun 8
8 St.Paul Pioneer Press 148 43 Lowell Sun 7
9 Bismarck Tribune 126 44 Pasadena Star- News 7
10 The Philadelphia Inquirer 118 45 Long Island Business News 6
11 San Jose Mercury News 113 46 Alameda Times-Star 5
12 The Columbian 89 47 New Orleans City Business 5
13 Chicago Daily Herald 70 48 Lincoln Journal Star 4
14 South Bend Tribune 69 49 San Mateo County Times 4
15 WashingtonPost.com 68 50 Tri-Valley Herald 4
16 The Pantagraph 66 51 Daily Journal of Commerce 3
17 Austin American-Statesman 63 52 Intelligence Journal 3
18 The Atlanta Journal and Con-
stitution
59 53 Long Beach Press-Telegram 3
19 Monterey County Herald 51 54 Marin Independent Journal 3
20 Dayton Daily News 48 55 Santa Fe New Mexican 3
21 The Daily Record 46 56 Tampa Bay Times 3
22 The New York Post 44 57 The Wall Street Journal 3
23 The Tampa Tribune 43 58 Daily Camera 2
24 Pittsburgh Tribune Review 39 59 The Daily Record of Rochester 2
25 The Orange County Register 38 60 The Evening Sun 2
26 St.Petersburg Times 37 61 Colorado Springs Business
Journal
1
27 Wisconsin State Journal 36 62 Finance & Commerce 1
28 Daily News 28 63 Mississippi Business Journal 1
29 The Daily News of Los Ange-
les
27 64 New York Observer 1
30 Inside Bay Area 25 65 Roll Call 1
31 Philadelphia Daily News 25 66 The Indianapolis Business
Journal
1
32 Star Tribune 22 67 The Mecklenburg Times 1
33 The Oklahoman 21 68 Tribune-Review 1
34 Capital Times 20 69 Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 1
35 Creators Syndicate 19 Total 3750
Notes: List of all newspapers from which articles are used in the analysis, i.e. all articles from LexisNexis
database published in US newspapers within seven days of FOMC meetings in the sample period, and
containing the three keywords ‘inflation’, ‘central bank’ and ‘fed’.
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Table B.3: Demographics and news heard
Dependent var.: indicator of having heard news in t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
General Economic situation Inflation Interest rates
Female -0.03*** 0.01 -0.09*** -0.18***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Income, bottom 33% -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.00 -0.29***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Income, middle 33% -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.01 -0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
HS degree or less -0.60*** -0.45*** -0.14*** -0.43***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Some college, no degree -0.30*** -0.21*** -0.04** -0.25***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
College degree -0.14*** -0.08*** 0.01 -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Rent -0.02* -0.05*** -0.03* -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
No stocks -0.34*** -0.28*** -0.11*** -0.20***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Stocks, bottom 33% -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Stocks, middle 33% -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.04** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
18-39 years -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.06*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
40-59 years 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.20***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.96*** 0.52*** -1.41*** -1.40***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 109898 100160 110394 110394
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.06
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC meet-
ings. Baseline categories are male, income in top 33%, graduate degree, homeowner,
stockowner with inv. amount in top 33%, and 60 years and older. Dependent variables
are dummy variables, where 1 indicates household heard news referring to the topic in
the column header. 0 indicates no news heard. Details on news questions can be found in
Appendix B2.2. Coefficients are from probit estimations. Cluster-adjusted robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Effect for additional demographic groups
Dependent var.: inflation expectations in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Cohort Joint spec. 1 Joint 2 Joint 3
FF surprise, t-1 0.96 0.97* 0.84 2.84* 1.62
(1.03) (0.54) (0.79) (1.63) (1.97)
18-39 years × 0.60 1.25
FF surprise, t-1 (1.40) (2.56)
40-59 years × -0.35 1.77
FF surprise, t-1 (1.27) (1.66)
Born 1970 and later × 0.17 0.78
FF surprise, t-1 (1.50) (2.71)
Female × -0.22 -1.39 -1.33
FF surprise, t-1 (1.05) (1.39) (1.40)
Rent × -1.93 -1.31 -1.56
FF surprise, t-1 (1.40) (1.88) (1.93)
Income, bottom 33% × 0.39 -0.16 0.48
FF surprise, t-1 (1.61) (2.21) (2.29)
Income, middle 33% × 1.45 2.11 2.30
FF surprise, t-1 (1.18) (1.71) (1.73)
HS degree or less × -0.64 -0.77
FF surprise, t-1 (2.03) (2.04)
Some college, no degree × -2.96 -3.06
FF surprise, t-1 (2.01) (2.01)
College degree × -0.61 -0.75
FF surprise, t-1 (1.85) (1.85)
No stocks × 0.31 0.10
FF surprise, t-1 (2.10) (2.13)
Stocks, bottom 33% × -1.60 -2.07
FF surprise, t-1 (2.27) (2.34)
Stocks, middle 33% × 1.33 1.12
FF surprise, t-1 (1.94) (1.99)
Gas price inflation, t 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price inflation, t 0.62*** 0.62*** 0.65*** 0.87*** 0.89***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 86542 86540 79924 53716 59982
Households 43271 43270 39962 26858 33193
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC
meetings. Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer
to the next 12 months. Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change
in the price level for food and gasoline products, respectively. Baseline categories are
(1) 60 years and older, (2) born before 1970, (3)-(5) male, income in top 33%, graduate
degree, homeowner, stockowner with inv. amount in top 33%, 60 years and older, and
born before 1970. Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
CHAPTER 2. MONETARY POLICY AND HOUSEHOLD EXPECTATIONS 83
Table B.5: Monetary policy and self-reported news
Dependent variable: type of news heard on
economy inflation interest rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FF surprise, t-1 0.05 0.05 0.83** 0.74** 1.63*** 1.65***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.34) (0.34) (0.52) (0.52)
Gas price inflation, t 0.00*** 0.01*** -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price inflation, t 0.07*** -0.00 -0.03
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 22892 22892 1026 1026 960 960
Households 11446 11446 513 513 480 480
Within R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.02
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around
FOMC meetings. Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in
the price level for food and gasoline products, respectively. Dependent variables
are dummy variables, where 1 indicates ‘good/better’ for economy news and
‘high/increasing’ for inflation and interest rates. 0 indicates the opposite. Cases
of contradicting news or no news are excluded. Details on news questions can
be found in Appendix B2.2. Coefficient results from a fixed effects regression.
Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table B.6: Expectations, monetary policy and self-reported news
Dep. var.: inflation exp. in t
(1) (2) (3)
Economic sit. Inflation Interest rates
FF surprise, t-1 1.00** 0.93* 0.97*
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Good/better situation 0.02
(0.04)
Bad/worse situation -0.04
(0.04)
Contradicting news 0.11**
(0.05)
Higher prices/increasing infl. 0.69***
(0.08)
Lower prices/decreasing infl. -0.27***
(0.10)
Higher interest rates 0.15*
(0.08)
Lower interest rates -0.14*
(0.08)
Gas price inflation, t 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price inflation, t 0.62*** 0.60*** 0.63***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 86988 86988 86988
Households 43494 43494 43494
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around
FOMC meetings. Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Con-
sumers, and refer to the next 12 months. Realized inflation is measured as
the month-on-month change in the price level for food and gasoline products,
respectively. Additional explanatory variables are dummy indicators for type
of news heard on different topics: economic situation in column (1), inflation in
column (2) and interest rates in column (3). Cluster-adjusted robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B2 Questions in the Michigan Survey
B2.1 Inflation expectations
Q1 During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in
general will go up, or go down, or stay where they are now?
Go up Go down Stay the same Don’t know
Do you mean that prices will go
up at the same rate as now, or
that prices in general will not go
up during the next 12 months?
END
Go up Will not go up
ENDQ2 By about what percent do you expect prices to go
(up/down) on the average, during the next 12 months?
x percent Don’t know
x ≤ 5 x > 5
How many cents on the dollar do you
expect prices to go (up/down) on the
average, during the next 12 months?
END
Don’t know
END
Let me make sure I have that correct. You said
that you expect prices to go (up/down) during
the next 12 months by x percent. Is that correct?
No Yes Don’t know
END
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B2.2 Other questions
Q3 Homer ownership Do you (and your family living there) own your home, pay
rent, or what? (Open answer possible)
Q4 Stock ownership The next questions are about investments in the stock mar-
ket. First, do you (or any member of your family living there) have any invest-
ments in the stock market, including any publicly traded stock that is directly
owned, stocks in mutual funds, stocks in any of your retirement accounts, in-
cluding 401(K)s, IRAs, or Keogh accounts? (Yes or no answer)
Q4a Stock amount If “yes” for Q4: Considering all of your (family’s) investments
in the stock market, overall about how much would your investments be worth
today? (Probe: What is your best estimate?)
Q4b Stock amount bracket If “don’t know” for Q4a: Would the total be $100,000 or
more?
Yes No
Is it $200,000 or more?
Yes No END
Is it $50,000 or more?
Yes No
Is it $300,000 or more?
Yes No END
Is it $25,000 or more?
Yes No
Is it $500,000 or more?
Yes No END
Is it $10,000 or more?
Yes No
Is it $5,000 or more?
Yes NoEND
Q5 News heard During the last few months, have you heard of any favorable or
unfavorable changes in business conditions? (Yes or no answer)
Q5a News type If “yes” for Q5: What did you hear? (Open answer, up to two answers are
reported to researchers using classification scheme detailed in Table B.7 and Table B.8.)
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B2.3 Classification of self-reported news
Table B.7: Classification of news, items categorized as favorable by respondents
MSC report Economic Sit. Inflation Interest rates
Elections, admin, Congress, President
More military spending, more war/tensions
Less military spending, few tensions
Gov’t programs improved
Specific gov’t programs incr/cont
Specific gov’t programs decr/end
Taxes, changes/reforms, rebates
Other references to gov’t
Fiscal policy, budgets, deficits
Gov’t good/better business condition good/better
Opening of plants, factories, stores good/better
Consumer/auto demand high good/better
Purch power high, wages high good/better
Employ is high, plenty of jobs good/better
Population increase, more people to buy good/better
Low debts, higher savings/assets, invest up good/better
Other references to employ and purch power good/better
Production increasing, GNP is up good/better
Unemp has risen, good for economy
Tight money, int rates high good/better increasing/high
Lower/stable prices, less inflation bad/worse decreasing/less
Higher prices, inflation is good good/better increasing/more
Easier money, credit easy to get, low int rates bad/worse decreasing/low
Profits high/rising good/better
Stock market, rise in price of stocks good/better
Other references to prices/credit
Balance of payments, dollar devalue
Controls (price or wage)
Better race relations, less crime
Union disputes settled, relations good
Times/business is good in the coming year good/better
Bad times can’t last, due for good times good/better
R sees sign of improvement already good/better
Improvements in specific industries good/better
Farm situation good, crops good good/better
Other good factors or favorable ref
Economy more stable, optimism good/better
Energy crisis, pollution
Notes: This classification is provided by the MSC when downloading the data from https://data.sca.
isr.umich.edu/sda-public/cgi-bin/hsda?harcsda+sca.
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Table B.8: Classification of news, items categorized as unfavorable by respondents
MSC report Economic Sit. Inflation Interest rates
Election, new admin/President
More military spending, more war/tensions
Less military spending, few tensions
Specific gov’t spend programs changed
Specific gov’t spend programs eliminated
Gov’t progams begun/increased
Taxes, changes/reforms, rebates
Other references to gov’t
Fiscal policy, budgets, deficits
Gov’t not good/better business conditions bad/worse
Closing of plants, factories, stores bad/worse
Consumer/auto demand low bad/worse
Lack of purch power, no money to spend bad/worse
Drop in employ, less overtime bad/worse
Population increase, immigration
High(er) debts, lower savings/assets bad/worse
Other references to employ/purch power
Production decreasing, GNP down bad/worse
Prices falling, deflation bad/worse decreasing/less
Prices high, inflation good/better increasing/more
Tight money, int rates high good/better increasing/high
Profits low, falling bad/worse
Profits high, too high good/better
Stock market decline bad/worse
Other price/credit references
Balance of payments, dollar devalue
Controls (price or wage)
Bad race relations; more crime
Excessive wage demands by unions; labor unrest
Times are bad now and won’t change in next
year
bad/worse
Good times can’t last, due for a fall bad/worse
R sees downward trends, has heard business is
bad
bad/worse
Decline in specific industries bad/worse
Farm situation is bad, low farm prices, drought bad/worse
Other unfavorable/bad factors
Economy in general less stable, lack of confi-
dence
bad/worse
Energy crisis, pollution, less natural resources
Change mentioned but NA whether favor-
able/unfavorable
Notes: This classification is provided by the MSC when downloading the data from
https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/sda-public/cgi-bin/hsda?harcsda+sca.
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B3 Controlling for other economic news
As discussed at the end of Subsection 2.3.1, other economic news releases may corre-
late with the monetary policy surprises. Therefore, I also control for these other news.
Following Del Negro et al. (2012), I use surprises measured as the difference between
a survey forecast and the actual release. In particular, I use the Reuters Poll surprises
available at ThompsonReuters Datastream. Unfortunately, most series start later than
1994. I therefore, have to limit the sample for this analysis. In order to ensure compa-
rability, I also report the baseline estimation results for the sample when Reuters data
is available.
The news surprises I include are measured as the difference in the median fore-
cast from the Reuters Poll and the actual release. I consider the following monthly
variables: industrial production, capacity utilization, the unemployment rate, and the
manufacturing purchasing manager index (PMI). These series are available since June
1999. Given the lack of information about the timing of the MSC interviews, both news
from the previous months and the current month may be relevant. Therefore, I control
for both.
Table B.9 shows the results. The first two columns focus on news surprises from
the current month. In the sample from June 1999 to December 2016, the coefficient is
larger than in the baseline estimation (2.14 compared to 1.00). However, including the
other economic news only changes the coefficient slightly to 2.21. The same is true for
the results with news from the previous month (columns (3) and (4)), and news from
both months (columns (5) and (6)). In all cases, the inclusion of the news measures
only changes the effect of the monetary policy surprises slightly, and actually increases
it. Furthermore, most of the other economic news do not have a significant effect on
inflation expectations. The difference between the coefficients in these samples and the
one from the baseline sample highlights the state dependence of the quantitative effect.
Depending on which years are included, the effect is smaller or larger. However, the
effect is always positive, indicating the presence of information effects in all samples.
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Table B.9: Role of other economic news releases
Dependent var.: inflation expectations in t
News, month t News, month t-1 News, both
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FF surprise, t-1 2.14*** 2.21*** 2.73*** 2.80*** 2.66*** 2.98***
(0.66) (0.67) (0.67) (0.68) (0.67) (0.69)
Industrial production, surprise, t 0.11 0.00
(0.08) (0.08)
Capacity utilization, surprise, t -0.18* -0.08
(0.10) (0.10)
Unemployment rate, surprise, t 0.40*** 0.59***
(0.13) (0.14)
Manufacturing PMI, surprise, t -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Industrial production, surprise, t-1 -0.18** -0.24***
(0.08) (0.08)
Capacity utilization, surprise, t-1 0.02 0.08
(0.09) (0.10)
Unemployment rate, surprise, t-1 0.16 0.17
(0.14) (0.14)
Manufacturing PMI, surprise, t-1 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Gas price inflation, t 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Food price inflation, t 1.02*** 1.08*** 1.12*** 1.12*** 1.15*** 1.19***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 60386 60386 59668 59668 56724 56724
Households 30193 30193 29834 29834 28362 28362
Within R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Notes: FF surprise: surprise change in the 3-month federal funds future around FOMC meetings.
Inflation expectations are from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and refer to the next 12 months.
Realized inflation is measured as the month-on-month change in the price level for food and gasoline
products, respectively. News surprises are measured as the difference between the median expectation
in the Reuters poll and the actual release of the respective variable. Data available since June 1999, and
taken from Datastream. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the baseline regression for the sample in which
Reuters news data is available to make results comparable. Cluster-adjusted robust standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B4 Classification of newspaper articles
The method of text analysis I use is called dictionary or lexicon method. Since I am
looking for very specific topic in the articles, I use my own list of keywords. In addi-
tion, I make use of the grammatical structure of the articles by only considering sen-
tences. This is more specific than the simple bag-of-words method often used, where
classification is simply based on all words which occur within a text, independent of
their order or distance (see Shapiro et al. 2019). Below I provide the list of keywords I
use. In addition, I describe the detailed adjustments I make based the order of words
as well as the distance of words. The last section discusses some checks I carried out.
B4.1 List of keywords
Table B.10: Keywords used to classify articles
high/increasing low/decreasing
all positions accelerate quickening decline falls
accelerating rampant declined fell
elevated rapid declining low
fast rise decrease lower
faster risen decreased lowered
galloping rises decreases lowest
heightened rising decreasing slow
high rose down slower
higher soaring downward slowest
highest spur drop slowing
increase spurring dropped sluggish
increased strong dropping subdued
increases stronger drops waning
increasing up fall weak
quicken upward fallen weaker
falling
only next to ‘inflation’ more raises less
much raising little
raise raised
B4.2 Adjustments
After locating the word ‘inflation’ in each sentence, I separately check the five words
before and after inflation for the keywords referring to the two categories, see Ta-
ble B.10. In order to ensure the classification is correct, I adjust these raw counts in
several ways:
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1. Some words are only considered if they are directly next to ‘inflation’, see bottom
part of Table B.10. This is done because these words are likely to carry a differ-
ent meaning or to be linked to a different word if they are further away from
‘inflation’.
2. I remove any misleading compound words and phrases including ‘inflation’ from
the text, such as ‘inflation-adjusted’, ‘adjusted for inflation’, or ‘inflation hawk’.
3. I remove misleading expressions including the keywords, such as ‘down the
road’.
4. I remove comparative statements, such as “higher than”.
5. I exclude several cases with conjunctions and negations. For all cases where a
negation or conjunction occurs within the five-word range, I checked all cases
manually and chose how to treat them based on how much misclassification they
introduce. Here I took a conservative approach in the sense that I valued cases
introducing false positives more strongly than cases introducing false negatives.
This leads to the exclusion of the following cases:
i. negation precedes keyword
ii. negation occurs between keyword and ‘inflation’
iii. ‘and’, ‘or’ or ‘by’ occur between keyword and ‘inflation’
iv. ‘up’ keyword followed by ‘or’ (this is usually a phrase like “inflation will be
higher or lower”, it is common not to say “lower or higher”)
v. keyword followed by ‘by’+‘percent’/‘percentage’ (this usually is a phrase
like “inflation rose by 1.3%”, which does not necessarily imply high or in-
creasing inflation)
6. In a few cases keywords from both categories occurred around the same instance
of ‘inflation’. For these I chose the classification manually.
B4.3 Manual checks of results
In order to check how well my dictionary performs, I drew a random sample of 300
sentences from all sentences, which were classified and published on the day of the
meeting or within 7 days after the meeting. Then, I manually checked the classifica-
tion: 10.9% of the 176 sentences classified to refer to high or increasing inflation were
incorrect, i.e. either did not refer to any direction for inflation or the opposite (although
the majority referred to no clear direction). For the 135 sentences classified to refer to
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low or decreasing inflation, 11.9% were incorrect. In total 11.7% of all 300 sentences
were incorrectly classified.
I also considered a random sample of 300 sentences including the word inflation
but not classified to refer to high/increasing or low/decreasing inflation. Of these sen-
tences 31 or 10.3% were classified wrongly, 13 should have been classified to refer to
high/increasing inflation, and 18 should have been classified to refer to low/decreasing
inflation. The differences in both error rates between the two categories may also par-
tially explain the asymmetric response to monetary policy surprises: the measure of
‘down’ reporting may be more imprecise than the ‘up’ measure.
Chapter 3
Firm Expectations and Economic
Activity*†
*This chapter is based on joint work with Zeno Enders (University of Heidelberg) and Gernot Müller
(University of Tübingen). An earlier version of this chapter is available as CESifo Working Paper No.
7623.
†We thank participants of various conferences and seminars for useful comments. We also gratefully
acknowledge valuable suggestions by Nikolai Histrov in the early stage of the project, and the technical
support by the team of the LMU-ifo Economics & Business Data Center (EBDC) in Munich and Mark
Brisske. This research has received financial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) under
the Priority Program 1859.
CHAPTER 3. FIRM EXPECTATIONS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 95
3.1 Introduction
To what extent do firms’ expectations affect current decision making? According to
theory, expectations should have a first-order effect. Expectations about the business
cycle take center stage in modern macroeconomic theory: firms decide on production,
investment, and hiring as well as on prices in a forward-looking manner (see e.g., Kyd-
land and Prescott 1982; Lucas 1973; Mortensen and Pissarides 2009; Woodford 2003).
This, in turn, is essential for why and how cyclical impulses propagate and how policy
announcements shape economic outcomes (see e.g., Del Negro et al. 2012; Eggerts-
son and Woodford 2003). Yet at an empirical level, the systematic exploration of how
expectations affect economic decisions and hence economic outcomes is still in its in-
fancy. Arguably, two major difficulties are to blame. First, expectations are not directly
observable. Second, expectations are responsive to changes in the economic environ-
ment – identifying a causal effect of expectations on economic decisions is therefore
challenging.
In this study, we take up the issue by exploiting a particular data set and a novel
identification strategy. Specifically, we base our analysis on the EBDC Business Expec-
tations Panel (BEP), maintained by the LMU-ifo Economics & Business Data Center
(EBDC) in Munich. Our sample comprises monthly observations for the period 1991
to 2016. In each month, about 2000 German firms in the manufacturing sector report
their expectations regarding future production in a qualitative manner: it may increase,
not change, or decrease. Similarly, firms report expectations about business cycle con-
ditions. The survey is the basis for the ifo business climate index, a widely observed
leading indicator for economic activity in Germany (Becker and Wohlrabe 2008). In ad-
dition, the BEP contains a rich set of observations for each firm. These include a large
range of measures that capture the economic and financial conditions under which
firms operate.
We exploit these data in order to identify the causal effect of firm expectations on
their behavior, notably in terms of production and price setting. For this purpose, we
match firms based on fundamentals and compare price-setting and production deci-
sions of firms that have the same fundamentals but differ in their views about the fu-
ture. Formally, we estimate a probit model and match optimistic and pessimistic firms,
in turn, with neutral firms using their propensity scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
Intuitively, we consider “optimism” and “pessimism” as a treatment that is randomly
assigned across firms with the same fundamentals: we estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated by comparing the behavior of treated and untreated firms with the
same probability of being treated.
We find that expectations have a significant effect on production and prices. In the
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impact period, optimistic firms are 15 percentage points more likely to raise production
than neutral firms. Similarly, we also find that optimistic firms are more likely to raise
prices. For pessimistic firms, we find an opposite effect of about the same magnitude:
they are more likely to reduce production and prices.
These results are consistent with two distinct hypotheses on how expectations af-
fect economic decision-making. Under the first hypothesis, expectations that are or-
thogonal to current fundamentals are not necessarily orthogonal to future fundamen-
tals. Put differently, expectations represent genuine information (“news”) about the
future, which is not yet reflected in current fundamentals. Under this interpretation,
expectations matter as a transmission channel, but not as an exogenous source of varia-
tion. A number of influential contributions suggest that news are indeed an important
source of business cycle fluctuations (Barsky and Sims 2012; Beaudry and Portier 2006;
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2012). Yet, these studies provide only indirect evidence on
the role of expectations as news. In contrast to our analysis, they do not analyze expec-
tations data explicitly.
Under the second hypothesis, changes in expectations are fully exogenous and dif-
ferent labels are used to capture this notion, such as “noise,” “sentiment,” or “animal
spirits”.1 In this spirit, a number of recent contributions have put forward modern
models of the business cycle in which “noise shocks” play a key role (Angeletos and
La’O 2013; Lorenzoni 2009). Again, these contributions also do not exploit expectations
data directly. Instead, they show that noise helps quantitative business cycle models
to account for key features of aggregate time-series data.
The unique nature of our data set allows us to test these two hypotheses directly.
For not only do we observe firm expectations regarding future production and busi-
ness conditions, we also observe actual production and business conditions. We are
thus able to construct a measure of firms’ forecast errors and identify firms whose op-
timism or pessimism turns out to be incorrect or “undue” from an ex-post point of
view (Pigou 1927). In the second step of our analysis, we match, in turn, incorrectly
optimistic and pessimistic firms with ex-ante neutral firms. We find that incorrectly
optimistic firms are also relatively more likely to raise output and prices.
In a third step, we quantify the contribution of incorrect optimism and pessimism
to aggregate fluctuations. For this purpose, we compute an aggregate measure of in-
correct optimism and pessimism in our population of firms. Specifically, we use an
ordered probit model to measure the extent of optimism and pessimism at the firm
level and classify such sentiment as incorrect whenever we observe a forecast error ex-
post. Finally, we aggregate across firms and project macro variables of interest on the
1According to Keynes, animal spirits are “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction”, which
drive economic decisions beyond considerations based “on nothing but a mathematical expectation”
(Keynes 1936, pp. 161–162).
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resulting time series of incorrect optimism and pessimism. We find that optimism in
particular causes industrial production and prices to rise.
Our analysis relates to studies that focus on the expectation formation process.
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015a) document the presence of information rigidi-
ties using survey data from different sources. More recently, Coibion et al. (2018) ex-
ploit a survey of New Zealand firms. There is also work on expectation formation
with the data from the ifo survey. An early study by Nerlove (1983) finds evidence in
support of an adaptive expectations model. Bachmann and Elstner (2015) show that at
most one-third of the firms in the ifo survey make systematic forecast errors. Massenot
and Pettinicchi (2018), in turn, identify various factors which account for forecasting
errors of firms in the ifo sample. In Enders et al. (2019b), we show that firm expecta-
tions respond systematically to monetary policy announcements.
Few studies investigate empirically how expectations affect economic decision mak-
ing. An exception is Boneva et al. (2020). They find that expectations of UK firms fea-
ture significantly in an estimated version of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Tanaka,
Bloom, David, and Koga (2020) analyze GDP forecasts of Japanese firms and show
an association with employment, investment, and output growth at the firm level.
Coibion et al. (2020) use a survey of Italian firms to estimate the effect of decision
makers’ inflation expectations on firm decisions. Bachmann and Zorn (2018) use ifo
data to study the drivers of investment and find, among other things, a role for firm
expectations. Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2015) analyze the Duke University quar-
terly survey of Chief Financial Officers and show that CFOs’ expectations of earnings
growth explain firm investment.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides
details on our data set as well as a number of descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 describes
the estimation approach and the results of the first step of our analysis. In Section 3.4,
we zoom in on the transmission channels of firm expectations and distinguish between
firms with and without forecast errors. Afterwards we quantify the aggregate effects
of firm expectations using local projections. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
The EBDC Business Expectations Panel (BEP) combines monthly survey data from
the ifo institute and annual balance sheet data from the Amadeus and Hoppenstedt
databases (EBDC-BEP 2017). The data combines different surveys covering German
firms in four sectors: manufacturing, retail, construction, and services. The surveys in-
clude the same basic stock of questions for each sector, but the wording of these ques-
tions and answers may differ at times. In our analysis, we focus on the manufacturing
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survey, which is the longest running and includes the largest number of firms. Also,
in this case the wording of the survey questions is particularly suitable for the purpose
of our investigation. One caveat to note is that the responses to the survey and the bal-
ance sheet data come at different frequencies: while the survey is conducted monthly,
balance sheet data is only available annually. We will use balance sheet data to predict
firm expectations. To ensure that we do not use information that is not yet available
when firms report expectations, we only use the most recent balance sheet data at a
given point in time.2
The BEP sample period starts in 1986 with the manufacturing survey. In our analy-
sis, we use data from 1991 to 2016 because some of the variables we rely on are avail-
able only since 1991. The unit of observation in the manufacturing survey is a prod-
uct. As a result, some firms respond to several questionnaires each month or different
plants of one firm respond separately. However, in our sample this is the case for less
than 10% of firms. We conduct our analysis at the product/plant level and do not ex-
plicitly account for whether a product/plant is part of a multi-product firm. In our
analysis below, we refer to the individual observation as a “firm” in order to ease the
exposition.
We report a number of basic statistics for the firms in our sample in Appendix C1.
For this purpose, we distinguish between the sample of all firms (“full sample”) and
the sample for which balance sheet data is available. The latter sample is smaller but
still includes about different 5,000 firms and more than 300,000 firm-month observa-
tions, see Table C.1. Table C.2 shows that means and standard deviations of firms’
responses are generally quite similar across the samples, although firms for which bal-
ance sheet data are available tend to be somewhat larger. Firms with balance sheet
data stay in the survey for 87 months (7 years) on average and provide answers in
74 months (6 years), implying that they respond in 83% of the months they are in the
sample. We also stress that independently of the starting period sample attrition is
moderate, as shown in Table C.3.
The BEP covers a large set of questions, but only a subset of those are asked regu-
larly. Within firms, the questions are typically answered by the top management. In
more than 80% of small and medium-sized firms and more than 60% of large firms, the
CEO or owner responds. Otherwise, the response is typically provided by the head of
the relevant department (for details, see Sauer and Wohlrabe 2019). In our analysis, we
focus on four main questions, listed in Table 3.1. Some questions vary over time. Es-
2For example, if a firm publishes balance sheet data every September, we will use this data for all the
following months until the next balance sheet is published. Hence, our specification is conservative as
we neglect potential information known to firms in the months close to but preceding the publication of
the balance sheet. In Appendix C4.1, we pursue an alternative strategy but find the results obtained for
the baseline specification robust.
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Table 3.1: Selected ifo survey questions
Label Question1 Possible answers
Q1 Expectations for the next 3 months: Our domestic production ac-
tivity regarding good XY will probably . . .
increase [1]
not change [0]
decrease [-1]
Q2 Expectations for the next 6 months: Taking economic fluctuations
into account our state of business will be . . .
rather more favorable [1]
not changing [0]
rather less favorable [-1]
Q3 Tendencies in the previous month: Our domestic production ac-
tivities with respect to product XY have . . .
increased [1]
not changed [0]
decreased [-1]
Q4 Tendencies in the previous month: Taking changes of terms and
conditions into account, our domestic sales prices (net) for prod-
uct XY have . . .
increased [1]
not changed [0]
decreased [-1]
Notes: Tables shows our translation of the most recent formulation of the question in the German ques-
tionnaire. Additional questions used are listed in Table C.6. Changes to the questions are listed in
Table C.7
pecially in 2002, many changes were implemented due to a harmonization of business
and consumer surveys in the European Union. The changes relevant to our analysis
are documented below.
Our measure of firm optimism is based on question Q1, which refers to expecta-
tions about production activity in the next three months. The wording of this question
has changed over time. Since July 1994, firms can additionally report that they have
no significant domestic production. These firms are not included in our analysis. Fur-
thermore, the question contained a note to ignore seasonal fluctuations until the end
of 2001. Since these are minor changes affecting all firms in the same way, they are
unlikely to matter for our results. Further details on the wording of the questions can
be found in Table C.7 in the appendix.
Q2 is a broader question regarding expectations for the state of business over the
next six months. Combined with a question on the current state of business it pro-
vides the basis for the ifo business climate index. In a sensitivity analysis, we consider
optimism as reflected in the answer to this question and find similar results as in our
baseline. Furthermore, the answers to both questions tend to be highly correlated, see
Figure C.1 in the appendix. In our baseline analysis, we use Q1, though, because its
wording is more specific and the time horizon in question is shorter. Q2 also used to
include an additional note to ignore seasonal fluctuations. This note was dropped in
1997, see Table C.7.
Questions Q3 and Q4 refer to our outcome variables: changes in production and
prices. These questions changed in 2002. Previously both questions asked about the
change in production and prices in the current month compared to the previous month.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of production expectations, 1991 to 2016
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Notes: Full sample. Shaded areas in Panel (a) indicate recession periods as defined by the German
Council of Economic Experts. Panel (b) only includes firms which respond at least 10 times.
Since 2002 both questions ask about the change in these variables in the previous
month. We adjust the data to account for this change in timing. To make sure that this
adjustment does not affect results, we also consider a reduced sample, which starts in
2002 in our sensitivity analysis. The results are very similar to those for the full sample
(see Section 3.3).
In what follows, we compute a number of descriptive statistics for the variables of
interest. For the purpose of our quantitative analysis, we assign a value of 1 to positive
responses (increase/improve) and a value of -1 to negative responses (decrease/worsen)
and a value of 0 otherwise. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of responses over time
and across firms. Because distributional statistics are not straightforward to compute
with qualitative data, we report results from two alternative approaches. In Panel (a)
of Figure 3.1, we plot a common measure of dispersion based on the shares of posi-
tive and negative responses in a given month.3 Dispersion generally increases during
crisis periods and tends to decrease afterwards. In Panel (b) of Figure 3.1, we plot the
distribution of the average response to Q1 per firm. It shows that the share of notori-
ous optimists and pessimists is limited, and that for most firms the average response
is zero. The distribution is close to normal.
Figure 3.2 plots the cross-correlation function for expected production and six leads
and lags of realized production and prices. The correlation between expectations and
reported outcomes is positive in both cases, across all leads and lags (Panels (a) and
(b)). The contemporaneous correlation of current production and prices, on the one
3Dispersion of expectations based on qualitative survey data is measured as√
frac+ + frac− −
(
frac+ − frac−
)2, where frac+ and frac− are the fraction of positive and nega-
tive responses in each month, respectively. This measure is also used by Bachmann et al. (2013).
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Figure 3.2: Correlation of expected changes in production with changes in realized
production and prices in the manufacturing sector
(a) Expected production in t and reported produc-
tion t + k, firm level
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(b) Expected production in t and reported prices
t + k, firm level
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(c) Mean expected production in t and industrial
production in t + k, monthly
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(d) Mean expected production in t and producer
prices in t + k, monthly
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Notes: Full sample; indices of production and prices in manufacturing from the German Statistical
Office and the Bundesbank, respectively. Industrial production is measured as the month-on-month
change in the not seasonally adjusted index. Producer prices are measured as month-on-month changes
in the calendar adjusted price index.
hand, and production expectations, on the other hand, is particularly strong. In our
analysis below, we seek to establish the causal effect of production expectations on
production and price-setting decisions.
We also compute the correlation of average firm expectations and aggregate pro-
duction and prices. Panel (c) of Figure 3.2 shows the cross correlation function for
average production expectations across firms within a month, and leads and lags of
the monthly growth rate of industrial production. The two time series are strongly
correlated for small leads of industrial production. This is consistent with the well-
established fact that the ifo business climate index is a leading indicator of economic
activity in Germany (Abberger and Wohlrabe 2006; Henzel and Rast 2013). We com-
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pute the same statistic for month-on-month changes in the producer price index and
average production expectations and show results in Panel (d). Here the correlation is
very strong for more lags and leads.
3.3 Do firm expectations matter?
The main purpose of our analysis is to identify the effect of firm expectations on firm
decisions. Specifically, in our baseline specification, we assess to what extent firms’
production and price-setting decisions depend on production expectations. To this
end, we compare the behavior of firms that expect an increase (decrease) of production
to firms that expect production to remain unchanged. A key challenge in this regard
is to identify variation in expectations that is orthogonal to current fundamentals. For
only to the extent that firms are comparable in terms of fundamentals, we may think of
expectations as a “treatment” into which some firms are randomly selected and others
are not.
Put differently, as we compare the behavior of firms with different views about
the future, we face a selection problem because firms with better fundamentals are
also more likely to enjoy a more favorable outlook. In order to address this selec-
tion problem, we rely on propensity score matching (see e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig
2008; Imbens and Rubin 2015). The idea is to mimic randomized control trials where
treatment is actually assigned in a random fashion and hence orthogonal to observ-
able characteristics. The matching approach is particularly suited for the purpose of
our analysis since we are dealing with qualitative data on expectations: firms may be
either optimistic, neutral, or pessimistic, i.e. expect an increase, no change, or a de-
crease, respectively. Hence, in our analysis, to the extent that firms receive a treatment,
they are treated either with “optimism” or with “pessimism.” Of course, our analysis
does not require optimism or pessimism to be literally assigned in a random way. We
merely assume that the assignment is orthogonal to current fundamentals. Note also
that we do not require optimism/pessimism to be unrelated to future fundamentals.
We take up this issue in more detail in the Section 3.4.
In general, the matching approach offers several advantages over conventional re-
gression analysis. First, it ensures that the distribution of control variables is similar
across treated units and the control group (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Imbens and Rubin
2015). This is important because differences in the distribution of controls can lead to
a significant bias when estimating treatment effects (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and
Todd 1998). Second, the matching approach disciplines the analysis since the control
group is specified prior to and independently of the estimation of the treatment effect
(Imbens and Rubin 2015). Lastly, after matching, the treatment effect is estimated by
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a simple mean difference, thus allowing for a non-parametric estimation (Dehejia and
Wahba 1999; Heckman et al. 1998).
3.3.1 Propensity score matching
We now briefly outline our approach following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). Infer-
ence is based on estimating the potential outcome of a treated firm under no treatment,
that is, the (unobserved) counterfactual outcome had the treated firm not been treated.
Formally, the object of interest is the average treatment effect on treated (ATT) firms:
θ = E[Y(1)−Y(0)|D = 1] = E[Y(1)|D = 1]−E[Y(0)|D = 1],
where D = 1 indicates treatment, Y(1) the potential outcome of a treated firm, that is,
a firm which is optimistic (pessimistic), and Y(0) the potential outcome in the absence
of treatment. Since we do not observe the latter for treated firms, we can only estimate
the following relationship:
E[Y(1)|D = 1]−E[Y(0)|D = 0] = θ + E[Y(0)|D = 1]−E[Y(0)|D = 0]. (3.1)
This is equivalent to the ATT only if
E[Y(0)|D = 1]−E[Y(0)|D = 0] = 0,
that is, the potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment. In random-
ized control trials, this holds true due to the random assignment of treatment. In ob-
servational studies, additional assumptions are required. One approach is to assume
that treatment is assigned randomly given a set of relevant covariates X:
Y(1), Y(0) ⊥ D|X.
Covariates are relevant if they affect both the (potential) outcome and the probability of
being treated. In our case, this means that we need to include all information that mat-
ters for firms’ expectation formation as well as for their production and price-setting
decisions. We describe these variables below. Since we are only interested in the effect
on the treated, we merely need Y(0) to be independent of treatment status, see equa-
tion (3.1). In this case, the required conditional independence assumption simplifies
to
Y(0) ⊥ D|X.
In the expressions above, we condition on the whole set of control variables. This
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Table 3.2: Control variables in the propensity score model
Variable Description Frequency Reference period
debt share1 total debt over assets annual t-11 to t
financing coefficient1 liabilities minus provisions annual t-11 to t
divided by equity plus provisions
employees no. of employees annual2 October/November
state of business answer to question on state monthly t
of business (values: 1, 0, −1)
orders answer to question on state monthly t
of orders (values: 1, 0, −1)
foreign orders answer to question on state monthly t
of foreign orders (values: 1, 0, −1)
production answer to question on change monthly t-1
in production (values: 1, 0, −1)
prices answer to question on change monthly t-1
in prices (values: 1, 0, −1)
capacity utilization utilization of existing capacity in % quarterly2 t-1
demand answer to question on demand monthly t-1
in previous month (values: 1, 0, −1)
Notes: For all variables with monthly frequency three lags are also included. In addition various
interaction terms are included (based on a log-likelihood ratio test).
1 To ensure outliers and measurement error do not affect our results, we exclude the 99.99 percentile
of observations for the debt share and the 0.02 and 99.98 percentiles for the financing coefficient.
2 In months with no reporting, we use data from the most recent balance sheet/most recent quarter
the question was asked (if available).
can be challenging when the number of observable controls is large. In our analysis,
we include 4 continuous variables and 18 categorical variables with 3 outcomes each.
If we were to split the sample by the categorical variables only, we would already
have 318 potential bins. This makes accounting for controls by creating sub-samples
of identical observations infeasible even with a large data set. We therefore rely on a
result established by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983): asymptotically, it is equivalent to
condition on the propensity to be treated, p(X) ≡ Pr(D = 1|X), or to condition directly
on X. The conditional independence assumption can thus be stated as follows:
Y(0) ⊥ D|p(X).
Conditioning on the propensity score requires the additional assumption of common
support, that is, treatment is not fully determined:
0 < p(X) = Pr(D = 1|X) < 1.
In what follows, we estimate the ATT by comparing the outcome of each treated
observation to one or several untreated units with the same (or very similar) propen-
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sity score. In our analysis, there are two possible treatments: optimism and pessimism.
To establish the effect of a treatment, we compare firms in each case to firms which do
not expect production to change (“neutral firms”). In order to estimate the propensity
score, we pursue two alternative approaches. Since we are dealing with two treat-
ments, we first estimate an ordered probit model where optimism and pessimism are
outcomes of a common model. Alternatively, we consider two distinct probit models
for optimists and pessimists. In the first case, we estimate the probability of the latent
variable, y∗it, falling between two thresholds αj−1 and αj for treatment j as
Pr(yit = j) = Pr(aj−1 < y∗it ≤ αj) = Φ(αj − X′itβ)−Φ(αj−1 − X′itβ), (3.2)
where j = {−1, 0, 1} corresponds to the three possible answers to Q1. We collect the
control variables in the vector Xit. It includes time and sector fixed effects, the sector
average of the reported state of business in each month, three lags of the dependent
variables, and all firm specific variables listed in Table 3.2 (including three lags for
each of the survey variables). More detailed information on the survey variables is
provided in Table C.6 in the appendix.
The ordered probit does not directly yield the propensity score. In this case the
propensity score, pm(Xit) for treatment m = {optimism, pessimism}, equals the condi-
tional probability of the treatment given the alternative of no treatment, that is, expect-
ing production to remain unchanged (see again Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008):
pm(Xit) =
Pr(yit = m|Xit)
Pr(yit = m|Xit) + Pr(yit = 0|Xit)
.
The second approach involves two separate probit regressions – one for each treat-
ment. The specification is the same as for the ordered probit model:
Pr(Dmit = 1) = Pr(X
′
itβ) = Φ(X
′
itβ), (3.3)
where Dmit is a dummy variable which is 1 for an observation responding increase in
the case of the optimism treatment, or decrease in the case of the pessimism treatment,
and 0 for an observation responding no change in both cases. We again collect the same
control variables in vector Xit. Since the sample only includes the specific treatment
group and the untreated, the estimated probability is a direct estimate of the propensity
score:
pm(Xit) = Pr(Dmit = 1).
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) discuss the use of serial probit estimation compared to
multinomial models in the case of multiple treatments. They argue that, generally,
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Figure 3.3: Histogram of the density of the propensity scores
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Notes: Histograms show the propensity scores for treated and untreated firms respectively, estimated
as described by equation (3.3). In Panel (a) treated firms are optimistic. In Panel (b) treated firms are
pessimistic.
authors found no difference or a slight advantage of using separate probit models. It
turns out that also in our case the serial probit estimation has a slight advantage as
it yields improved balancing statistics. We therefore use it in our baseline. However,
results based on the ordered probit do not differ much from results using the two probit
regressions, see Subsection 3.3.4.
As mentioned above, we include all potentially relevant variables as controls in
order to capture the fundamentals of the firm, both current values as well as lags.
However, we only consider realizations, which are available at the time the survey is
conducted. In this regard, it is important to note that most firms respond to the survey
in the first two weeks of the month. Figure C.2 in the appendix shows the distribution
of participation days within the month. 50% answer within the first eight days and
another 25% answer in the following week.4
After computing the propensity scores, we match treated and untreated observa-
tions using a variant of caliper or radius matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).5 We
match each treated observation i (optimistic or pessimistic) to all untreated observa-
tions k (neutral) within the same month, which satisfy
p(Xit)− 0.02 ≤ p(Xkt) ≤ p(Xit) + 0.02.
Here we allow for a radius of 0.02. This corresponds to about a tenth of the standard
4These statistics pertain to firms that answer the survey online. They represent more than 60% of the
firms since 2004.
5We also test an alternative matching procedure proposed by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011).
The results are very close to our baseline results. Details can be found in Appendix C4.2.
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Table 3.3: Number of matched observations
Optimism treatment Pessimism treatment
Total Matched Total Matched
Panel (a): All firms
Treated observations 26 974 25 050 23 327 20 947
Untreated observations 114 843 111 027 114 809 110 625
Panel (b): Correct firms
Treated observations 12 366 9 995 12 123 9 493
Untreated observations 82 317 73 321 82 519 72 762
Panel (c): Incorrect firms
Treated observations 10 634 9 671 7 641 6 614
Untreated observations 82 505 76 349 82 497 74 357
Notes: Panel (a) shows results for matching as discussed in this section. Panels (b)
and (c) show results for matching based on more detailed treatments as discussed
in Section 3.4.
deviation of the estimated propensity score.6 All untreated observations to which a
treated observation is matched are given equal weights: the inverse of the number of
untreated observations in each match. Note that the untreated observations can be
matched more than once to different treated observations.
Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of the propensity scores. The left panel contrasts
the distribution for firms which receive an optimism treatment (light blue, transparent
bars) with those for untreated firms (dark blue, solid bars). The right panel reports
results for pessimism. In each instance, we find that there is considerable overlap of
the distribution (common support), although the mass of untreated firms is more con-
centrated at lower propensity scores.7 Panel (a) of Table 3.3 reports basic statistics
regarding our matches.8 We are able to find matches for about 93% of all treated opti-
mists and for 90% of treated pessimists. This is due to the large overlap in propensity
scores between treated and untreated firms.
3.3.2 Diagnostics
Before turning to the results, we report some diagnostics of the matching exercise.
We compute balancing statistics in order to assess how similar the samples of treated
6Alternative values for the radius give similar results or, if not, fail to deliver satisfying balancing
statistics (see next sections).
7There are also some treated observations with a larger propensity score than the largest propensity
score of all untreated observations. We drop these observations in what follows. This trimming ensures
that only suitable observations are matched. Specifically, we drop 15 observations for optimism but 0
for pessimism.
8For now only consider Panel (a). The other two panels refer to additional results from Section 3.4.
CHAPTER 3. FIRM EXPECTATIONS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 108
and untreated observations are. The main statistic of interest is the standardized bias
between the treated and untreated sample for each control variable. Following Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983), this is computed as follows:
SB = 100
x̄1 − x̄0√
0.5(s21 + s
2
0)
, (3.4)
where x̄1 is the mean of the control variable among the treated observations, x̄0 is the
mean of the control variable for all untreated observations, s1 is the standard deviation
of the treated observations and s0 the standard deviation of all untreated observations.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.4 display the bias before and after matching for optimists
and pessimists. They show that matching leads to a sizeable reduction of the standard-
ized bias. According to a widely used rule of thumb, the matched sample is regarded
as well balanced when all standardized biases are below 5% (Caliendo and Kopeinig
2008).9 We meet this standard in all instances, see also Table C.8 in the appendix.
Rubin (2001) suggests a second measure of balancing. He argues that the variance
of the part of each covariate that is orthogonal to the propensity score (the residual of
a regression of the covariate on the propensity score) should be similar for treated and
untreated firms. Specifically, the ratio of the variances should not be below 0.5 or above
2. Ratios between a range of 0.8 and 1.25 are considered acceptable. Panels (c) and (d)
of Figure 3.4 plot the variance ratios before and after matching. Again, we find that
matching firm-month observations ensures that treated and non-treated firms appear
well balanced in terms of covariates. Only the ratio for the number of employees and
the financing coefficient (for pessimists) falls in the “of concern” area (outside dashed
lines).
3.3.3 Computation of the treatment effect
In what follows, we focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in terms
of production and price-setting decisions. For each outcome variable, we compute the
ATT as the mean difference, across all matches, of treated and untreated firms.
The computation of standard errors for estimates of the ATT computed after match-
ing is not straightforward. One can use analytical variances or bootstrapping. Since
bootstrapping has sometimes been shown to be invalid (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008),
we use the methodology of Lechner (2001). He shows that in case of variants of nearest
9Imbens and Rubin (2015) suggest that 10% can also be considered a satisfactory value, especially
when the initial bias is large.
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Figure 3.4: Standardized bias and variance ration, before and after matching
(a) Standardized bias, optimists
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(b) Standardized bias, pessimists
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0
dep. var, t-1
demand, t-1
production, t-1
dep. var, t-2
orders, t
state of business, t
dep. var, t-3
demand, t-2
production, t-2
orders, t-1
state of business, t-1
foreign orders, t
demand, t-3
orders, t-2
state of business, t-2
production, t-3
foreign orders, t-1
state of business, t-3
orders, t-3
prices, t-1
avg. state of business, t
capacity, t-1
foreign orders, t-2
prices, t-2
capacity, t-2
foreign orders, t-3
capacity, t-3
prices, t-3
employees, t
financing coefficient, t
debt share, t
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
(c) Variance ratio, optimists
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(d) Variance ratio, pessimists
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Notes: Figure shows diagnostics statistics for the matching of optimists and pessimists. The standardized
bias measures the mean difference of each variable in the treated and untreated groups, as described
by equation (3.4). The variance ratio measures the difference between the variances orthogonal to the
propensity score. Variance ratios below 0.8 and above 1.25 (dashed lines) are considered “of concern”;
ratios below 0.5 and above 2 (gray solid lines) are considered “bad”, according to Rubin (2001).
neighbor matching, as in our case, the variance of the ATT, τ̂ATT, is:
Var(τ̂ATT) =
1
N1
Var(Y(1)|D = 1) +
∑j∈{D=0}(wj)2
(N1)2
Var(Y(0)|D = 0),
where Y(1) and Y(0) refer to a variable of interest given the treatment indicator D
equals 1 or 0. N1 is the number of matched treated firm and wj is the weight of un-
treated firm j (see above).
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Table 3.4: Average treatment effect on the treated, optimistic and pessimistic firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Radius 0.01 Sample Sample excl. Ordered Exp. state of
2002-2016 fin. crisis1 probit business
Panel (a): Optimists – Production (change in current month)
ATT 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.170*** 0.152*** 0.182***
(30.43) (29.34) (30.03) (28.52) (27.14) (35.02)
Observations 129812 120335 108683 113690 128932 129706
Panel (b): Optimists – Prices (change in current month)
ATT 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.020***
(5.97) (5.80) (5.74) (5.52) (3.87) (5.18)
Observations 129858 120367 108715 113734 128977 129759
Panel (c): Pessimists – Production (change in current month)
ATT -0.173*** -0.170*** -0.169*** -0.172*** -0.198*** -0.204***
(-27.77) (-26.47) (-24.85) (-25.37) (-32.53) (-35.03)
Observations 125458 113992 104490 106764 123941 125091
Panel (d): Pessimists – Prices (change in current month)
ATT -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.029***
(-6.13) (-6.41) (-5.18) (-6.53) (-7.80) (-6.33)
Observations 125530 114050 104551 106821 124014 125169
Notes: Tables shows treatment effects on prices and production for different specifications. T-statistics
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1 Excluding the years 2008 and 2009.
3.3.4 Results
We now turn to the question that motivates our analysis: to what extent do firms’ ex-
pectations affect current decision making? Table 3.4 provides a first answer. In the
upper part of the table, we report the ATT of optimism regarding future production, in
the lower part we report the ATT of pessimism. In each instance, we focus on produc-
tion and price-setting decisions. In the columns, we consider alternative specifications.
The left-most column (1) reports results for our baseline. We find a significant
positive treatment effect for production (Panel (a)). This positive effect may reflect
a stronger tendency among treated firms to raise production or a reduced tendency
to lower production, or both. We disentangle these effects below. For prices, we also
find a significant positive effect. Although, in this case the effect is much smaller (see
Panel (b)). Taken at face value, such an apparently small effect is consistent with the
notion that prices are adjusted only infrequently in the short run. However, note that
the effect is the outcome either of more frequent upward adjustments or of less fre-
quent downward adjustments of prices among treated firms. Last, we note that the
CHAPTER 3. FIRM EXPECTATIONS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 111
Table 3.5: Average treatment effect on the treated, increases and decreases in
production and prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prod. increase Prod. decrease Price increase Price decrease
Panel (a): Optimists
ATT 0.149*** -0.022*** 0.018*** -0.008***
(36.93) (-6.86) (5.35) (-3.20)
Observations 129812 129812 129858 129858
Panel (b): Pessimists
ATT -0.024*** 0.149*** -0.005 0.025***
(-7.11) (31.35) (-1.63) (7.23)
Observations 125458 125458 125530 125530
Notes: Table shows treatment effects for binarized production and price indicators, i.e. sepa-
rately considering increases and decreases. T-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
effect on production and prices is quite symmetric across optimism and pessimism,
even though we estimate separate models for optimists and pessimists (see Panels (c)
and (d) of Table 3.4).
Table 3.4 also reports results for alternative specifications. In column (2), we show
results for a smaller radius in the matching procedure (0.01 instead of 0.02). In col-
umn (3), we consider a shorter sample period. It starts in 2002 rather than in 1991. In
column (4), we report results for a sample which excludes observations from the finan-
cial crisis, that is, the years 2008 and 2009. Column (5) shows results for the case when
we use an ordered probit model to estimate the propensity scores. Column (6) refers
to the case when we use expectations for the future state of business rather than future
production to define the treatments. Recall that in this case the “forecasting horizon”
is 6 months rather than only 3 months. We observe that in all instances the estimate of
the ATT is close to that for the baseline and always significant. Balancing statistics for
the three sensitivity specifications that require changes in the matching procedure are
summarized in Table C.9 and Table C.10 in the appendix.
As noted above, our results regarding the response of production and prices may
reflect more upward adjustments or fewer downward adjustments, or both. In order to
disentangle the overall effect, we transform the dependent variable such that we obtain
two binary variables for, in turn, production and prices, a frequently used approach
when dealing with qualitative survey data. We then compute the probability of treated
firms to raise (lower) prices or production as the mean difference in the newly defined
variable across treated and non-treated firms.
Table 3.5 shows the results for the baseline specification. Columns (1) and (2) show
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that optimistic firms stand out by their increased probability of raising production.
Specifically, the probability of a production increase is 14.9 percentage points higher
for optimistic firms than for untreated firms. This accounts for the bulk of the overall
effect discussed above. The probability of a production decrease, in turn, falls by 2.2
percentage points. Optimism also raises the probability of a price increase by 1.8 per-
centage points and lowers the probability of a price decrease by 0.8 percentage points,
see columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5.
Likewise, pessimism increases the probability of a cut of current production by 14.9
percentage points, while the probability of a production increase falls by 2.4 percent-
age points. The response of prices to pessimism is somewhat larger than the one to
optimism. The probability of a price decline increases by 2.5 percentage points. The
probability of a price increase is not affected significantly.
3.4 News or noise?
In the previous section, we established that firm expectations affect decisions on cur-
rent production and pricing at the firm level. This raises the question of why this is
the case. Two alternative hypotheses appear plausible. According to the first hypoth-
esis, firms may have information about the future developments that is unrelated to
current fundamentals. While our set of fundamentals includes forward-looking vari-
ables such as orders, one cannot rule out the possibility that firms have additional
information beyond what is already reflected in current fundamentals. According to
this “news” hypothesis, firms therefore have a good reason to be either optimistic or
pessimistic. It is only that these reasons are not yet observable to the econometrician.
Instead, according to the second hypothesis, optimism and pessimism are just “noise”,
that is, misperceptions about the future that are fundamentally unwarranted or “un-
due” (Pigou 1927). Of course, our estimate of the ATT may also reflect a mixture of
news and noise.
3.4.1 Production and prices
In what follows, we seek to determine to what extent the expectations, which govern
current decisions about production and prices, reflect news and noise. We do so on the
basis of firms’ forecast errors. Intuitively, if a firm appears particularly optimistic rela-
tive to its current fundamentals, but reports later that actual production is unchanged
or declined, its view about the future appears—with the benefit of hindsight—to have
been misperceived. We are thus able to classify optimism and pessimism as incorrect
from an ex-post perspective. Note that we do not take a stand on whether expectations
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Table 3.6: Classification of correct/incorrect firms
Expectation Realization Classification
expected increase in t realization in t+1 to t+3 > 0 correct
expected increase in t realization in t+1 to t+3 ≤ 0 incorrect
expected no change in t realization in t+1 to t+3 > 13 incorrect
expected no change in t − 13 ≥ realization in t+1 to t+3 ≤
1
3 correct
expected no change in t realization in t+1 to t+3 < − 13 incorrect
expected decrease in t realization in t+1 to t+3 ≥ 0 incorrect
expected decrease in t realization in t+1 to t+3 < 0 correct
Notes: Table shows how we classify firms into correct and incorrect based on the
reported expectation and the reported realization. The latter is the simple average
of the firms’ responses to the question on realized production in periods t+1, t+2
and t+3 (Q3).
were rational or not from an ex-ante point of view. We simply compare them to ac-
tual outcomes. For instance, a firm may have been optimistic about some aspect of the
future and correctly so. Actual production may still fall short of the expected level be-
cause of some other unforeseen development. Since our concept of optimism pertains
to future production rather than to specific events or fundamentals, we classify such
firms as incorrect optimists.
In order to assess whether a firm is incorrectly optimistic or pessimistic, we follow
Bachmann et al. (2013) and interpret the qualitative responses to questions about ex-
pected and realized production (Q1 and Q3, respectively) as pertaining to the same
latent variable. In a nutshell, we classify firms that expect a change as incorrect when-
ever the average realization in the three months has a different sign than expected.
Firms expecting no change are considered to have made no error if they report at most
one change in either direction or two changes in opposite directions. Table 3.6 provides
an overview of our classification scheme.
Based on this classification scheme, we define a treatment with “correct optimism.”
It refers to optimistic firms (answer “increase” to Q1) that are classified as correct. The
control group are all neutral firms (answer “not change” to Q1) which are classified as
correct. The second treatment we consider is “incorrect optimism.” Here we consider
firms that were optimistic but incorrect from an ex-post point of view. The control
group is the same as in the first case. The third and fourth treatments are defined
analogously for pessimists. Using these four new treatment indicators, we perform
the same matching procedure as described in Subsection 3.3.1.
Before turning to the results, we again consider some diagnostic statistics to ensure
that the matching works reasonably well in this case as well. The statistics are the same
as described in Subsection 3.3.2. Panels (b) and (c) in Table 3.3 above report the number
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Table 3.7: Average treatment effect on the treated, correct and in-
correct firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Radius 0.01 2002-2016 Sample ex. crisis1
Panel (a): Correct optimists – Production (change in current month)
ATT 0.302*** 0.298*** 0.314*** 0.297***
(36.89) (34.85) (36.14) (34.26)
Observations 81254 68946 68785 71391
Panel (b): Correct optimists – Prices (change in current month)
ATT 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.033***
(5.40) (5.18) (5.72) (4.90)
Observations 81254 68945 68778 71392
Panel (c): Incorrect optimists – Production (change in current month)
ATT 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.072*** 0.063***
(8.58) (7.94) (9.20) (8.13)
Observations 84029 74232 69715 73973
Panel (d): Incorrect optimists – Prices (change in current month)
ATT 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.011*
(2.92) (2.58) (2.80) (1.89)
Observations 84032 74232 69714 73978
Panel (e): Correct pessimist – Production (change in current month)
ATT -0.307*** -0.300*** -0.307*** -0.303***
(-33.71) (-30.52) (-30.78) (-32.00)
Observations 80282 66948 67112 68156
Panel (f): Correct pessimist – Prices (change in current month)
ATT -0.030*** -0.021** -0.028*** -0.044***
(-3.83) (-2.52) (-3.24) (-5.66)
Observations 80285 66941 67109 68158
Panel (g): Incorrect pessimist – Production (change in current month)
ATT -0.086*** -0.093*** -0.074*** -0.086***
(-9.99) (-10.29) (-7.92) (-9.15)
Observations 79026 68414 65323 68835
Panel (h): Incorrect pessimist – Prices (change in current month)
ATT -0.003 -0.008 0.000 -0.008
(-0.36) (-1.07) (0.00) (-1.08)
Observations 79033 68420 65326 68842
Notes: Tables shows treatment effects on prices and production for different
specifications. T-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1 Excluding the years 2008 and 2009.
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of observations for which a propensity score can be computed as well as the number
of observations that can be matched. Even though the number of matches is now
smaller than before, there is still common support (see Figure C.3 in the appendix). We
display balancing statistics in Figure C.4 and Figure C.5 in the appendix. For all four
treatments balancing is achieved and no bias is above 5% (Table C.8 shows the bias in
detail). In addition, the variance ratios are generally within the defined bounds with
similar exceptions as before.
We report the ATTs in Table 3.7. We focus again on how firms’ current production
and price-setting decisions depend on optimism (upper part of the table) and on pes-
simism (lower part of the table). Now, however, we distinguish between correct and
incorrect optimists and pessimists. Panels (a) and (b) show the results for production
and prices for correct optimists, while Panels (c) and (d) display the results for incorrect
optimists.
We present estimates for the baseline in column (1) and stress that results are, as
before, robust across alternative specifications, see columns (2) to (4). We find that the
effect of optimism on firms’ current decisions is stronger for correct optimists than for
incorrect optimists; likewise for pessimists. Still, also for optimism and pessimism that
turns out to be incorrect in light of actual developments, we find a significant effect,
except for prices in case of pessimists. As before, this effect may reflect a mixture
of more upward or fewer downward adjustments compared to untreated firms. For
pessimism it may reflect more downward adjustments and fewer upward adjustments.
In order to shed some light on this aspect, we rely once more on the transforma-
tion of the dependent variables into two binary variables indicating increases and de-
creases, respectively. Table 3.8 shows the results. We find that the probability of a
production increase is 27.6 percentage points higher for correct optimists than for un-
treated firms and 7.2 percentage points higher for incorrect optimists. The probability
of reducing production, instead, does not change much in both instances. A similar
picture emerges for prices. By and large, the decisions of pessimists mirror those of
optimists, i.e. there are more decreases and less increases. The results are shown in the
bottom panel of Table 3.8.
In sum, we find that firm expectations matter for firm decisions. This holds not only
for expectations that turn out to be correct ex-post, but also for incorrect optimism and
pessimism. Hence, the role of expectations for today’s decisions is not limited to a
transmission channel of news. Our results show that expectations also have a noise
component, that is, they cause firms to adjust prices and production even though there
is no fundamental reason for firms to do so.
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Table 3.8: Average treatment effect on the treated, correct and incorrect firms,
increases and decreases in production and prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prod. increase Prod. decrease Price increase Price decrease
Panel (a): Correct optimists
ATT 0.276*** -0.026*** 0.028*** -0.007*
(44.90) (-5.87) (5.45) (-1.93)
Observations 81254 81254 81254 81254
Panel (b): Incorrect optimists
ATT 0.072*** 0.009** 0.012*** -0.004
(13.82) (2.11) (2.84) (-1.24)
Observations 84029 84029 84032 84032
Panel (c): Correct pessimists
ATT -0.033*** 0.274*** 0.000 0.030***
(-6.62) (39.14) (0.01) (5.57)
Observations 80282 80282 80285 80285
Panel (d): Incorrect pessimists
ATT -0.002 0.084*** 0.004 0.007
(-0.46) (12.66) (0.96) (1.42)
Observations 79026 79026 79033 79033
Notes: Table shows treatment effects for binarized production and price indicators, i.e. sepa-
rately considering increases and decreases. T-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
3.4.2 Further evidence
By now, we have established that firms respond to expectations – both to correct and
incorrect ones – by adjusting current prices and production. In what follows, we turn
to additional variables for which we may also expect an effect in light of this result. In
each instance, we use the same framework as above, but report the ATT on variables
other than production and prices.
In particular, we conjecture that optimistic (pessimistic) firms consider current in-
ventories as too low (too high), independently of whether expectations turn out to be
correct or not. In the survey, firms can evaluate the current state of their inventories as
“too small” [1], “sufficient” [0], or “too large” [-1], see Table C.6 in the appendix. Panels
(a) and (d) of Table 3.9 show how optimism and pessimism affect this assessment. As it
turns out, both correctly and incorrectly optimistic firms evaluate their inventories as
too low (Panel (a)). The opposite is true for correctly and incorrectly pessimistic firms
(Panel (d)).
Furthermore, taking decisions based on expectations that turn out to be correct or
incorrect should also have a bearing on future profits. Panels (b) and (c) of Table 3.9 re-
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Table 3.9: Average treatment effect on the treated, correct and incorrect firms,
inventories and profits
Correct firms Incorrect firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Radius Sample excl. Baseline Radius Sample excl.
0.001 fin. crisis1 0.01 fin. crisis1
Panel (a): Optimists – Inventories in t
ATT 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027***
(3.97) (3.36) (3.58) (3.42) (3.19) (3.27)
Observ. 11150 9384 9543 11137 10188 9457
Panel (b): Optimists – Change in profits t+2
ATT 0.141*** 0.149*** 0.136*** -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.076***
(5.16) (5.33) (4.67) (-2.91) (-3.01) (-2.96)
Observ. 11930 10661 10220 12149 11034 10410
Panel (c): Optimists – Change in profits t+3
ATT 0.229*** 0.240*** 0.207*** -0.077*** -0.066*** -0.088***
(8.49) (8.79) (7.21) (-3.18) (-2.63) (-3.38)
Observ. 11403 9931 9712 11680 10562 9940
Panel (d): Pessimist – Inventories in t
ATT -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.018* -0.026** -0.022**
(-5.98) (-5.25) (-6.34) (-1.78) (-2.50) (-2.05)
Observ. 10586 9353 8768 10200 8865 8526
Panel (e): Pessimist – Change in profits t+2
ATT -0.122*** -0.141*** -0.148*** 0.068** 0.032 0.088**
(-3.44) (-3.83) (-4.16) (2.24) (1.01) (2.56)
Observ. 11403 9756 9426 11267 10137 9491
Panel (f): Pessimist – Change in profits t+3
ATT -0.240*** -0.201*** -0.290*** 0.047 0.035 -0.004
(-6.59) (-5.02) (-7.57) (1.52) (1.09) (-0.13)
Observ. 10356 8256 8295 10441 9087 8743
Notes: Tables shows treatment effects on inventories and demand for different specifications.
T-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1 Excluding the years 2008 and 2009.
port the effect of optimism on profits in the second and third month after impact.10 We
find that profits increase in both months for correct optimists. Given that those firms
anticipated higher production and acted accordingly, this result appears plausible.11
10In the survey, the question about profits is asked twice a year, in May and in September. Our re-
sults are therefore based on different sets of firms. For results pertaining to profits two months after
impact, we rely on expectations data from March and July. For profits three months after impact, we use
responses from February and June. For details on the question see Table C.6.
11Profits in the first month after the price and production changes are less responsive to these changes.
CHAPTER 3. FIRM EXPECTATIONS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 118
Likewise, we find that profits of correct pessimists decline (Panels (e) and (f)). Profits
of incorrect optimists also fall, see columns (4) to (6) in Panels (b) and (c). This decrease
suggest acting based on incorrect expectations can be costly. We note, however, that
according to our estimates, incorrect pessimists do not see their profits decline signif-
icantly (columns (4) to (6) in Panels (e) and (f)). This result appears to be consistent
with our previous finding according to which they do not adjust their prices.
3.5 Noise and aggregate fluctuations
Up to now, we have focused on individual firms and, more specifically, we have docu-
mented that incorrect optimism and pessimism causes firms to adjust prices and pro-
duction. In what follows, we investigate whether noise at the firm level matters for
aggregate outcomes. Intuitively, a sufficiently large number of incorrectly optimistic
firms may cause economic activity to rise at the aggregate level, and vice versa for
pessimism.
Against this background, we first assess the degree to which the forecast errors
of firms are correlated, both within sectors and across the entire economy. For this
purpose, we now not only classify firms as correct or incorrect, but also quantify the
extent to which firms are incorrect, following the approach of Bachmann et al. (2013).12
We report descriptive statistics and the serial correlation pattern of forecast errors in
Table C.4 and Table C.5 in the appendix. Table 3.10 shows that forecast errors are gen-
erally positively correlated within sectors and more strongly so than across all firms.
This finding is consistent with the notion that optimism and pessimism can be conta-
gious, assuming that firms in the same sector interact more.
3.5.1 An aggregate measure of noise
In what follows, we develop an aggregate measure of noise. Our goal is to mimic the
micro-level analysis by creating a measure of noise, which considers both the current
fundamentals as well as the ex-post performance. For this purpose, we rely on the
ordered probit model described in equation (3.2) in Section 3.3 in order to account for
fundamental determinants of expectations. However, now, rather than matching firms
based on their propensity score, we compute the difference between a firm’s response
12Specifically, the error is 0 if the firm is correct, that is, if the sign of the expectation and the average
realization is the same. If the firm is incorrect, the error equals the difference between the sum of realized
production in t+1 to t+3 and the expectation in t, divided by 3.
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Table 3.10: Correlation of firms’ forecast errors with economy and sectoral aver-
ages
Correlation with Correlation with
Sector same all Sector same all
sector firms sector firms
All sectors 0.1967 0.1310 Rubber&plastic prod. 0.1902 0.1513
Food 0.1558 0.0383 Glass prod. 0.1889 0.1266
Beverages 0.2669 0.0186 Basic metals 0.2735 0.1977
Tobacco 0.6281 -0.0207 Fabricated metal prod. 0.1646 0.1465
Textiles 0.1985 0.1018 Computer&electronic prod. 0.1700 0.1339
Wearing apparel 0.2185 0.0397 Electrical equipment 0.1775 0.1460
Leather&related prod. 0.2965 0.0893 General-purpose machinery 0.1568 0.1333
Wood&cork products 0.2161 0.1361 Motor vehicles&trailers 0.2592 0.1966
Paper products 0.2130 0.1687 Other transport equi. 0.3299 0.1413
Printing 0.1731 0.0989 Furniture 0.2245 0.1081
Coke&refined petrol. 0.4659 0.0865 Other manufacturing 0.1969 0.1060
Chemical products 0.2126 0.1697 Repair&installation 0.3821 0.0881
Pharmaceuticals 0.3073 -0.0134
Notes: Correlation of firms’ individual forecast error with average of the forecast error in the
same 2-digit WZ08 sector and the whole economy. Shown separately for each 2-digit sector.
Error computed following the approach of Bachmann et al. (2013): the error is 0 if the firm is
correct, that is, if the sign of the expectation and the average realization is the same. If the firm is
incorrect, the error equals the difference between the sum of realized production in t+1 to t+3 and
the expectation in t, divided by 3.
and the prediction of the ordered probit model.13 Based on the ordered probit model,
we classify firms as optimists whenever they expect an increase in production even
though the model predicts otherwise, and as pessimists when they expect and decrease
despite a different prediction by the model.14 In a second step, to capture incorrect
optimism and pessimism, we only consider firms, which are incorrect from an ex-post
perspective as defined in Section 3.4 above. Finally, we compute the share of firms that
fulfill these two criteria relative to all firms in a given month.
In computing the aggregate noise measure, we consider three alternative weights.
First, we compute the share giving equal weight to each firm. For the second measure,
we use the number of employees as weights. We drop the largest 5 percent of our ob-
servations to ensure that results are not driven by large individual firms. Finally, we
13We use the ordered probit, rather than distinct models for optimists and pessimists, because we
seek to account for all outcomes simultaneously. Recall that the ordered probit model includes as control
variables time and sector fixed effects, the sector average of the reported state of business in each month,
three lags of the dependent variables, and all firm-specific variables listed in Table 3.2 (including three
lags for each of the survey variables and interaction terms).
14The predicted response is the response to which the ordered probit model assigns the highest prob-
ability.
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Figure 3.5: An aggregate measure of noise, 1991 to 2016
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Notes: Aggregate time series for incorrect optimism and pessimism, unweighted and weighted by em-
ployees. Shaded areas indicate recession periods as defined by the German Council of Economic Ex-
perts.
weigh firms in line with the approach by the ifo institute for aggregating answers to
the business climate index (Sauer and Wohlrabe 2018). This approach weights all firms
within a 2-digit WZ08 sector (the German system of industry classification) using the
number of employees in production as reported in the survey. Instead of using the
number of employees directly, the weight is a logarithmic transformation of employ-
ment.15 The sector averages are then aggregated using data on gross value added by
sector from the German Statistical Office.
Figure 3.5 displays the unweighted and the employee-weighted time series for in-
correct optimism and pessimism (using ifo weights results in a very similar time se-
ries). The computation of these shares requires firms to be in the survey for at least
eight consecutive months because we need three lags for the estimation of the ordered
probit model and four leads for the computation of the forecast error.16 This leads to a
gap in our time series from August 2001 to March 2002 because the ifo survey was not
conducted in December 2001. In addition, it reduces the number of observations in the
last five months of 2016. The main takeaway of Figure 3.5 is that there is considerable
variation of incorrect optimism and pessimism over time. In addition, we note that the
time series exhibit little persistence.
15Specifically, the weight is w = (log10(N))
e, with N being the number of employees, see the EBDC
Questionnaire Manual. This transformation ensures that very large firms do not distort the averages.
16We need data on the production for the next three months. Since production is reported only for the
previous month, we need four leads of the survey.
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3.5.2 The aggregate effect of noise
Our noise measure is an aggregate of firm-level expectations. We compute this mea-
sure as optimism/pessimism relative to current fundamentals. In addition, we allow
for time-fixed effects. As such, aggregate optimism and pessimism is unlikely to be
caused by macroeconomic shocks. Moreover, even if macroeconomic shocks were
to affect firms differently, it is important to note that we focus on incorrectly opti-
mistic/pessimistic firms, that is, firms whose expectations turn out to be unwarranted
from an ex-post perspective. For these reasons, we treat our aggregate measure as an
explanatory variable of macroeconomic outcomes that is not itself caused by macroe-
conomic developments.
We may therefore rely on local projections to estimate the causal effect of noise
on aggregate outcomes (Jordà 2005). Formally, using eot and e
p
t to denote the time-
series observations for incorrect optimism and pessimism, respectively, and xt for the
realization of a macroeconomic variable of interest, we estimate following model:
xt+h = c(h) +
J
∑
j=1
α
(h)
j xt−j +
K−1
∑
k=0
β
(h)
k e
o
t−k +
K−1
∑
k=0
γ
(h)
k e
p
t−k + εt+h, (3.5)
where c(h) is a (horizon-specific) constant.17 In addition, we include a linear time trend.
To enhance efficiency, we also include the residuals of the previous horizon when in-
creasing the horizon by steps of one (Jordà 2005). For the estimation, we include 1
lag of the dependent variable and 12 lags of incorrect optimism and pessimism. In
all specifications, we include both incorrect optimism and pessimism to account for a
potential correlation between the two variables. The estimated coefficients βh and γh
provide a direct measure of the impulse response at horizon h, given a unit shock in
period t.
We show the effect of a noise shock in Figure 3.6. It displays the response to an
increase of one standard deviation in the share of incorrectly optimistic firms. The top
panels show the response of industrial production in the manufacturing sector (IP),
measured in percentage deviations from the trend, while the bottom panels show the
response of the producer price index in the manufacturing sector (PPI), also measured
in percentage deviations from the trend. The left column displays results using the
unweighted measure, the middle column is based on employee-weighted shares, while
the right column shows responses for ifo weights.
In each instance, time is measured in months along the horizontal axis. The blue
solid line represents the point estimate, shaded areas indicate 68 and 90 percent confi-
17In order to account for non-stationarity, the dependent variable can be expressed relative to its pre-
shock level (Stock and Watson 2018). Including lags of the dependent variable, as we do above, generally
yields the same result.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of a noise shock, optimism
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Notes: Responses of industrial production (IP) and the producer price index (PPI), both for the manu-
facturing sector, to incorrect optimism (one standard deviation shock). Local projections with constant,
linear trend, one lag of dependent variable and 12 of the shocks. Shaded areas indicate 68 and 90 percent
confidence intervals. Data for IP from the German Statistical Office. Data on the PPI from the German
Bundesbank.
dence intervals. We find that industrial production responds strongly and significantly
to the shock. The observed increase is temporary and becomes insignificant after ap-
proximately one year, except in case we use ifo weights. Consistent with the results at
the firm level, reported in Section 3.4 above, we also find a strong and significant in-
crease in the price level after an increase in incorrect optimism. This reaction is in line
with the interpretation of noise shocks as a specific form of demand shocks (Enders,
Kleemann, and Müller 2017; Lorenzoni 2009).
Figure 3.7 displays the results for incorrect pessimism. Here we find much weaker
effects. Specifically, the response of industrial production is insignificant throughout
and the producer price index falls (marginally significant) only in period 1 after the
shock. This result is in line with the firm-level observation that incorrect pessimism
does not seem to cause a significant downward adjustment of prices, see Table 3.8
above.
Finally, Table 3.11 displays a forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) for a
horizon of 12 months, using the methodology of Gorodnichenko and Lee (2017). We
present results for incorrect optimism and pessimism and for all three measures of
noise. We find that incorrect optimism is responsible for 10-18% of aggregate fluctua-
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Figure 3.7: Effect of a noise shock, pessimism
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Notes: Responses of industrial production (IP) and the producer price index (PPI), both for the manu-
facturing sector, to incorrect pessimism (one standard deviation shock). Local projections with constant,
linear trend, one lag of dependent variable and 12 of the shocks. Shaded areas indicate 68 and 90 percent
confidence intervals. Data for IP from the German Statistical Office. Data on the PPI from the German
Bundesbank.
tions of industrial production at a one-year horizon. At the same horizon, around 20%
of the PPI is driven by incorrect optimism. This amounts to a sizeable contribution.
Pessimism, on the other hand, has much a smaller effect on IP and the PPI. The specifi-
cation for the PPI with unweighted observations delivers a value of around 6%, similar
to that with ifo weights for IP. Regarding the small effect on prices, these results are in
line with those of firm-level effects, reported in Section 3.4 above.
Table 3.11: Forecast error variance decomposition (one year horizon)
Variable Unweighted Empl. weights ifo weights
Optimism IP 14% 10% 18%
PPI 19% 23% 20%
Pessimism IP 1.3% 1.7% 6.4%
PPI 5.9% 0.9% 2.9%
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we ask to what extent firm expectations matter for firm decisions. From
a theoretical point of view, the answer to the question is obvious: expectations should
matter a great deal. However, to date there is little direct evidence to support the
theory. In this analysis, we aim at filling this gap using a particularly suited data set
and a new identification strategy.
We use a large survey of firms in the German manufacturing sector. Firms report
on a monthly basis whether they expect production to increase, to remain constant, or
to decline. For each firm-month observation, we also observe a large number of firm
characteristics, including balance-sheet information. This allows us to match firms,
which differ in their expectations, but not in their fundamentals, and to identify the
effect of expectations on firm decisions.
We find that optimistic firms tend to raise prices and production today. This re-
sult can be explained in two ways. According to the “news view,” firms simply have
additional information about future developments, which is not reflected in current
fundamentals. Their optimism is thus fundamentally justified – by future fundamen-
tals, so to speak. According to the “noise view,” firms are optimistic or pessimistic
for no fundamental reason. They simply have wrong ideas about the future and their
current actions are driven by animal spirits.
We disentangle the effect of news and noise on firms’ decision makers by consid-
ering the ex-post forecast error. Because we observe the actual developments ex-post,
we can assess whether firms were right about the future or not. We match incorrectly
optimistic and pessimistic firms, in turn, to neutral firms, as well as correctly opti-
mistic/pessimistic firms. For both groups we find a positive effect of optimism on
current production and prices, and a negative effect of pessimism. The effect is consid-
erably smaller in case of incorrect expectations, however. Still, these results show that
firm decisions are to some extent caused by noise.
Finally, we turn to the aggregate effects of optimism and pessimism. For this pur-
pose, we compute an aggregate measure of noise based on firm-level data. We run
local projections to estimate the effect of noise shocks on aggregate production and
prices. We find, in particular, that positive noise shocks (optimism) cause industrial
production and producer prices to increase. Negative shocks play only a small role in
causing business cycles.
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Appendices to Chapter 3
C1 Additional descriptive statistics
Table C.1: Observations and average duration in panel, 1991 to 2016
Full sample Sample with balance
sheet data
Avg. duration in survey (months) 140.2 87.1
Avg. number of responses (months) 119.3 74.1
Response rate 82.5% 83.8%
Respondents 6625 4938
Respondents ×months 620671 322839
Notes: Number of firms and duration of firms in the ifo survey. Separately for the
full sample and the sample with balance sheet data.
Table C.2: Descriptive statistics for different samples, 1991 to 2016
Full sample Sample with balance sheet data
Mean Std. Dev. Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Observ.
Employees in production 505 3024 620411 579 3665 322823
Exp. production, t 0.00 0.55 607578 0.02 0.56 313788
Exp. state of business, t -0.01 0.61 619148 0.01 0.61 321946
Activity, t-1 -0.05 0.58 585075 -0.03 0.58 311828
Prices, t-1 0.00 0.42 597422 0.02 0.43 320617
Orders, t -0.27 0.63 618229 -0.21 0.64 321226
Foreign orders, t -0.28 0.57 616199 -0.22 0.58 319775
Capacity utilization, t 81.15 16.36 527754 81.10 16.13 279901
Demand, t-1 -0.02 0.64 598360 -0.00 0.65 321154
Inventories, t -0.17 0.51 425005 -0.15 0.49 227742
State of profits, t -0.12 0.69 51995 -0.11 0.69 42528
Change in profits, t -0.06 0.71 51389 -0.05 0.71 42031
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the micro-level analysis. Separately for the
full sample and the sample with balance sheet data. For details on the related survey questions see
Table C.6.
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Table C.3: Sample attrition, 1991 to 2016
Start date Total Fraction of firms surviving after
6m 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1991m1 1896 1 1 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75
1992m1 2114 1 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.70
1993m1 2320 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.65
1994m1 2213 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.68 0.64
1995m1 2130 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.66 0.62
1996m1 2072 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.70 0.66 0.63
1997m1 2040 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.62
1998m1 1979 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.60
1999m1 2038 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.62 0.58
2000m1 2055 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.56
2001m1 2050 0.98 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.72 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.56
2002m1 2006 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.54
2003m1 1990 0.97 0.93 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.53
2004m1 2044 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.74 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.57 0.52
2005m1 1979 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.72 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.55 0.51
2006m1 1973 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.55 0.50
2007m1 1935 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.82 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.54 0
2008m1 1859 0.97 0.95 0.88 0.84 0.79 0.73 0.68 0.63 0.58 0 0
2009m1 1874 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.77 0.70 0.65 0.60 0 0 0
2010m1 1845 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.82 0.75 0.70 0.64 0 0 0 0
2011m1 1930 0.97 0.94 0.87 0.78 0.73 0.68 0 0 0 0 0
2012m1 2228 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.76 0.70 0 0 0 0 0 0
2013m1 2105 0.94 0.91 0.84 0.77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2014m1 1976 0.96 0.92 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2015m1 1881 0.96 0.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Table shows share of firms from initial period given by the row still in the sample after the
time specified in the column, e.g. the last row shows that of the 1881 firms which were part of
the sample in January 2015, 96% were still there after 6 months, 93% were still there after 1 year,
and 84% after two years. The zeros in the bottom right corner are due to our sample ending in
December 2016. ‘6m’ = 6 months, ‘1y’ = 1 year.
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Table C.4: Forecast error in the full sample, 1991 to 2016
Full sample Excl. recession months
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Forecast error, t -0.038 0.362 -1.33 1.33 -0.022 0.358 -1.33 1.33
Exp. production, t 0.002 0.551 -1 1 0.028 0.545 -1 1
Realized prod., t+1 to t+3 -0.152 1.297 -3 3 -0.053 1.273 -3 3
Notes: Expected production based on response to Q1 and realized production based on Q3, see Ta-
ble C.6 for wording of question and coding of answers. Forecast error computed following the
approach of Bachmann et al. (2013): the error is 0 if the firm is correct, that is, if the sign of the
expectation and the average realization is the same. If the firm is incorrect, the error equals the
difference between the sum of realized production in t+1 to t+3 and the expectation in t, divided by 3.
Right panel excludes months in which Germany was in a recession according to the German Council
of Economic Experts.
Table C.5: Serial correlation of the forecast error full sample, 1991 to 2016
Correlation with forecast error in month
t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 t-7 t-8 t-9 t-10
Forecast error, t 0.580 0.341 0.152 0.128 0.120 0.109 0.095 0.087 0.082 0.095
Notes: Table shows correlation of forecast errors over time at the firm level. Forecast error computed
following the approach of Bachmann et al. (2013): the error is 0 if the firm is correct, that is, if the sign
of the expectation and the average realization is the same. If the firm is incorrect, the error equals the
difference between the sum of realized production in t+1 to t+3 and the expectation in t, divided by 3.
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Figure C.1: Average expectations and industrial production, 1991 to 2016
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Notes: Shaded areas mark recession periods as defined by the German Council of Economic Experts.
Average response computed as share of positive responses (increase/improve) minus share of negative
responses (decrease/worsen). Survey data from the BEP. Industrial Production from the German Statistical
Office.
Figure C.2: Distribution of days firms respond to survey
within month, 2004 to 2016
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Notes: Histogram shows days of the month on which firms respond in
the online sample, for which the time of handing in the questionnaire is
recorded.
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C2 Details on survey questions
Table C.6: Complete list of survey questions used in our analysis
Label Name Question Possible answers
Q1 expected pro-
duction
Expectations for the next 3 months: Our do-
mestic production activity regarding good
XY will probably . . .
increase [1]
not change [0]
decrease [-1]
Q2 expected state
of business
Expectations for the next 6 months: Tak-
ing economic fluctuations into account our
state of business will be. . .
rather more favorable [1]
not changing [0]
rather less favorable [-1]
Q3 production Tendencies in the previous month: Our do-
mestic production activities with respect to
product XY have . . .
increased [1]
not changed [0]
decreased [-1]
Q4 prices Tendencies in the previous month: Taking
changes of terms and conditions into ac-
count, our domestic sales prices (net) for
product XY have been . . .
increased [1]
not changed [0]
decreased [-1]
Q5 employees Number of employees: In our company
(domestic enterprises only) we employ [. . . ]
persons, of which x persons are for produc-
ing product XY.
x is the number of
persons employed for XY
Q6 orders We consider our order backlog to be. . . relatively high [1]
sufficient [0]
too small [-1]
no export of XY [4]
Q7 foreign orders We consider our order backlog for exports
to be. . .
relatively high [1]
sufficient [0]
too small [-1]
no export of XY [4]
Q8 capacity utiliza-
tion
The current utilization of our capacities for
producing XY (standard utilization = 100%)
is currently x%.
x is a value between 30 and
100 divisible by 10
Q9 demand Tendencies in the previous month: The de-
mand situation with respect to product XY
is . . .
better [1]
not changed [0]
worse [-1]
Q10 inventories Current situation: We evaluate our current
stock of unsold finished goods of XY to be
. . .
too small [1]
sufficient [0]
too large [-1]
no stock keeping [4]
Q11 change in prof-
its
Profit situation and development: As com-
pared to fall last year/the first quarter this
year1 the profit situation of our company
measured by the operating results from
customary business operations . . .
improved [1]
did not change [0]
deteriorated [-1]
Notes: Authors’ translation of the most recent formulation of the question in German according to the
EBDC Questionnaire manual. We only show the answer possibilities that we consider. Specifically, we
exclude “no production” or similar answers, which indicate that the question does not apply to the
firm.
1 Questions asked biannually in May and September. In May question refers to “fall last year”, in
September it refers to “first quarter this year”.
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Table C.7: Main survey questions, changes over time
Label Time period Question
Q1 01/1980-06/1994 Our domestic production activity regarding good XY in the next 3
months taking economic fluctuations into account – i.e. after elimi-
nating purely seasonal fluctuations – will probably . . . increase/not
change/decrease.
07/1994-06/1997 Our domestic production activity regarding good XY in the next 3
months taking economic fluctuations into account – i.e. after elimi-
nating purely seasonal fluctuations – will probably . . . increase/not
change/decrease/no substantial domestic production.
07/1997-11/2001 Our domestic production activity regarding good XY in the next 3
months taking economic fluctuations into account will probably . . . in-
crease/not change/decrease/no substantial domestic production.
Since 01/2002 Expectations for the next 3 months: Our domestic production activity
regarding good XY will probably . . . increase/not change/decrease/no
substantial domestic production.
Q2 01/1980-06/1997 Our state of business regarding good XY in the next 6 months tak-
ing economic fluctuations into account – i.e. after eliminating purely
seasonal fluctuations – will be . . . rather more favorable/ not chang-
ing/rather less favorable.
07/1997-11/2001 Our state of business regarding good XY in the next 6 months taking
economic fluctuations into account will be . . . rather more favorable/
not changing/rather less favorable.
Since 01/2002 Expectations for the next 6 months: Taking economic fluctuations into
account our state of business will be . . . rather more favorable/ not
changing/rather less favorable.
Q3 01/1980-06/1994 In comparison to the previous month our domestic production activi-
ties regarding good XY have . . . been more lively/unchanged/weaker.
07/1994-11/2001 In comparison to the previous month our domestic production activi-
ties regarding good XY have . . . been more lively/unchanged/weaker
/no substantial domestic production.
01/2002-02/2002 In the last 2-3 months our domestic production activities regarding
good XY have . . . been more lively/unchanged/weaker/no substantial
domestic production.
Since 03/2002 Tendencies in the previous month: Our domestic production
activities with respect to product XY have . . . increased/not
changed/decreased/no substantial domestic production.
Q4 01/1980-11/2001 Compared to the previous month our domestic prices (net prices) of
good XY – taking changes of terms and conditions into account – have
been . . . increased/not changed/decreased.1
01/2001-02/2002 In the last 2-3 months our domestic prices (net) of good XY – tak-
ing changes of terms and conditions into account – have been . . . in-
creased/not changed/decreased.
Since 03/2002 Tendencies in the previous month: Taking changes of terms and condi-
tions into account, our domestic sales prices (net) for product XY have
been . . . increased/not changed/decreased.
Notes: Authors’ translation of the question in German according to the EBDC Questionnaire manual.
Bold font highlights components which change from the initial formulation or drop out. Italic font
highlights components which are added later on.
1 In several months in 1980 the question was split into two parts, one covering regular and additional
orders.
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C3 Balancing statistics
Table C.8: Standardized bias, baseline specification
Optimists Pessimists
Variable All Correct Incorrect All Correct Incorrect
Dep. var, t-1 1.8 1.6 1.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9
Dep. var, t-2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.7 -3.5 -2.5
Dep. var, t-3 0.8 0.7 0.1 -0.7 -2.8 -0.5
Production, t-1 1.3 0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.3 -0.6
Production, t-2 1.1 0.3 -0.9 0.3 1.1 0.8
Production, t-3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -0.9 -1.3 1.6
Prices, t-1 0.3 1.8 -0.0 0.3 1.5 0.1
Prices, t-2 1.0 -0.8 0.8 1.1 3.1 -0.1
Prices, t-3 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.3 2.0 -0.6
Demand, t-1 1.0 1.1 0.6 -1.1 -0.6 -1.5
Demand, t-2 1.1 2.0 -1.3 -1.5 -1.0 1.2
Demand, t-3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -1.4 -1.7 1.6
Capacity, t-1 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.3 3.3 1.0
Capacity, t-2 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.8 3.1 1.3
Capacity, t-3 0.9 1.2 -0.1 0.3 3.1 0.6
Employees, t 0.2 -0.8 0.1 1.6 1.0 1.2
Avg. state of business, sector, t 0.9 1.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.3
State of business, t 0.4 -0.7 -0.5 0.9 2.0 1.2
State of business, t-1 0.5 -0.0 -0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0
State of business, t-2 0.6 0.6 -0.5 -0.2 0.9 1.8
State of business, t-3 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 0.7
Orders, t 0.4 -1.4 -0.4 1.6 1.8 -0.4
Orders, t-1 2.0 2.1 -0.8 0.4 0.7 0.1
Orders, t-2 1.2 1.4 0.0 -0.3 -1.4 -0.6
Orders, t-3 1.1 0.9 0.0 0.6 -0.9 0.1
Foreign orders, t 1.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -2.1 -0.0
Foreign orders, t-1 1.9 1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -1.5 0.9
Foreign orders, t-2 1.1 0.6 -0.5 -1.0 -1.7 -0.6
Foreign orders, t-3 0.9 0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -2.1 -0.1
Debt share, t -2.1 -2.8 -1.2 -0.2 -4.5 -2.6
Financing coefficient, t -0.4 -0.7 -1.5 0.7 0.9 0.1
Notes: Table shows standardized bias which captures the difference in means between the treated
and untreated groups. The standardized bias is the mean difference of each variable in the
treated and untreated groups relative to the variances, details can be found in equation (3.4) in
Section 3.3.
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Table C.9: Standardized bias, specification with radius r=0.01
Optimists Pessimists
Variable All Correct Incorrect All Correct Incorrect
Dep. var, t-1 1.3 2.4 1.9 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1
Dep. var, t-2 0.1 -0.9 -0.3 -1.8 -2.8 -2.2
Dep. var, t-3 0.1 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -2.6 0.6
Production, t-1 0.8 0.1 -1.6 0.3 0.1 -0.4
Production, t-2 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.9 2.3 2.4
Production, t-3 -1.0 -2.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.4 3.4
Prices, t-1 0.6 1.4 0.0 -0.2 3.6 -0.5
Prices, t-2 1.3 -0.6 2.0 0.8 4.7 1.0
Prices, t-3 0.7 1.2 0.1 -0.1 3.5 -0.5
Demand, t-1 0.9 1.6 -0.5 -1.3 -1.1 -1.6
Demand, t-2 0.9 0.8 -1.2 -0.3 -1.5 3.0
Demand, t-3 -0.4 -0.7 -0.5 -1.0 -1.6 3.5
Capacity, t-1 0.0 -0.7 1.2 2.8 4.3 1.4
Capacity, t-2 0.1 -0.6 1.5 2.3 3.7 1.1
Capacity, t-3 0.6 -0.6 0.8 1.7 3.8 0.5
Employees, t 0.7 -0.0 0.6 2.0 2.0 -0.3
Avg. state of business, sector, t 0.6 1.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.5 -1.0
State of business, t 0.8 -1.6 -0.8 1.9 3.6 1.5
State of business, t-1 0.5 -1.0 0.4 2.1 2.7 1.2
State of business, t-2 -0.0 -0.4 -0.2 1.4 1.7 1.9
State of business, t-3 -0.2 -1.4 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.0
Orders, t 0.7 -2.1 -0.8 2.0 3.6 0.5
Orders, t-1 1.5 0.5 -0.2 1.3 0.9 0.5
Orders, t-2 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.7
Orders, t-3 0.9 -0.2 1.1 1.8 0.5 -0.5
Foreign orders, t 1.3 -1.2 -0.9 0.5 -1.1 0.3
Foreign orders, t-1 1.6 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.7 1.2
Foreign orders, t-2 0.9 -0.6 -0.9 0.0 -0.7 -1.4
Foreign orders, t-3 1.0 -0.4 0.1 1.1 -1.0 -0.9
Debt share, t -1.7 -0.9 -1.2 0.1 -5.2 -2.2
Financing coefficient, t -1.3 -0.6 -1.2 1.5 1.5 0.7
Notes: Table shows standardized bias which captures the difference in means between the treated
and untreated groups. The standardized bias is the mean difference of each variable in the
treated and untreated groups relative to the variances, details can be found in equation (3.4) in
Section 3.3.
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Table C.10: Standardized bias, specifications with ordered probit and state
of business expectations
Ordered probit State of business exp.
Variable Optimists Pessimists Optimists Pessimists
Dep. var, t-1 -0.7 -0.2 2.0 -1.0
Dep. var, t-2 0.6 -3.6 1.4 -1.0
Dep. var, t-3 2.0 -0.3 0.4 -1.1
Production, t-1 -7.5 -12.8 -0.1 -1.1
Production, t-2 -1.4 -2.7 -0.9 0.0
Production, t-3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9 -0.2
Prices, t-1 -2.8 -2.5 0.0 -0.2
Prices, t-2 -1.9 -0.7 -0.5 0.1
Prices, t-3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.5
Demand, t-1 -4.3 -5.1 0.7 -1.5
Demand, t-2 -1.8 -2.2 -0.2 -0.4
Demand, t-3 -0.4 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9
Capacity, t-1 -6.5 -6.2 -0.8 -1.2
Capacity, t-2 -5.1 -3.2 -0.9 -0.8
Capacity, t-3 -4.6 -3.0 -0.8 -0.9
Employees, t -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 1.4
Avg. state of business, sector, t -0.6 -2.8 -0.4 -0.5
State of business, t -6.7 -5.0 -0.7 0.2
State of business, t-1 -3.5 -1.2 -1.0 0.2
State of business, t-2 -2.6 -0.2 -0.7 -0.0
State of business, t-3 -2.8 0.8 -0.3 -0.0
Orders, t -8.6 -6.3 -1.2 0.1
Orders, t-1 -4.3 -5.0 -0.4 -0.7
Orders, t-2 -4.3 -3.8 -0.4 -0.9
Orders, t-3 -3.9 -1.6 -0.2 -0.9
Foreign orders, t -5.2 -2.3 -0.7 -1.2
Foreign orders, t-1 -2.6 -1.9 -0.5 -1.8
Foreign orders, t-2 -2.5 -1.6 -0.6 -1.8
Foreign orders, t-3 -2.5 0.2 -0.2 -1.1
Debt share, t -0.5 2.5 -1.2 -0.4
Financing coefficient, t -0.4 1.7 0.6 0.6
Notes: Table shows standardized bias which captures the difference in means between
the treated and untreated groups. The standardized bias is the mean difference of each
variable in the treated and untreated groups relative to the variances, details can be found
in equation (3.4) in Section 3.3.
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Figure C.3: Histogram of the density of the propensity scores
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Notes: Histograms show the propensity scores for treated and untreated firms respectively, estimated
as described by equation (3.3). In Panel (a) treated firms are correct optimists, Panel (b) treated firms
are correct pessimists, in Panel (c) treated firms are incorrect optimists, and Panel (d) treated firms are
incorrect pessimists.
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Figure C.4: Standardized bias, before and after matching, correct and incorrect firms
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(c) Incorrect optimists
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(d) Incorrect pessimists
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Notes: Figure shows standardized bias for the matching of correct and incorrect optimists and pes-
simists. The standardized bias measures the mean difference of each variable in the treated and un-
treated groups, as described by equation (3.4) in Subsection 3.3.2.
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Figure C.5: Variance ratio of residuals, before and after matching, correct and incorrect
firms
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(c) Incorrect optimists
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(d) Incorrect pessimists
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Variance ratio of residuals
Unmatched
Matched
Notes: Figure shows variance ratios for the matching of correct and incorrect optimists and pessimists.
The variance ratio measures the difference between the variances orthogonal to the propensity score.
Details on this measure can be found in Subsection 3.3.2. Variance ratios below 0.8 and above 1.25
(dashed lines) are considered “of concern”; ratios below 0.5 and above 2 (grey solid lines) are considered
“bad” according to Rubin (2001).
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C4 Sensitivity analysis for Sections 3.3 and 3.4
Table C.11: Aggregate results with alternative use of balance sheet data
Optimists Pessimists
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: Production Prices Production Prices
ATT 0.170*** 0.026*** -0.175*** -0.029***
(28.85) (5.82) (-27.23) (-5.57)
Observations 120754 120802 116470 116548
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
C4.1 Alternative use of balance sheet data
As discussed in Section 3.2, the survey data has a different frequency than the balance
sheet data. In our baseline setting, we use the most recently published balance sheet
data to estimate the debt share and financing coefficient in each month. This implies
that in the months before a new balance sheet is published, we use information which
is almost one year old. We use this approach to avoid including any information,
which is not yet available to firms at the time expectations are formed. However, one
may argue that firms become aware of changing fundamentals already ahead of the
publication of the new balance sheet. We therefore now propose an alternative method
to link the annual balance sheet data to the monthly survey data. Specifically, for the six
months following the publication of the balance sheet, we use the most recent report
as before. However, for the next six months until the new balance sheet is published,
we use the new data. This means that we always use the balance sheet data with the
publication date closest to the respective month.
Table C.11 shows that changing the method for allocating the balance sheet data
barely affects the results. Given that we only use two balance sheet variables in the
probit regressions determining the propensity score this is not very surprising. Never-
theless, it is reassuring that our estimation is robust in this regard.
C4.2 Alternative matching method
In order to ensure our results are not affected by our choice of matching algorithm,
we implement an alternative algorithm as described in Lechner et al. (2011). These
authors propose a radius (or caliper) matching procedure, which includes weighting
proportional to the distance of the match and a bias adjustment.
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Table C.12: Aggregate results with alternative matching procedure
Optimists Pessimists
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No bias corr. Bias corr. No bias corr. Bias corr.
Panel (a): Production (change in current month)
ATT 0.172*** 0.172*** -0.174*** -0.174***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 135170 135170 131656 131656
Panel (b): Prices (change in current month)
ATT 0.027*** 0.027*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 135170 135170 131656 131656
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Specifically, the algorithm first selects all nearest neighbors in terms of the propen-
sity score and other variables (in the latter case using the Mahalanobis distance) with-
out replacement. In our case, we use the propensity score from the simple probit re-
gressions described in Subsection 3.3.1 and the month as an additional variable. The
latter is done to ensure comparability to our matching procedure. In a next step the
radius is computed as a function of the maximum distance within a matched pair in
step one. Using this radius additional matches are selected if they are within the radius
around the respective observation. This matching step is done with replacement, i.e.
untreated observations can be matched to different treated observations. Weights are
computed as the inverse of the distance between the untreated and treated observa-
tions in a match.
Finally, a regression bias adjustment is implemented by regressing the outcome
variable on an intercept, the propensity score, the square of the propensity score, and
any further variables used to define the distance. The regression is done only for the
matched untreated observations using the weights obtained from matching. Using the
regression coefficient, one then predicts the potential outcome under no treatment for
all observations. The difference between the weighted mean of the predicted outcome
in the untreated group and the mean of the predicted potential outcome in the treated
group is the estimated bias. This bias is then subtracted from the estimated ATT. The
variance is computed analytically.
This approach differs from our matching algorithm because the radius is deter-
mined endogenously, the weights are proportional to the distance, matches can be from
different months (albeit only from close months because we include the month as an
additional distance measure), and finally there is regression adjustment. We imple-
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ment this procedure using the STATA code provided by Huber, Lechner, and Stein-
mayr (2015). For simplicity we use their default settings. The results can be found
in Table C.12. Using this alternative matching procedure does not affect our results
substantially. Compared to our baseline specification in column (1) of Table 3.4 results
only differ at the third digit. The largest difference is observed for prices of pessimists:
-0.036 compared to -0.031 in the baseline. Reassuringly the bias adjustment also does
not have any effects up to three digits. This implies that using a more simple matching
procedure with no bias correction is valid in our data set.
Chapter 4
Exportweltmeister: The Low Returns on
Germany’s Capital Exports *†
*This chapter is based on joint work with Moritz Schularick (University of Bonn) and Christoph
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4.1 Introduction
In a famous scene in Michael Lewis’ book “The Big Short”, a senior executive at Deutsche
Bank, Greg Lippmann, tours Wall Street in 2007 to short-sell securities containing US
subprime mortgages. When asked who was still buying these toxic high-risk papers,
“he always just said: Düsseldorf” (Lewis 2010, p. 67). As a matter of fact, Düsseldorf
based IKB Bank was one of the first banks to fail in 2007. Via its “Rhinebridge” invest-
ment vehicle, IKB Bank heavily invested in the US subprime mortgage market. IKB
Bank subsequently had to be rescued by the German government. These and other
anecdotes have tainted the reputation of German investors in global markets, as the
notion of “stupid German money” indicates.
Is there economic truth in this caricature? Are German investment returns partic-
ularly low, and if so, why? From the point of view of German savers and economic
policymakers, this is a first order question. Germany today is the world’s foremost ex-
porter of savings. More than 300 billion Euros of German savings are sent abroad every
year. Despite the heavy losses on American and other investments in the 2008 crisis,
Germany has exported 2.7 trillion Euros in the past decade alone, equivalent to about
70% of GDP. These capital outflows came from German banks, firms, and households.
Unlike in China or Japan, the public sector has played only a secondary role in the
build-up of Germany’s foreign asset stock, despite the Bundesbank’s much-debated
Target2 claims within the Eurosystem.1
The German public debate has generally interpreted the high current account sur-
plus as a demonstration of the competitiveness of German industry, and not as an
indication of insufficient domestic demand (see e.g., Fuest 2017; German Council of
Economic Experts 2017; Schuknecht 2014; Sinn 2017). Various voices in the domestic
debate view Germany’s capital outflows favorably. Often-heard arguments include
the potential for international risk sharing and for providing a hedge against adverse
demographic trends, in line with the traditional textbook view.2 An aging country like
Germany, so the argument goes, can benefit from investing abroad and achieve bet-
ter investment returns in younger, more dynamic economies than at home (see e.g.,
Deutsche Bank 2013). Storing wealth abroad will also improve risk sharing and con-
sumption insurance: when a recession occurs in Germany but not in other countries,
capital income transfers from abroad stabilize domestic income (see e.g., Bundesbank
2018).
Internationally, the country’s large-scale capital exports have drawn more criticism.
They are sometimes seen as problematic for the recovery in the euro area, and possibly
1In 2017, Target2 claims accounted for about 10% of Germany’s total external assets.
2See e.g., Taylor and Williamson (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
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as a driver of credit and asset-price bubbles abroad (see e.g., Bernanke 2015; den Haan,
Ellison, Ilzetzki, McMahon, and Reis 2016; European Commission 2016; IMF 2016;
Krugman 2017). While German economists and institutions used to reject this criticism
(see e.g., German Ministry of Finance 2017; Weidmann 2014), the debate has recently
shifted. More voices are now questioning the size of Germany’s current account sur-
plus, which continues to exceed 7% of GDP per year (see e.g., Board of Academic Ad-
visors 2019; Weidmann 2019). A key reason is that the economic consequences of low
domestic investment have become difficult to overlook. In an ironic reference to IKB
Bank’s failed "Rhinebridge" investment vehicle, the deteriorating condition of actual
bridges over the Rhine has become a symbol of crumbling infrastructure and growing
domestic investment needs.
This study presents a comprehensive empirical assessment of Germany’s invest-
ments abroad over the entire postwar period. We estimate investment returns and
valuation changes across seven decades and compare Germany’s returns abroad with
those of 12 other advanced economies as well as the returns on domestic investment.
We also assess the consumption insurance offered by foreign returns, and their role as
a hedge for demographic risks. A central contribution is the international perspective,
which we pursue throughout the analysis.
Since all economies have access to the same investment opportunities abroad, it is
informative to compare the returns on foreign assets of one country to those of another.
We ask, how large are the returns on foreign investment of each nation in international
capital markets, and how does Germany compare? In other words, we focus on returns
on external assets, not on the difference between returns on assets and liabilities. This
is the relevant question to assess investment performance, as the liability structure of
countries is a function of the investment decisions of others. Moreover, the returns on
liabilities can be distorted due to tax shifting and country-specific effects that make
comparisons difficult.3
Our analysis brings several new insights that break rank with the consensus view
in Germany. First, we find that the returns on German foreign assets are considerably
lower than the returns earned by other countries investing abroad. Since 1975, the
average of Germany’s annual foreign returns was about 5 percentage points lower
than that of the US and close to 3 percentage points lower than the average returns of
other European countries. Germany fared particularly bad as an equity investor where
investment returns underperformed by 4 percentage points annually.
Second, we find that Germany earns significantly lower foreign returns within each
3In Germany, the difference between asset returns and liability returns has turned positive in recent
years, but not because German foreign investments performed better in terms of yields or valuation
gains, but rather because the yield of foreigners investing in Germany went down, partly for idiosyn-
cratic reasons (see Appendix D6).
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asset category, after controlling for risk. This suggests that Germany’s weak financial
performance abroad is not merely the result of a more conservative investment strat-
egy that focuses on safer assets. The low German returns compared to other countries
also cannot be explained by exchange rate movements, nor by the recent build-up of
Target2 balances. Instead, valuation losses are a big part of the explanation. The val-
uation of Germany’s external asset portfolio has stagnated or decreased, while other
countries witnessed considerable capital gains. Germany’s frequent investment losses
are remarkable given that the world economy has witnessed a price boom across all
major asset markets over the past 30 years (Jordà, Knoll, Kuvshinov, Schularick, and
Taylor 2019).
Third, German returns on foreign assets were considerably lower than the returns
on domestic assets. This is an important insight for the policy debate on the merits
of domestic versus foreign investment. The difference was particularly pronounced in
the last decade, when the average return on a domestic portfolio of German bonds,
equity, and real estate was about 4 percentage points higher per year than the returns
on Germany’s foreign assets.4 German capital exports surged in the past decade, but
the better returns were possible home. Clearly, while it is possible that domestic returns
were to some extent pushed up by capital exports, negative real interest rates on a
wide range of assets provide some prima facie argument against a scarcity premium on
domestic capital.
Fourth, we find little evidence that foreign returns have positive effects for con-
sumption insurance. The return on Germany’s external assets is highly correlated with
German economic activity – even more so than domestic returns – and thus provides
no hedge against domestic consumption shocks. Moreover, 70% of Germany’s foreign
assets are invested in other advanced economies that face similar demographic risks.
In the past decade, less than 10% of capital flows went to younger, more dynamic
economies outside of Europe or North America, even though emerging markets now
account for more than 50% of world GDP.
Table 4.1 summarizes the main findings of the study. The table ranks countries by
their average return on foreign assets, using all countries for which we have sufficiently
detailed data (see Section 4.2 for details and methodology). Germany has the worst
investment performance among the G7 countries. In the full country sample from 1975
to 2017, Germany ranks 12th, with only Finland performing worse. The picture looks
similar if we consider the past decade (2009-2017), where Germany ranks 10th. The
same is true when we use real returns, deflating each country’s foreign asset returns
with domestic inflation rates (see Table D.1, where Germany ranks 9th).
4Data on the domestic return is from Jordà et al. (2019). The return is computed as a weighted average
of return on equity, housing, bonds and bills. Weights are stock market capitalization, housing wealth,
and public debt (split half-half between bonds and bills).
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Table 4.1: Returns on foreign assets, 1975 to 2017
Rank 1975–2017 1999–2017 2009–2017
United States 1 10.64 8.00 9.27
United Kingdom 2 10.22 5.68 4.09
Canada 3 9.19 4.93 8.98
Sweden 4 8.99 6.45 5.38
Norway 5 8.00 5.89 7.38
Italy 6 7.96 3.31 4.39
Spain 7 7.91 2.09 2.89
France 8 7.38 4.01 4.43
Netherlands 9 6.65 4.82 6.05
Denmark 10 5.32 5.32 6.98
Portugal 11 5.01 2.71 2.20
Germany 12 4.95 3.73 3.78
Finland 13 4.43 3.90 3.39
Notes: This table shows average, nominal returns on foreign assets for
various time samples. Countries are ranked by their average return.
We compare nominal returns in domestic currency to abstract from
different national inflation dynamics. The ranking is similar with real
returns (see Appendix D2). Data for Denmark and Portugal starts in
1999 and 1993, respectively. No data is available for Japan. For details,
see Section 4.2.
The cumulative effects of these bad investment returns are quantitatively large, as
can be illustrated with a simple counterfactual exercise. In the decade since the 2008
financial crisis alone, Germany could have become about 2 to 3 trillion Euros richer
had its returns in global markets corresponded to those earned by Norway or Canada,
respectively. This implies a (hypothetical) wealth loss of 70% to 95% of German GDP
(see Section 4.5 for details). On a per capita basis, this implies an amount of about
27,000 to 37,000 Euros of foregone wealth for each German citizen (compared to the
performance of Norway and Canada).5 These numbers are only an illustrative thought
experiment, but they highlight the economic relevance of return differentials on foreign
investments.
The large cumulative effects are also evident in Figure 4.1, which compares the total
return performance of foreign asset position of Germany, the US and the UK, as well
as a portfolio of domestic German assets (stocks, bonds and houses). Assume you
invested 1 Euro in global capital markets in 1975 and that you reinvest any dividends
or interest gains. As of 2017, you would own 40 to 60 times of that initial investment
had you followed the investment strategy of the UK or the US. In comparison, the
initial investment only increased by a factor of 7 using the returns on German foreign
5Numbers are based on the German population in 2017, which was 82.8 million according to the
German Statistical Office.
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Figure 4.1: Cumulated nominal returns, 1975 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows cumulated total returns since 1975 for a portfo-
lio with an initial value of 1. We focus on foreign nominal returns of the
US, the UK and Germany, as well as the German domestic return (data
until 2015 from Jordà et al. (2019)). Returns are cumulated over the years
using the following formula: ∏ti=0(1 + ri). For details, see Section 4.2.
assets (before inflation). German domestic assets increased to 14 times of the initial
investment.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it compares
the foreign investment returns of 13 nations in a systematic way. Much of the literature
focuses on individual countries and typically compares the returns on assets abroad
to those earned by foreigners on inward investments, i.e., on liabilities (for a survey
see, e.g. Gourinchas and Rey 2014). A main motivation of that strand of research is to
examine the size of the “exorbitant privilege”, referring to the phenomenon that some
countries, mainly the United States, can borrow at low yields from abroad and rein-
vest these into higher-yielding assets internationally (Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock
2008, 2013; Gourinchas and Rey 2007a; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2003; Meissner and
Taylor 2008). Here, we take a broader perspective and benchmark returns across coun-
tries, decompose these returns, and examine their determinants in a sample spanning
multiple decades. This adds to a small literature that compares international returns
(Habib 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2003, 2007a). We apply a broad range of tests
across countries that so far have only been employed to analyze return differentials
of individual countries. In particular, using newly gathered data and new estimates
for our 13-country sample, we compute how valuation changes due to exchange rates,
the asset composition, and the geographical distribution of foreign investments affect
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returns.6
Second, this chapter is the most comprehensive analysis of the returns of Germany’s
external assets, going as far back as the 1950s, and by applying a similar degree of
rigor as influential studies conducted for the United States. Our basic methodological
approach resembles that of the Bundesbank (2014, 2018). We also get similar return
estimates for the overlapping sample period from 2005 to 2017 (see Appendix D3 for a
detailed comparison with these and other studies focusing on Germany). Our contri-
bution is to put these numbers into perspective by benchmarking the investment per-
formance to that of similar economies, by adding five decades of data, and by study-
ing why German returns are so low. The results reveal how badly German investments
have done in international comparison, including in the past decade. This in contrast
to earlier work on German foreign investment which came to different conclusions
about the profitability by only comparing German foreign investment with foreigners’
investment in Germany. Furthermore, our findings on risk sharing and demographic
hedging question two of the most common arguments in support of Germany’s large
capital outflows.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We first guide the reader through some
technical but important preliminaries about data, balance of payment arithmetic and
methodology used. The next section presents long run series for returns, yields, and
valuation changes on German foreign investments. We then compare returns on Ger-
man foreign assets to returns on the foreign assets of other countries and to domestic
German assets. The last section looks at the performance of foreign assets as a hedge
for domestic consumption and demographic risks.
4.2 Data and definitions
This section gives an overview of the main data and definitions used. We start by de-
scribing the method for computing returns and the classification of investment types,
then discuss the data for Germany, and move on to international data.
4.2.1 Return computation
We compute the aggregate domestic currency return as the sum of investment income,
I It, and aggregate valuation changes, VCt, over the stock of assets at the beginning of
year t:
r̃At =
I IAt + VC
A
t
I IPAt−1
=
I IAt
I IPAt−1
+
VCAt
I IPAt−1
= ĩAt + ṽc
A
t ,
6Bénétrix, Lane, and Shambaugh (2015) also analyze a large set of countries but they mainly focus on
valuation changes due to exchange rates and not on their effects on returns.
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where the superscript A indicates the asset side of the economy, i.e. assets owned
abroad, financial account outflows and income earned by German residents. This is
the standard approach in the literature (see e.g., Habib 2010). We transform the three
measures of returns to real values using consumer price inflation πt:
iAt =
1 + ĩAt
1 + πt
− 1 (real yield)
vcAt =
1 + ṽcAt
1 + πt
− 1 (real valuation changes)
rAt =
1 + ĩAt + ṽc
A
t
1 + πt
− 1 = iAt + vcAt +
πt
1 + πt
(real return).
Following the residual approach, we compute aggregate valuation changes as all changes
in the asset position not due to transactions in the financial account:
VCAt = I IP
A
t − I IPAt−1 − FAAt = VXAt + VPAt + VOTAt .
These aggregate valuation changes can be further split into valuation changes due
to exchange rate changes, VXt, changes due to price changes, VPt, and changes due
to other adjustments, VOTt, which include write-offs and permanent losses but also
residuals due to statistical discrepancies. The latter result mainly from changes in pri-
mary data sources and differences between in the primary data sources used for the
stock and flow series. In the literature on the exorbitant privilege of the US, much at-
tention focused on the treatment of this other adjustments term, which can be large in
some cases (see e.g., Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2009).
In the United States, the main reason for discrepancies are different revision poli-
cies for the IIP and the balance of payments, specifically revisions in asset data are
more extensive than revisions in flow data (Curcuru et al. 2008). In Germany, this is
not the case. The Bundesbank revises both stock and flow data up to the four previous
years, and adjusts both accounts in order to ensure consistency. Therefore, we include
other adjustments fully in our valuation gains following authors such as Habib (2010)
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a). However, we correct for statistical problems that
are not accounted for in revisions, as discussed for example by the Bundesbank (2014)
and Frey, Grosch, and Lipponer (2014). We explain our adjustments in detail in Sub-
section 4.2.2. Our procedure ensures that we include relevant permanent losses while,
at the same time, not including changes due to purely statistical effects.
Starting in 2005, the Bundesbank provides a breakdown of the valuation changes
into the three components (exchange rates, prices, other). Using this data, we show in
Appendix D3.2 that different allocations of the residual term only have minor effects on
the overall return. We take this as evidence that our residual approach with additional
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adjustments is appropriate for the study of long-run return developments in Germany.
Following standard practice, we will focus on four broad categories of foreign in-
vestments:
(1) Foreign direct investment (FDI) is any kind of foreign investment associated with
control or significant influence over a foreign affiliate. This category also includes any
additional investment associated with the foreign direct investment relationship, in-
cluding reverse investment. Furthermore, real estate investments typically fall into the
FDI category.
(2) Portfolio investment is further split into debt and equity investment, where debt
investment refers to bonds of any kind and equity refers to any direct claims not clas-
sified as FDI. Furthermore, investment fund shares are combined with the equity part
of portfolio investment. In our analysis, we will usually consider debt and equity (incl.
investment fund shares) separately.
(3) Other investment is a combination of various additional investment categories.
It mainly covers financial loans, trade credit and advances, currency, and deposits. In
addition, ‘other investment’ includes some residual ‘other equity’ as well as claims
from pension entitlements and insurances (the latter only since the recent reform of
the Balance of Payments Manual). For euro-area countries, also Target2 balances are
included in the ‘currency and deposits’ subcategory.
(4) Reserves refer to any assets held by the central bank for the purpose of monetary
operations.
4.2.2 German data
To compute returns, we need data from three different balance of payments accounts
published by the Bundesbank: the International Investment Position (IIP), the financial
account, and data on primary income from the current account.
The IIP is available since 1949 on the Bundesbank website. The flow accounts data
there starts in 1971. We combine these series with data for 1949 to 1970 using a Bundes-
bank report published in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Deutsche Mark,
which is made available electronically by Histat/GESIS (Bundesbank 1998). The stock
data and the recent flow data have been revised to match the requirements of the sixth
edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual (BPM).7 The older flow data is still
based on the previous edition of the BPM and it is denominated in Deutsche Mark
(DM).
7The BPM5 was introduced in 1993 and implemented by the Bundesbank in 1995 for the current
account and in 1998 for the IIP. The new BPM6 was introduced in 2009. Using the underlying data
sources the Bundesbank was able to revise the old data in line with the most recent manual, which is
very helpful for our purposes.
CHAPTER 4. EXPORTWELTMEISTER 149
A main challenge in this context was to ensure that we have consistent time series
for each asset category over the seven decades we study, for which we adapt the old
(pre-1971) data to make it compatible to the newer data. The easiest part was to convert
all old series into Euro using the fixed conversion rate (1.95583 DMe ). In addition, there
were several changes in the BPM that relate to the classification of asset classes and
their subcategories, which we deal with as follows.
First, we combine ‘loans’ and ‘other investment’ in the historical data into an aggre-
gate category to make it consistent with the modern (BMP6) classification, which com-
bines loans, currency, deposits and other investment activities under the label ‘other
investment’. The historical series, we created includes interest income from loans but
not from ‘other investment’, since this mainly constitutes government stakes in inter-
national organizations.8
Second, in the old data, financial account flows of the central bank were recorded in
a separate account. The data from this central bank account is similar to that in today’s
central bank flows in the financial account (we can compare the old and new series for
a lengthy overlapping period, namely 1971-1997). Therefore, we use the data from the
old Bundesbank account to measure financial account flows by the central bank in the
period before 1971.
Third, in the modern data, portfolio debt investments are divided into long-term
and short-term bonds, while there is no such distinction in the old data, where this
category is labeled as ‘fixed income assets’.9 Since these terms refer to the same as-
set class, we merge the old and new series and rename them “portfolio debt”. This
category captures both long-term and short-term bonds in history and today.
Fourth, we face the problem that reserve assets are a distinct category in the IIP
and the financial account, while reserves are combined with ‘other investment’ in the
primary income account.10 As a result, we merge the two series so that returns can
only be computed for the sum of ‘other investment and reserves’.
Fifth, portfolio equity investment includes the subcategory ‘investment fund shares’
but data availability and reliability of this series is limited historically. The subcategory
was fully incorporated in the German IIP only in 1994, but the estimation of the liabil-
ity position is noisy and imprecise until the year 2009 (Frey et al. 2014). Therefore,
we only compute returns from investment fund shares from 2010 onward and exclude
this series until 2009. Since investment fund shares make up no more than 6% of total
8See annotation in Table B6_07 in Bundesbank (1998).
9More specifically, in German the category in the new data is called “Schuldverschreibungen”
whereas it used to be “festverzinsliche Wertpapiere”.
10In the BPM6, countries are left the choice whether to show the income flows separately or combine
them with ‘other investment’. In the old manual countries could choose to include the income flows
either in ‘other investment’ or portfolio investment. The Bundesbank chose to combine the reserve asset
income with ‘other investment’ income, such that there is a consistent time series available.
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IIP assets and less than 1% of IIP liabilities before 2009, this does not affect our results
much.11 We face similar problems for the category of FDI debt, meaning loans that are
part of foreign direct investment flows. The IIP series on this subcategory only starts
in 1997 while it was included in the other accounts earlier on. We therefore exclude the
data on FDI loans prior to 1997 to ensure consistent return series.
Sixth, the Bundesbank added financial derivatives to the IIP in 2010, as this category
had become increasingly relevant. Financial derivatives are only recorded as balances
in the financial account and not included in primary income, making it difficult to
compute precise returns. Therefore, we subtract financial derivatives from aggregate
quantities and do not consider them in our main return calculations. However, we
do show some stylized facts on the amount of outstanding derivatives in Section 4.3.
More generally, whenever any further new category is added to the IIP, we subtract
the increase due to this addition from the change in assets in the given year to avoid
overestimating valuation gains.
Beyond the categorization of asset classes, we need to consider idiosyncratic breaks
in the data series, changes in data availability, as well as mismatches between the three
different accounts, as also discussed by Bundesbank (2014) and Frey et al. (2014).
First, the initial values in 1954 for IIP liability categories equity investment and debt
instruments within portfolio investment are unrealistically low, compared to values in
the following period, resulting in double or triple digit returns in the following year.
We exclude these values as outliers.
Second, the Bundesbank changed the valuation of its reserves and other external
holdings after the introduction of the Euro in 1999. Before 1999, the reserves were
valued using the “lower of cost or market” concept, while they are valued at market
prices afterwards. According to Bundesbank (2012), this resulted in a e26.25 billion
jump in the reported value of reserves and other assets held by the Bundesbank in 1999
(of these e25.42 billion are FX reserves and e0.83 billion are other assets). To correct
for this one-time change, we subtract this increase from the change in the relevant IIP
asset categories in 1999.
Third, there are issues with regard to market versus book valuations. For our pur-
pose of computing investment returns, it is crucial to value assets at market prices. This
is particularly challenging for the valuation of FDI. For listed companies, FDI equity is
valued at market prices by the Bundesbank since 2004, but not before. For non-listed
companies, the Bundesbank uses the values reported in the parent company’s balance
sheet, as is standard practice in many countries and is also recommended in the BPM6
11The aggregate return on foreign assets is barely affected. The return on equity is lower if we include
investment fund shares since their return is lower than the return on equity. Between 1994 and 2009, the
inclusion of investment fund shares lowers the return from 8.71% to 6.1%. Hence, if anything, ignoring
this sub-category will result in an overestimation of German returns (upward bias).
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(Bundesbank 2008). Moreover, no market prices are used for other, smaller compo-
nents of FDI assets, for example assets related to construction sites. Only real estate
assets have always been valued at market prices (Bundesbank 2008). The lack of mar-
ket values in some parts of the FDI data may lead to an underestimation of returns,
which is particularly problematic if Germany uses a different valuation approach than
other countries. We explore how our results may be biased due to FDI valuation issues
in Appendix D8, concluding that the effects are small.
Valuation issues are less relevant for the remaining asset categories. The Bundes-
bank has always reported portfolio investments at market prices.12 For reserves, the
Bundesbank provides market-based values since 1999. Before 1999, it applied the low-
est value accounting principle, assigning the minimum of market value and original
(purchasing) costs. For loans, deposits, and currency valuation changes are secondary,
except for exchange rate effects, which we consider throughout our analysis.
Taken together, these adjustments allow us to compute consistent time series of
returns using primary income, financial account flows, and asset stocks for the asset
categories of foreign direct investment, portfolio debt investment, portfolio equity in-
vestment, and ‘other investment’ (including reserves) starting in 1949.
Beyond data on German assets and liabilities, we use data on the German price
level and GDP from the Macro History Database (MHD) (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor
2017). MHD data is only available until 2016, so we append data from German Federal
Statistics Office (GDP) and Eurostat (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP))
for 2017. For GDP, we do this by using official data levels and applying the growth
rates from the MHD data.
4.2.3 International data
In order to place German returns in a broader context, we compare them to other coun-
tries’ returns on their foreign assets. We compute the returns of other countries as dis-
cussed above and thus require the same type of data. The main data sources are the
IMF’s balance of payments and international investment position statistics.
The time series generally start in 1970 but there are differences across countries.
Data on assets is the most limited when drawing on national sources. Therefore, we
add data on assets from the External Wealth of Nations database (EWN) of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007b). We follow their recommendation regarding the starting year
of when to use IMF data and when to use their estimates. This is mainly due to part
of the older time series from the IMF still being book-value series. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007b) on the other hand, provide estimates of market-value positions. Due
12The valuation used to be done by using price indices (Bundesbank 2008). Since 2006 individual
securities can be tracked and valued to provide an even better estimate of foreign assets.
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to the relevance of valuation changes for our returns, we rely on their estimates. This
allows us to compute returns for 12 additional countries. For five countries, the return
series start in 1971, for an additional five countries the series starts at the latest in 1976.
We provide details on countries and time spans covered in Table D.3 in Appendix D4.
To ensure comparability, we also exclude data on financial derivatives from the other
countries’ returns. In addition, we also check the consistency of the data sources as
we do for Germany and adjust accordingly. These country-specific data issues are also
described in Table D.3.
To compute real returns, we use data on inflation from the World Bank’s Word
Development Indicators. Furthermore, we also use nominal GDP data from the World
Development Indicators database in the regression analyses.
One important influence on returns are valuation changes due to exchange rates.
Unfortunately, exchange-rate specific valuation changes are only published scarcely
by some countries and there is no readily available dataset across countries, especially
not by asset class. Therefore, we estimate exchange rate driven valuation change for
each investment category in our sample as discussed in more detail in Subsection 4.6.1.
For this purpose, we need data on the currency composition of assets, but such data is
also not readily available. Instead, we follow the suggestions of Bénétrix et al. (2015)13
to approximate the currency composition. For each asset category, we use different
external sources. Table D.4 in the appendix provides details on the data used for each
country and asset type. We also discuss the data choices in the following.
For FDI assets, we use OECD data on bilateral FDI stocks, which starts in 1985 for
most countries and covers a large set of partner countries.14 Following Bénétrix et al.
(2015), we assume that FDI in a country is always denominated in the local currency.
To estimate the currency shares of portfolio investment, we rely on data from the
IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). The survey collects data on
the cross-border holdings of portfolio equity and debt assets starting in 2001. The
holdings are broken down by country pairing and by currency. The currency break-
down includes US Dollars, British Pound, Euro, Japanese Yen, and Swiss Franc. Not
all countries provide a currency breakdown since 2001. In those cases, we use informa-
tion from the country breakdown to estimate currency shares. We adjust the country
shares by the average ratio of country to currency shares when both are available since
13This is an update and extension of Lane and Shambaugh (2010), which describes the process in some
more detail.
14Bénétrix et al. (2015) suggest using the UNCTAD database. However, we find for our sample the
OECD database is more useful. The UNCTAD data only covers the years 2001-2012. Its advantage is that
it covers a large set of reporting countries, and that it includes the ultimate counterparts instead of the
immediate target of the investments. This is relevant especially for the investment of large multinational
corporations. The former is not relevant to us since we focus only on advanced economies. The latter is
unlikely to affect the currency composition in a major way.
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there is no one-for-one match between the two (especially for the US Dollar). Here, we
again deviate from Bénétrix et al. (2015) who only use the country data available.
‘Other investment’ mainly comprises of loans and deposits by banks, and Bénétrix
et al. (2015) suggest using the Locational Banking Statistics (LBS) provided by the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS). This data set covers cross-border lending by banks
in US Dollars, British Pound, Euro, Japanese Yen, and Swiss Franc. We use these cur-
rency shares as an estimate for the currency share of ‘other investment’. Data is avail-
able from 1977 onward.15 However, for some countries data availability is limited, see
Table D.4 in Appendix D4.16
Reserve assets also include a significant share of foreign currency assets. Therefore,
we gathered balance sheet and annual report data of each of the national central banks.
In some cases, only approximate shares are reported (e.g. “more than 90%”). In these
cases, we resort to IMF data on reserve positions and apply the reported shares. Fur-
thermore, we use IMF data on special drawing rights (SDRs) which are also subject to
valuation changes. Again, we provide details on coverage and sources by country in
Table D.4 in the appendix.
To validate our approach on exchange-rate driven valuation changes, we make use
of the fact that some countries have started to publish a breakdown of IIP valuation
changes in recent years, albeit usually with limited time coverage. Among these coun-
tries are Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Whenever official time series are available, we use these. Otherwise, we
rely on our own estimates.17 Using these data, we can also show that our estimates
are similar to the official time series, see Appendix D5 for the results. The similar-
ity highlights that our approach works well. In the same appendix, we also compare
our estimates to estimates using the currency shares of Bénétrix et al. (2015). These
estimates are also very close to ours.18
As mentioned earlier, we also study the geographical distribution of assets, i.e., the
countries where the assets are held. For this purpose, we rely on the same data sources
as for the currency composition estimates. This is possible because the IMF’s CPIS and
15Bénétrix et al. (2015) report that they have access to more detailed data directly from the BIS, poten-
tially covering the gaps in the officially reported series
16A notable case are the United States for which the currency breakdown is only available from 2012
on with exception of one data point in 1998. We use this fact to linearly interpolate between 1998 and
2012 to increase data coverage. We check whether this biases the US data by comparing the resulting
series on valuation changes to the valuation changes published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) since 2002 and find only small deviations (see Appendix D5 for details).
17We do not include the UK data since their estimation procedure is less sophisticated and builds on
less detailed data than ours, see the Appendix D5 for details on this.
18We provide this additional comparison because the currency data of Bénétrix et al. (2015) differs
slightly from ours and in some cases is more detailed, as discussed above. However, we cannot rely on
their more detailed data for our estimations because they only provide the currency shares for the ag-
gregate asset positions. For our analysis we need the currency shares separately for each asset category.
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Figure 4.2: German current account balance in % of GDP, 1872 to 2017
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Notes: This figure shows Germany’s long history of current account sur-
pluses, which is interrupted only by few periods with deficits, in partic-
ular after Germany’s reunification in 1990. The past two decades stand
out, showing record surpluses both in absolute terms and as a share of
GDP. No data is available for 1914–1924 and 1939–1947. Data from the
Macro History Database (Jordà et al. 2017) and Bundesbank.
the BIS’s LBS databases both include data on the country composition as well. The FDI
data refers to countries anyways. We discuss the approach in Subsection 4.3.2. In this
case, too, data is not available for all years for all countries. Table D.5 in Appendix D4
provides details.
Finally, we use data on exchange rates from the Bundesbank for Deutsche Mark
(until 1998) and Euro (since 1999). All other required bilateral exchange rates are ap-
proximated using BIS data on US Dollar exchange rates.
4.3 Germany’s capital exports since WW2
4.3.1 Evolution of Germany’s current account and foreign assets
Germany has been running current account surpluses for a large part of its modern
economic history. Notable exceptions are the late 1920s and the first ten years after the
reunification. Figure 4.2 shows that the last decade is characterized by exceptionally
high surpluses, even by historical standards. The recent surpluses were about three
times higher relative to GDP than in gold standard times and during the so-called
economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s.
Due to its consistently high capital exports, Germany ranks among the world’s top
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Figure 4.3: Germany’s international investment position, 1949 to 2017
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Notes: The net position is the difference between foreign assets (assets
held abroad) and foreign liabilities (domestic assets held by foreigners).
The graph shows the significant buildup of Germany’s gross positions
since the 1990s, of both assets and liabilities (financial globalization).
The net position has grown most markedly over the last decade (large
and sustained current account surpluses). Assets data from Bundesbank.
GDP from the Macro History Database (Jordà et al. 2017) and the German
Statistical Office.
external creditors, both in absolute numbers and relative to GDP.19 Furthermore, Fig-
ure 4.3 shows that Germany not only has a large net position but also a large gross
position. Both the asset and liability positions rose strongly since the mid-1990s and
now amount to 256% and 197% of GDP respectively. While they initially grew in tan-
dem leaving the net position at relatively small levels, the gap has been increasing since
the mid-2000s and especially in recent years. The net position has been positive over
the entire post-war period with few exceptions. It currently stands at 59% of GDP. This
reflects Germany’s sustained past current account surpluses.
How does Germany’s international investment position (IIP) compare to accumu-
lated capital exports? In a simple framework, one can think of Germany’s external
asset portfolio as a savings account. Adding up all the payments that have flowed
into this account correspond to the historical book value of gross investments. The
difference between historical costs and market value then reflects valuation gains on
that portfolio. In other words, the larger the difference between the accumulated flow
measure and the current market value of external investments, the higher the capital
19In absolute numbers Germany ranked second in 2017, only exceeded by Japan. In percent of GDP
Germany ranked seventh, when excluding the small oil exporting countries. For details see Figure D.1
in Appendix D1.
CHAPTER 4. EXPORTWELTMEISTER 156
Figure 4.4: Germany’s foreign assets and cumulated finan-
cial account outflows, 1949 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows that Germany’s cumulated financial outflows
(gray dashed line) closely track the stock of total foreign assets (blue solid
line). This indicates small valuation gains or even losses on the gross
asset position. More specifically, the difference between the two series
equals cumulated valuation changes, which are negative with the excep-
tion of a few years (blue bars). Foreign assets and cumulated financial
account flows are adjusted to remove statistical differences between the
series, see Subsection 4.2.2 for details. Financial derivatives are excluded.
Data from the Bundesbank.
gains.
Figure 4.4 demonstrates that the value of Germany’s gross foreign asset position
very closely tracks the cumulated financial account outflows. This implies that the
valuation gains, i.e., the wedge between historical flows and current market value,
have been small. The blue bars in Figure 4.4 show that this wedge has often even been
negative and is generally small. In light of the multi-decade asset price boom that has
characterized the world economy in the past decades, this fact is clearly noteworthy
(see Jordà et al. 2019).
4.3.2 Germany’s external portfolio: asset types and geography
The composition of Germany’s foreign assets also changed notably over time. The
balance of payments data broadly distinguishes between five different asset categories:
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, other investment, reserves, and
financial derivatives. For Germany, we have data on the first four categories since 1949,
but data on financial derivatives only starts in 2010 since this is an investment type that
only became relevant more recently. Therefore, we will show derivatives once here and
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Figure 4.5: Composition of Germany’s international investment position, 1949 to 2017
(a) Foreign assets by type
0
50
100
150
200
250
%
 o
f G
D
P
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Financal derivatives
Reserves
Other claims
Loans
Target2 claims
Currency holdings and deposits (excl. Target2)
Equity, portfolio holdings
Debt, portfolio holdings
Foreign direct investment
(b) Foreign assets by sector
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Notes: This graph shows the composition of Germany’s foreign assets over time along two dimensions:
by type of investment (a) and by sector (b). Asset data from the Bundesbank. The data split between
firms and households is only available since 2012. GDP data from the Macro History Database (Jordà
et al. 2017) and the German Statistical Office.
exclude them from the remainder of the analysis, as discussed in Section 4.2. This will
facilitate the interpretation of developments over time.
Panel (a) of Figure 4.5 shows the changing composition regarding asset classes over
time. The rise in the overall level in assets was largely driven by increases in foreign
direct investment and portfolio investment reflecting increasing international financial
integration. Reserve assets on the other hand made up 20-30% of all assets until the
1970s but have become almost irrelevant today. Target2 balances have been increas-
ing in recent years but only represent about 10% of all assets. As Target2 balances do
not generate income, they could potentially bias our estimated downwards. Through-
out the analysis, we will pay close attention that our findings are unaffected by the
inclusion of Target2 balances.
In addition to the composition by functional category, one can also decompose the
foreign asset position by domestic sectors. Here, the balance of payments distinguishes
between four broad sectors: banks, firms and households, the government, and the
central bank. In more recent data, the non-bank private sector is further split into fi-
nancial firms and non-financial firms plus households. Panel (b) of Figure 4.5 shows
the changing composition by sector over time. The panel shows that the increase in
gross position since the 1990s was mainly driven by banks increasing their exposure
relative to GDP. However, since the financial crisis the banking sector reduced its ex-
posure. This decline has been partially offset by non-financial firms.
It is equally interesting to consider the geographical distribution of assets. Unfortu-
nately, no official data on the country of residence of the counterparties are available.
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Figure 4.6: Geographical distribution of IIP assets, 1985 to
2017
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Notes: This graph shows that the majority of German foreign assets are
invested in other advanced economies, especially in Europe. The geo-
graphical distribution is estimated from additional data sources, see Sub-
section 4.2.3. The figure excludes financial derivatives since no data on
their geographical distribution available. Choice of offshore countries
is based on Bundesbank list of offshore banking centers. GDP from the
Macro History Database (Jordà et al. 2017) and the German Statistical
Office.
Therefore, we rely on additional data sources to estimate the geographical distribution
of foreign investments for Germany and other countries, as discussed at the end of
Subsection 4.2.3.
Figure 4.6 shows the resulting decomposition into four regions since 1985.20 The
figure reveals that Germany mainly invests in other advanced economies, especially in
fellow European countries. The introduction of the Euro in 1999 further increased the
European exposure as even more investment went to other euro-area countries. Today,
almost 70% of all investments are in other advanced European economies, another 15%
are in non-European advanced economies (mainly the US), and only the remaining
15% are invested in other countries worldwide, including offshore destinations.
20The additional data sources needed do not allow for a meaningful estimation for the period before
1985.
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Table 4.2: Returns on German foreign assets, 1950 to 2017
Panel (a): Real returns Panel (b): Nominal returns
1950–17 1999–17 2009–17 1950–17 1999–17 2009–17
Return, all assets 1.59 2.28 2.62 3.95 3.73 3.78
Yield, all assets 1.75 2.00 1.77 4.18 3.45 2.93
Valuation changes, all assets -2.48 -1.12 -0.28 -0.23 0.27 0.85
Return, FDI -0.18 3.78 4.85 2.38 5.27 6.05
Return, equity portfolio hold. 8.25 3.13 8.41 11.00 4.52 9.61
Return, debt portfolio hold. 5.66 3.18 3.40 8.39 4.65 4.57
Return, other inv.+ reserves 1.15 1.21 0.27 3.50 2.65 1.40
Notes: This table shows average real and nominal returns on German foreign assets. Returns are split
by components and asset category. Returns estimated using Bundesbank data as discussed in Subsec-
tion 4.2.1. Real returns deflated using German consumer price index from Macro history Database and
Eurostat.
4.4 Returns on German foreign and domestic assets
We now turn to the analysis of the profitability of German foreign investments. This
section presents descriptive statistics of Germany’s foreign asset returns and shows
that these are lower than returns on domestic investments.
4.4.1 Germany’s foreign investment returns 1950 to 2017
Table 4.2 summarizes the German return, yield, and valuation changes since 1950. For
the comparison over time it is more informative to focus on real returns (deflated by
national CPI), but we also show nominal returns for the main tables and figures (to
save space, some were shifted to Appendix D2).
The average real annual return between 1950 and 2017 was 1.59%. The yield was
1.75% while valuation changes were negative on average at -2.48%. Recall that the real
return equals the sum of the real yield and real valuation changes plus some adjust-
ment for inflation. Average real returns increased in the more recent periods to around
2% depending on the time horizon. This is mainly due to lower valuation losses, albeit
they remain negative.
The lower part of Table 4.2 reveals large differences between the asset categories.21
Over the full sample, portfolio equity investments saw the highest returns on average,
followed by portfolio debt. FDI and ‘other investment’ had much smaller real returns.
However, since 1999 the relationships changed: equity returns fell and FDI increased
so that now they are roughly similar.
21As discussed in the data section, we need to combine ‘other investment’ and reserves when com-
puting returns since investment income data is not available separately for those two categories.
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Figure 4.7: Real returns on German foreign assets, 5-year rolling means, 1950 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows real returns on German foreign assets as a rolling arithmetic mean computed
over 5-year windows and plotted at the third year of the window. Panel (a) shows returns on all assets
and the decomposition into yield and valuation changes. Panel (b) shows total return series by asset
category. Returns are estimated using Bundesbank data as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1. The series are
deflated using the German consumer price index from the Macro History Database (Jordà et al. 2017)
and Eurostat.
To visualize developments over time, Figure 4.7 plots 5-year rolling averages of our
measures of returns. Panel (a) shows the real return, yield, and valuation changes on
total assets. Panel (b) plots the real returns by asset category. Several observations
stand out.
First, valuation changes are more volatile than yields and drive the volatility in
returns (as should be expected). Average real valuation changes were almost always
negative. The improvement in average returns on German foreign assets since the
1980s was driven mainly by a significant increase in the yield, i.e., the direct income
earned on investments. Average real valuation changes, however, have remained in
negative territory even over much of the last decades, which is surprising as global
asset markets have performed exceptionally well since the 1970s.
Second, the average return to IIP assets hides diversity across asset classes. The
returns vary strongly across these asset categories, as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 4.7.
Returns to foreign direct investment were low for many decades but increased in the
2000s. Portfolio investment generated larger returns than the aggregate asset position
in most periods. This is mainly due to high returns on foreign equity. Finally, the ‘other
investment’ category that, among others, includes bank loans saw returns comparable
to the aggregate return.
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4.4.2 Comparison to domestic returns
How do Germany’s external returns compare to returns on domestic capital? There are
two main options to address this question. Many studies compare the return earned
abroad to the return earned on domestic capital markets. Others compare it to the re-
turn earned on the other side of international balance sheet, i.e., on inward investments
by foreigners. As explained above, the comparison with liability returns is not neces-
sarily insightful regarding the quality of foreign investment. Foreign liabilities do not
cover all investment opportunities available to German investors in their own country
and the returns reported by foreigners can be downward biased due to tax shifting,
especially in a high-tax country like Germany. For these reasons, we focus on the first
option – the comparison of foreign returns with returns on the aggregate capital stock
in Germany.
Despite our emphasis on domestic portfolio returns, we also compute the return on
IIP liabilities in Appendix D6. In line with earlier studies, we find that the difference
between asset and liability returns in Germany was negative for a long time but de-
creased in the past 20 years and recently turned positive. This trend is mainly driven
by decreasing yields on FDI liabilities and debt liabilities. The latter is not surprising
given the flight to safety compressing German bond returns after 2008. The former may
be related to tax incentives leading to the increased leverage on inward FDI, which in
turn leads to relatively low reported yields (see Appendix D6 for a discussion).
The return on Germany’s capital stock (held by both foreigners and Germans) is
taken from the data set of Jordà et al. (2019). We make use of the return to capital, which
is computed as the return to a portfolio consisting of equity, housing, bonds, and bills.
To compute the return to capital, the authors compute returns for all asset categories
using various data sources. The returns also include both valuation changes and direct
income flows. In the case of Germany since World War II, the authors use money
market rates for the bills returns, the performance index for the Bund bond market
return, the German stock market index for equity, and housing returns based on the
rent-price approach. Then they aggregate individual returns to arrive at an aggregate
return on capital using appropriate portfolio weights. These weights are stock market
capitalization for equity returns, housing wealth for housing returns, and public debt
split equally between bonds and bills. Unfortunately, the return to capital series starts
only in 1963.
Figure 4.8 plots five-year rolling averages of the foreign and domestic returns. It
reveals that domestic returns were significantly higher than the return earned abroad
for the majority of the time observed. On average, the difference was more than 3
percentage points. Only in the early 1980s and in the early 2000s until the financial cri-
sis average returns were roughly equal. Moreover, while the average domestic return
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Figure 4.8: Real foreign and domestic returns, 5-year rolling
means, 1963 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows that the return on German foreign assets (dark
blue line) is lower than the domestic return on German assets at home
(dotted line) for most years. The series are rolling means computed over
5-year windows and shown at the third year. The return on German
domestic assets is from Jordà et al. (2019) and available 1963-2015. Both
series are deflated using the German CPI.
computed by Jordà et al. (2019) rose significantly in the past decade, foreign returns
did not increase.
4.5 International comparison of returns
Our main focus is comparing German foreign returns to other countries’ foreign re-
turns. This is the most plausible comparison to gauge Germany’s relative performance
when investing abroad since all (advanced) economies in principle have access to the
same investment opportunities. For this comparison, we computed returns for a group
of 12 additional advanced economies from 1975 to 2017. We started by collecting data
for each of the G7 countries, although we could not find detailed, long-run data on for-
eign assets and their returns for Japan. We then tried to add as many OECD countries
as possible. The final selection is based on data availability in particular with regard to
the level of disaggregation and the years covered, since we wanted a long time horizon.
We express all returns in the country’s respective domestic currency.
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Figure 4.9: Nominal returns in comparison, 5-year rolling
means, 1975 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows that Germany’s returns on foreign assets (dark
blue line) were almost always lower than the foreign returns of other
G7 members (excluding Japan due to data availability). Rolling means
computed over 5-year windows and plotted at the third year of the win-
dow. We compare nominal domestic currency returns to abstract from
the effects of different inflation dynamics across the countries. The over-
all picture is similar when plotting real returns, as shown in Appendix
A1. For more details, see Section 4.2.
4.5.1 Descriptives
For now, we focus on the other G7 members for comparison to keep the graphs and
tables simple (Japan is not included due to data availability). Later, we will include
the additional advanced economies in the comparison group. Figure 4.9 shows that
German returns abroad were consistently lower than those of other countries. Impor-
tantly, this does not apply only to the US with its “exorbitant privilege” in international
finance, but also to Italy, France, Canada, and the UK.
Table 4.3 summarizes the key return statistics in comparison and over different time
horizons. The table demonstrates that German returns were lower than the European
average, and consistently lower than domestic returns.
4.5.2 Regression evidence
Is Germany’s financial underperformance statistically significant in a broader coun-
try panel? In the next step, we test whether German returns are lower relative to a
larger group of countries. As explained, the countries we consider are 12 comparable
OECD economies, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
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Table 4.3: Comparing returns, nominal, various time horizons
1975–17 1999–17 2009–17 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–17
Germany, foreign assets 4.95 3.73 3.78 6.68 7.12 2.77 3.65
Germany, domestic assets 7.03 6.26 8.48 6.79 8.37 4.24 8.68
Canada 9.19 4.93 8.98 10.27 15.31 1.29 8.88
France 7.38 4.01 4.43 13.56 8.60 3.41 4.13
Italy 7.96 3.31 4.39 10.23 13.17 2.28 3.72
United Kingdom 10.22 5.68 4.09 16.30 7.96 5.21 5.14
United States 10.64 8.00 9.27 14.93 10.69 7.62 7.50
Germany minus domestic -1.94 -2.33 -4.21 -0.11 -1.25 -1.47 -4.51
Germany minus US -5.69 -4.27 -5.49 -8.25 -3.57 -4.85 -3.85
Germany minus Europe1 -2.75 -0.68 -0.94 -5.02 -2.52 -0.53 -1.05
Notes: This table shows that Germany’s returns on foreign assets were lower than the return on domestic
assets as well as the foreign returns of other G7 members (excluding Japan due to data availability).
Foreign returns are computed as discussed in Section 4.2, while the domestic German return is from
Jordà et al. (2019). We compare nominal domestic currency returns to abstract from the effects of
different inflation dynamics across the countries.
1 Europe is an average of DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, IT, NL, NO, PT, SE.
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. We regress the observed an-
nual returns for Germany and these other advanced economies on standard control
variables as well as a “German dummy”. We are mainly interested in the size and
significance of the coefficient on the German dummy as it tells us whether German re-
turns differ significantly compared to other countries. In the cross-country setting, we
focus on nominal returns because we are interested in the direct returns that individual
countries earn abroad, abstracting from inflation dynamics across the countries. Using
this data, we estimate the following model using pooled OLS:
r̃it = α + βDit + δZit + γt + uit, (4.1)
where Dit is a dummy variable which is 1 for Germany and 0 for the other countries,
Zit are control variables and γt are yearly time fixed effects. In line with the existing lit-
erature, we control for the size of the net foreign asset position as well as past financial
account balances relative to GDP to capture rebalancing effects via returns in countries
with large past and current external imbalances (as discussed by e.g., Gourinchas and
Rey 2014).
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 4.4 present our core finding: German foreign investment
returns are consistently about 2 percentage points lower than the returns of other coun-
tries. Moreover, while the exact underperformance fluctuates between 1 and 3 percent-
age points, the finding is robust across different periods. Another important finding is
that the investment underperformance we measure is statistically significant.
Excluding the Target2 balances from foreign assets of all euro-area countries does
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Table 4.4: Determinants of returns on foreign assets, 1985 to 2017
Baseline (all assets) Excluding Target2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1985–2017 1985–1998 1999–2017 2009–2017 1999–2017 2009–2017
Germany dummy -2.27*** -3.01** -1.48** -2.08** -1.36** -1.79**
(0.63) (1.51) (0.59) (0.80) (0.59) (0.81)
Constant 4.20* 4.46* 14.01*** 7.42*** 14.04*** 7.42***
(2.47) (2.46) (1.31) (1.80) (1.32) (1.81)
Observations 406 160 246 117 246 117
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.27 0.41 0.18 0.41 0.19
No. countries 13 12 13 13 13 13
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows that German returns on foreign assets are significantly lower than the
foreign returns of other advanced economies. This is true across different samples (columns (1) to
(4)) as well as when Target2 balances are excluded (columns (5) and (6)). The dependent variable
is the nominal rate of return on total foreign assets by country and year. The regressions include
control variables for net foreign assets and the financial account balance (coefficients not shown).
Data for Denmark and Portugal starts in 1999 and 1993, respectively. No data for Japan available.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
not alter our main finding. This is shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.4, which
focus on the period after 1998 when the Euro (and, thus, the Target2 system) was in-
troduced. The coefficients confirm that Germany’s returns on foreign assets are about
1.5 percentage points lower than the returns of other countries.
We also consider how the Germany dummy evolved over time to see if the Ger-
man underperformance is driven by particular episodes. To test this, we interact the
German country dummy with year fixed effects to estimate a time-varying effect. The
regression and control variables are the same as above. Figure D.2 in Appendix D1
plots the resulting coefficients. The results show that no particular period leads to the
negative Germany dummy. In addition, the Germany dummy was always smaller or
equal zero, never significantly larger than zero.
4.5.3 Aggregate financial consequences – a counterfactual exercise
In this section, we aim to quantify the cumulative financial loss (or foregone gains)
caused by Germany’s low returns on foreign assets. For this, we need to construct a
counterfactual in which German returns would have been comparable to those of other
countries.
We compute Germany’s counterfactual investment income assuming that Germany
achieved the rates of return by the other G7 members (we also include Norway, which
achieved one of the highest returns over the past decade). We then compare these coun-
terfactual values to the realized income earned and compute the aggregate cumulative
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Table 4.5: Cumulated income losses due to low returns on German foreign assets
1975–2017 1999–2017 2009–2017
bn 2015 e % of GDP bn 2015 e % of GDP bn 2015 e % of GDP
Canada -3852.96 -105.20 -2158.89 -69.50 -3075.99 -93.77
France -1093.66 -25.03 -332.04 -9.44 -323.80 -9.39
Italy -1114.90 -22.57 217.41 5.02 -306.43 -8.89
Norway -3712.11 -103.29 -2622.25 -80.10 -2245.51 -69.52
United Kingdom -3093.65 -76.55 -2050.79 -59.02 -388.85 -13.02
United States -5676.56 -150.60 -4331.29 -124.24 -3080.99 -92.21
Notes: This table quantifies the foregone income on Germany’s foreign assets due to Germany’s
comparatively low investment returns abroad. Losses are computed as the difference between total
income earned (yield plus valuation changes) on German assets and hypothetical income earned had
Germany achieved the same return as the comparison country. Nominal losses are deflated using
the CPI index with 2015=100 and then added up over time. In columns (2), (4), and (6) the nominal
counterfactual losses are shown as a share of nominal German GDP of 2017.
loss or gain. To evaluate the economic size of the effects, we deflate the losses using
German CPI and express them as percent of German GDP in 2017. More specifically,
we compute the aggregate loss, Losst, in each year as
Losst = r̃t,DE I IPAt−1,DE − r̃t,c I IPAt−1,DE = (r̃t,DE − r̃t,c)I IPAt−1,DE,
where r̃t,DE is the nominal return on German foreign assets, I IPAt−1,DE is the German
gross foreign asset position, and r̃t,c is the nominal return on the foreign assets of coun-
try c. Table 4.5 displays the resulting losses.
As can be seen, the amounts are substantial. Had Germany been as savvy an exter-
nal investor as other countries, the country would be considerably richer today. The
losses are largest when using US returns as counterfactual, but the numbers are also
substantial when comparing to other countries. Had Germany achieved the same re-
turn on investment as France since the introduction of the Euro (in 1999), the country
would be 330bn Euros richer today, according to these simple back-of-the-envelope cal-
culations. By not achieving the returns that Italy achieved, Germany forgave wealth of
about 300bn Euros in the decade since the financial crisis alone. More remarkably, since
2009, Germany would have gained an additional 2-3 trillion Euros of wealth (or 70%
or 94% of its 2017 GDP) if its foreign investments had performed like those of Norway
or Canada, respectively. In per capita terms, this amounts to about 27,000 and 37,000
Euros of foregone income for each German citizen in less than 10-years, a substantial
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wealth loss compared to Norway and Canada, respectively.22
4.6 Why are German returns low?
We have established that German returns on foreign investments are considerably
lower than the returns of other countries. In this section, we aim to understand the
causes. More precisely, we decompose the return differential using cross-country data
as far back as possible (mostly starting in 1985, when detailed data on the currency
composition of foreign assets became available for most economies, see Section 4.2).
The negative German return differential may result from a range of factors linked
to asset allocation (asset class selection, geography, risk profile). In addition, the differ-
ential could be due to exchange rate effects. In particular, exchange rate appreciations
could have systematically lowered the “raw” returns achieved by German investors.
We will start by looking at the latter.
4.6.1 Exchange rate effects
To understand the role of exchange rates, we need information on the valuation changes
due to exchanges rates. The newest edition of the BPM requires countries to publish a
decomposition of valuation changes into the three components exchange rates, prices
and other adjustments. However, most countries either publish this breakdown only
for recent years or have not started publishing it yet. Therefore, we estimate the valu-
ation changes due to exchange rates ourselves.
In order to do this, we modify the approach of Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and
Bénétrix et al. (2015). These authors show that data on the currency composition of
assets is sufficient to estimate valuation changes due to exchange rate movements. To
see this, first note that valuation changes due to exchange rates are the changes in the
valuation of all foreign currency assets valued in the domestic currency neither due to
transaction nor due to price or other changes:
VXAt = ∑
c
(
I IPA,ct E
c
t − I IPA,ct−1E
c
t−1 − FA
A,c
t E
c
t − (VPA,ct + VOT
A,c
t )E
c
t
)
, (4.2)
where the superscript c indicates a variable, which is expressed in a different currency
than the German one. Ect and E
c
t are the end of period and average exchange rates
in year t between the Euro or DM and currency c, respectively. Here, we follow the
recommendation of the IMF’s balance of payments manual and use average exchange
22Euro values are the real values from Table 4.5. German population size was 82.8 million in 2017
(German Statistical Office). GDP shares are obtained by dividing the nominal loss by German GDP in
2017.
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Figure 4.10: Valuation changes due to exchange rates, 5-year rolling means, 1985 to
2017
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Notes: Graphs show that Germany’s valuation changes due to exchange rates are not significantly dif-
ferent from those of other countries. The lines represent rolling means computed over 5-year windows
across countries and plotted at the third year of the window. Valuation changes computed using esti-
mated currency shares from additional data sources, see Subsection 4.6.1. “Other countries” in Panel (b)
refers to CA, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, IT, NL, NO, PT, SE and US.
rates to value transactions and valuation changes due to a lack of data on the timing
of the two. Finally, note that the last part of the expression in equation (4.2) equals
all changes in the value of the foreign currency assets not due to transactions when
valued in the respective currency since there can be no valuation effects within the
same currency, i.e.,
VPA,ct + VOT
A,c
t = I IP
A,c
t − I IP
A,c
t−1 − FA
A,c
t .
Plugging this expression into equation (4.2) yields the following simple expression for
VXAt after some manipulation:
VXAt = ∑
c
(
I IPA,ct E
c
t − I IPA,ct−1E
c
t−1 − (I IP
A,c
t − I IP
A,c
t−1)E
c
t
)
.
Now we only need data on the currency composition of assets. As discussed in
Subsection 4.2.3, this is not available directly from the countries. However, we are able
to use other data sources to estimate currency shares. Despite the several approxima-
tions involved in the estimation procedure, our estimates are very close to the ones
published by the Bundesbank for Germany as well as those published by other coun-
tries’ statistical institutions (see Appendix D5).
Panel (a) of Figure 4.10 shows that German valuation changes due to exchange rates
did not differ significantly from that of other countries. All countries experience both
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gains and losses due to exchange rates.23
Before the introduction of the Euro, exchange rate effects tended to be relevant in
Germany, with valuation effects being among the larger ones within the G7 group. In
the period since then, German valuation changes due to exchange rates were rather
average. We can also compare Germany to the average of all other 12 countries (as in-
cluded in the regression in the previous section). Panel (b) of Figure 4.10 confirms that
German valuation changes do not stand out relative to these other countries. In sum,
exchange rate effects do not help explain the observed differences in returns between
Germany and other countries.
4.6.2 Portfolio allocation
Lower German returns could be a result of a more conservative investment strategy
that favors less risky asset classes such as bonds over equities. Figure 4.11 shows that
there are indeed notable differences in the composition of foreign assets between Ger-
many and the other countries. We show the periods 1985-1999 and 2001-2017 sepa-
rately to account for the large compositional changes in the 1990s as documented in
Section 4.3.
The figure reveals that Germany’s large share of ‘other investment’ in the 1980s and
1990s was atypical compared to other countries. In addition, the shift towards more
FDI and portfolio in recent decades was sizeable but other countries increased their
investment in these positions even more. As a result, in the past two decades Germany
invested significantly less in FDI and equities than the other countries. This provides
an indication of the potential relevance of compositional differences. However, the
detailed decomposition discussed in the next section reveals that differences within
each asset category are even more relevant.
Other than the asset composition, the geographical allocation of foreign invest-
ments could affect performance. Unfortunately, no data is available on the returns
by geographical location, so that we cannot include geography in our decomposition
exercise. However, as explained, we can estimate which share of Germany’s assets is
located in which country (see Subsection 4.2.3). This allows us to include geography
controls in our regression analysis in Subsection 4.6.4. Moreover, we know that the
large bulk of Germany’s investments goes to other European high-income countries,
while the share of investments in the rest of the world is small and shrinking. In in-
ternational comparison, Germany stands out as a country with a particularly strong
23The observation of negative valuation changes due to exchange rates raises a more fundamental
point about international adjustment. The intertemporal approach to the current account implies that
valuation changes matter for the external solvency constraint and via this constraint may be a potential
channel for external adjustment (Gourinchas and Rey 2007b, 2014).
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Figure 4.11: Composition of IIP assets, 1985 to 2017
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Notes: These graphs show that Germany holds a lower share of FDI and equity assets than other coun-
tries. This is true both in the earlier part of the sample (Panel (a)), and in recent years (Panel (b)). Data
from Bundesbank, IMF and (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007b). ‘Other countries’ includes CA, DK, ES, FI,
IT, NL, NO, PT and SE.
“home bias” in favor of European investments.
4.6.3 Comparing exchange rate, composition and return effects
In this section, we decompose the return differential into its components to analyze the
effects of exchange rates and asset composition more systematically. The exercise starts
in 1990, since we need information on the returns for all asset categories separately.
This is not available for most countries before the 1990s.
Our cross-country decomposition approach builds on and expands the exercise that
Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) apply for the United States. Specifically, one can write
the aggregate return to any portfolio p as the weighted average of the returns of the
different portfolio components j using lagged weights:
rpt =
J
∑
j=1
wpj,t−1r
p
j,t, (4.3)
where wpj,t−1 is the weight of assets class j in the portfolio p, r
p
j,t is the return to the
respective asset class and J is the number of asset classes. Using equation (4.3) one can
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then rewrite the difference in aggregate returns of two portfolios p and q as
rpt − r
q
t =
J
∑
j=1
rpt,j + r
q
t,j
2
(wpt−1,j − w
q
t−1,j)
+
J
∑
j=1
wpt−1,j + w
q
t−1,j
2
(rpt,j − r
q
t,j). (4.4)
The first term of equation (4.4) captures the difference in returns resulting from the
different weights of each asset class in the two portfolios and is labeled the composition
effect. The differences between weights are weighted by the average return of the re-
spective asset class in both portfolios. The second term captures the effect of the return
differential on the overall difference and is called the return effect.
Furthermore, we expand the exercise by subtracting valuation changes due to ex-
change rates from the returns before decomposing the difference. This allows us to
parse out the exchange rate effect.
Table 4.6 shows the decomposition results, which focuses on the comparison be-
tween Germany and other G7 members. The first column shows the difference be-
tween Germany’s foreign returns vis-à-vis each comparison country, averaged for the
full period 1990 to 2017. In line with our findings above, German returns are lower
than those of the other G7 members, so that the sign is negative in each row.
The second column shows the contribution of valuation changes due to exchange
rates. The positive values indicate that most countries’ returns suffered more from
exchange rate-driven valuation changes (appreciation effects) than Germany’s return.
The only exception is the United Kingdom, where exchange rate effects can help to ex-
plain about half of the return differential with Germany (-0.8 of -1.6 percentage points
overall). Taken together, however, the numbers in column (2) are small, so that ex-
change rate movements do not help much to explain the observed gap between Ger-
man and other countries’ returns.
The third column indicates that the asset composition is also not a major driver
of the observed return differentials between Germany and the other countries. Only
in the comparison with Canada and the US, the asset composition plays a non-trivial
role, accounting for up to 25% of the return differences (-0.8 and -1.3 percentage points
respectively, see column (3)).
The dominant part of the explanation are differences in returns within each asset
class. This can be seen in column (4) which shows large negative numbers. The return
effect explains more than three quarters of the differences in returns between Germany
and other countries.
In sum, the main reason why German foreign investments produce lower returns is
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Table 4.6: Decomposition of return differences: Germany vs other countries,
1990 to 2017
Difference due to
Comparison Difference in foreign exchange rates composition returns within
country returns (pp.) (asset class) asset class
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Canada -3.892 0.316 -0.820 -3.389
France -0.894 0.374 0.192 -1.463
Italy -2.007 0.340 -0.357 -1.993
UK -1.598 -0.794 -0.200 -0.604
US -4.106 0.441 -1.254 -3.294
Notes: Decomposition splits the difference between return on German foreign assets
and other country’s foreign assets into three parts: (1) difference in valuation changes
due to exchange rates, (2) different composition of asset position in the four broad
asset categories, and (3) difference in returns within each asset class (details in Sub-
section 4.6.3). Returns estimated as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1. For countries, we
compare nominal returns to abstract from the effects of different inflation dynamics
across the countries.
not the type of assets Germany holds (debt vs. equity vs. FDI) nor frequent exchange
rate appreciations. Instead, Germany’s foreign assets are less profitable within the
same asset class, after controlling for exchange rate and composition effects. We now
turn to understanding why this is the case.
4.6.4 Returns within asset classes
In this section, we want to understand what is driving the modest investment perfor-
mance on the level of individual asset classes. For this purpose, we compare German
returns to other countries’ return for individual asset classes. We return to our re-
gression model from equation (4.1) and include the geographical distribution of each
country’s assets as well as additional asset characteristics.
For each asset class j – portfolio equity and debt, foreign direct investment, and
‘other investment’ – we estimate the following regression:
r̃jit = αj + β1jDit + ∑
r
βrjS
A,j,r
it + β2jσ
j
it + δZit + γt + uijt,
where SA,j,rit is the share of assets from region r in total assets of category j owned by
country i in year t. Zit are additional control variables and γt are yearly time fixed ef-
fects. In addition to the net foreign asset position and the financial account balance, Zit
now also includes the exchange rate effects estimated before, as these are an important
driver of returns. We also include a measure of risk, σjit. Specifically, following stan-
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Table 4.7: Determinants of returns by asset class, equity and debt, 2002 to 2017
Equity returns Debt returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Val. FX Risk Geo. Baseline Val. FX Risk Geo.
Germany dummy -4.17** -4.16** -4.75*** -3.04 -0.70 -0.83 -0.44 -0.87
(1.76) (1.72) (1.82) (2.21) (0.91) (0.90) (0.88) (1.07)
Valuation ch. due 1.04*** 0.97*** 0.92***
to ex. rates, equity (0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
3-year rolling std. 0.38** 0.38**
dev., equity (0.17) (0.17)
Valuation ch. due 1.01*** 0.99*** 1.03***
to ex. rates, debt (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
3-year rolling std. 0.23 0.11
dev., debt (0.20) (0.21)
Advanced Europe 0.12 -0.14**
(0.15) (0.07)
Advanced 0.17 -0.08
Non-Europe (0.15) (0.08)
Emerging 0.20 -0.16**
&Developing (0.18) (0.07)
Constant -20.68*** -18.10*** -25.04*** -39.40** 8.95*** 10.06*** 8.52*** 21.44***
(1.89) (1.76) (4.15) (17.23) (2.99) (2.23) (2.04) (7.00)
Observations 175 175 164 164 175 175 164 164
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.09 0.39 0.41 0.45
No. countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Germany’s returns on equity are significantly lower than other countries’ returns even after
controlling for exchange rate effects and risk. Debt returns are comparable, albeit the coefficients
of the Germany dummy are negative as well. Sample restricted to 2002-2017 due to a lack of data
on geographic allocation and exchange rate valuation effects by asset class (see Section 4.2). Spain
and Norway dropped entirely due to a lack of data on the geographical distribution by asset class.
Net foreign assets and financial account balance included in the regressions but not shown. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
dard practice, we use the standard deviation of the respective return series, computed
over 3-year rolling windows and centered around t.
Note that in this exercise we set the bar intentionally high. The foreign exchange ex-
posure, geographic portfolio allocation, and risk are part of the investment decision of
German savers or intermediaries. Investors can freely choose where and what to invest
in. The regressions therefore test an even stricter version of the German returns puzzle.
We ask, conditional on foreign exchange movements and other controls, did German
investors receive worse returns within individual asset classes than other countries?
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 present the results in four columns for each asset category.
The regression in the first column only includes the controls from the baseline specifica-
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Table 4.8: Determinants of returns by asset class, FDI and ‘other investment’, 1985 to
2017
FDI returns ‘Other investment’ returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Val. FX Risk Geo. Baseline Val. FX Risk Geo.
Germany dummy -3.34*** -3.61*** -3.23** -2.90** -1.25 -1.42* -1.75** -1.07
(1.25) (1.27) (1.30) (1.36) (1.02) (0.75) (0.68) (0.82)
Valuation ch. due 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37***
to ex. rates, FDI (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
3-year rolling std. 0.15 0.13
dev., FDI (0.20) (0.21)
Valuation ch. due 1.00*** 1.07*** 1.09***
to ex. rates, ‘other’ (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
3-year rolling std. -0.16 -0.14
dev., ‘other’ (0.11) (0.14)
Advanced Europe -0.12 -0.09*
(0.15) (0.05)
Advanced -0.10 -0.07
Non-Europe (0.18) (0.06)
Emerging -0.10 -0.10
&Developing (0.15) (0.10)
Constant 9.83 11.69** 10.56** 21.33 3.63 12.68*** 12.74*** 20.72***
(5.98) (5.18) (5.09) (17.06) (3.37) (1.40) (0.89) (4.77)
Observations 339 339 328 328 227 227 212 189
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.67
No. countries 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 10
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Germany’s returns on FDI are significantly lower than those of other countries even after con-
trolling for exchange rate effects, risk and geographical allocation. Returns on ‘other investment’ are
lower but the effect is not always significant. Geographical distribution for the respective asset class.
Net foreign assets and financial account balance included in the regressions but not shown. The results
exclude Spain due to a lack of data on the geographical distribution by asset class. The results for
‘other investment’ further exclude Norway and Portugal for the same reason. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
tion in Section 4.4. The next three columns control for exchange rate effects, geography,
and risk, respectively.
We lack data on the geographic allocation of assets and on exchange rate valuation
effects for the regressions on debt and equity, so that the sample is restricted to 2002-
2017 in Table 4.7. For similar reasons, also the country sample varies across different
panels.24 In particular, for the ‘other investment’ category, data on the geographical
distribution is relatively scarce (also see Table D.5). Therefore, the number of observa-
24All results exclude Spain due to a lack of data on the geographical distribution by asset class. The
results for debt and equity further exclude Norway due to a lack of data on geographic allocation for
these assets. The results for ‘other investment’ exclude both Norway and Portugal for the same reason.
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tions and countries changes with the inclusion of geographical composition.
The tables deliver a clear finding. Germany’s returns are consistently lower across
asset classes. This means that returns are lower even when we zoom in to individ-
ual asset classes and control for risk characteristics. The effects are particularly pro-
nounced for portfolio equity investment and FDI. Both stand out economically and
statistically as markets in which German returns were substantially lower, even after
accounting for the effects of other allocation choices (which can also be seen as part
of investment performance). For debt and ‘other investment’ the mean effect remains
negative at about 1 percentage point but is not significant.
4.7 Benefits for consumption insurance and demographic
risks
So far, we showed that German returns are systematically lower than other countries’
returns even after controlling for various compositional aspects. One reason why Ger-
mans may accept these low returns is an insurance motive. If returns are countercycli-
cal with respect to domestic consumption, they provide a hedge against volatility in
consumption. Additionally, Germans may strategically invest in regions with better
demographic prospects. These might not yield high returns yet but potentially will in
the future. In this section, we briefly touch upon these two potential channels.
4.7.1 Consumption insurance – income smoothing from abroad?
There is large literature on the potential of international investment to reduce con-
sumption risks. The basic idea is that foreign investments can help to buffer shocks to
household consumption. Suppose Germany witnesses an economic downturn while
foreign countries do not. In this situation, German households that have invested into
foreign assets will benefit from their (high) capital income from abroad to counterbal-
ance their (lower) domestic income. The foreign capital income will thus help house-
holds to smooth their consumption over time, making them better off. So far, however,
the literature found only very limited effects of investment income flows on consump-
tion smoothing (see e.g., Lane 2001; Sørensen and Yosha 1998).
Here, we test to what extent German foreign investments provide consumption in-
surance for German households. We again focus on total returns on the foreign assets,
i.e., we combine yields and valuation changes. We base our empirical approach on
the consumption capital-asset pricing model (CCAPM). The CCAPM assumes that the
return of a risky asset is proportional to the consumption beta. Intuitively, this implies
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Table 4.9: Correlation of real consumption and real returns
1985–2017 1999–2017 2009–2017
Germany, foreign assets 0.298 0.504 0.444
Germany, domestic assets 0.268 0.319 0.134
Canada 0.099 0.353 0.579
Finland -0.152 0.400 0.837
France 0.127 0.397 0.420
Italy 0.072 0.528 0.563
Netherlands 0.319 0.255 0.667
Norway 0.133 0.089 -0.274
Spain 0.053 0.381 0.675
Sweden -0.027 0.424 0.649
United Kingdom -0.126 -0.213 -0.516
United States 0.379 0.366 0.553
Notes: This table shows that Germany’s real returns on foreign assets are
positively correlated with real domestic consumption growth per capita.
The correlation coefficient between returns and consumption is higher
for foreign assets than for domestic German assets. The coefficient
is also higher than those for most other countries. The returns and
consumption growth series are deflated using each countries consumer
price index. Denmark and Portugal are omitted because data only starts
in 1999 and 1993, respectively.
that assets with high payoffs in bad states of the world (when consumption is low) are
more desirable. This can be formalized as follows:
E[Rit]− γ0 = γ1βc,i, (4.5)
where Rit is the return to a risky asset, γ0 is the return to a portfolio not correlated
with consumption growth (the zero consumption beta portfolio), γ1 is the price of risk,
and βci = cov(Rit, ct)/var(ct) with ct as the growth rate of aggregate consumption
per capita is the measure of risk (Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger 1989). When the
CCAPM holds, the expected return to an asset or portfolio is linear in its consumption
beta. Therefore, a lower return on German foreign assets could be justified in terms of
the CCAMP by a low consumption beta.
For this purpose, we compute the covariance between consumption growth and
the investment returns discussed above. The CCAPM in equation (4.5) refers to spot
consumption, yet empirically only period average consumption can be measured. In
this study, we follow convention and choose the interpretation of consumption data
as measuring consumption at the beginning of the period. Therefore, we compute
consumption growth by dividing next period’s consumption by current period con-
sumption (Campbell 1999). The correlation between consumption growth and returns
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Figure 4.12: Correlation of real consumption and real return,
Germany, 10-year rolling windows, 1971 to 2017
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Notes: The correlation between Germany’s returns on foreign assets and
real consumption growth is positive in most years, especially since the
1990s. In recent years, the correlation is higher for foreign returns com-
pared to domestic returns. Correlation coefficients plotted at the 5th
year of the window. Correlation coefficient computed for consumption
growth and real returns, both deflated using the German consumer price
index.
is calculated using the return in period t and consumption growth between period
t + 1 and t. Data on consumption growth is taken from the Macro History Database by
Jordà et al. (2017), which includes data until 2016.25
Table 4.9 provides two crucial insights. First, the returns on German foreign assets
are more strongly correlated with domestic consumption growth than a bundle of do-
mestic German assets. In other words, they provide less consumption insurance than a
domestic German portfolio and their low returns are not justified by the consumption
insurance that the asset provides. Second, also in comparison with other countries,
the correlation of the German portfolio with German consumption appears high. The
key upshot is that low German returns compared to other countries are not justified by
their consumption insurance properties.
Moreover, if we take a closer look at the time path of the correlation between for-
eign asset returns and German domestic consumption, we find that the surge in Ger-
man capital exports in recent years has gone hand in hand with a loss of consumption
insurance (Figure 4.12). The correlation of foreign returns with domestic consumption
growth has increased in recent years, not decreased. German foreign assets do not only
25The data for 2017 are from the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank.
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Figure 4.13: Geographical distribution of foreign assets by category
(a) FDI, 1985 to 2017
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Notes: These graphs show that Germany’s geographical allocation of foreign assets differs from that of
other countries. Germany invests more in advanced European countries and less in developing coun-
tries. Germany’s bias towards European investments is especially large for portfolio holdings (Panels (c)
and (d)). Offshore countries are classified following the Bundesbank’s list of offshore banking centers.
have low payoffs overall, they are also not helping to smooth consumption, and these
trends have become worse in the past decade of record capital exports.
4.7.2 A hedge against demographic risks?
Germany faces increasing demographic risk from an aging population. Investing in
countries with younger populations may help to hedge this risk and facilitate inter-
temporal income smoothing. However, the data show that German assets are predom-
inantly invested in other advanced countries with aging populations, especially into
other European countries, and increasingly so.
It is particularly remarkable that the share of German investments to younger and
more dynamic developing countries and emerging markets has decreased rather than
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Figure 4.14: Geographical distribution of German foreign assets, 1985 to 2017
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Notes: This map shows the geographic distribution of German foreign assets. The stock is
expressed in % of German GDP held in each country and averaged between 1985 and 2017.
Figure 4.15: Old age population (% above 64 years), average, 1985 to 2015
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Notes: This map shows the share of each country’s population aged 65-years and older, aver-
aged between 1985 and 2015 (more recent data not available). Data from the UN Population
Division.
increased, from 15-20% in the 1980s to about 10% in 2017. This drop has occurred de-
spite the fact that developing countries such as China or India have seen record growth
rates and that the emerging world now accounts for more than 50% of world GDP.26
In other words, the “home-bias” of German investments in favor of European invest-
ments has intensified and the potential for demographic risk hedging has decreased
accordingly.
The preference for investing into aging economies is more pronounced in Germany
than in other countries. This can be seen in Figure 4.13 which compares the geographi-
cal allocation of foreign assets. While Germany’s preference for European investments
is observable for all asset categories, the focus on the euro area is especially strong for
26Note that before 2001 no data for portfolio assets is available and that both portfolio asset types have
a low exposure to emerging and developing markets. However, this does not affect the overall dynamics
because the share of portfolio investment in the total position was relatively small before 2000. When
assuming a 1% exposure of equity assets and a 5% exposure for debt assets (based on the averages in
the early 2000s), the exposure of total assets is still 15%. For FDI exposure to emerging markets actually
increased over time but this effect is outweighed by the increase in portfolio investment in the aggregate.
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portfolio equity and debt (Panels (c) and (d)). Specifically, the majority of Germany’s
equity assets are located in Northern euro-area countries, while the majority of debt
securities were in Southern euro-area countries until recently. Now debt securities are
distributed roughly equally across all member states.
Another way to explore the relevance of demography is to plot world maps. Fig-
ure 4.14 shows the geographic distribution of Germany’s foreign assets across the
world between 1985 and 2017. It is estimated as discussed in Section 4.2. Assets are
scaled by German GDP.
The map reveals once more that Germany’s foreign investments flow predomi-
nantly to Europe and other advanced countries. These are also the countries with a
population structure most similar to Germany. Figure 4.15 shows the average share of
the people aged 65 and older in total population between 1985 and 2015. It is clearly
visible that the two maps overlap, as Germany has almost no investments in countries
with a younger population structure. This illustrates that Germany’s large stock of
foreign assets does little for hedging against demographic risks.
4.8 Conclusion
Germany is world champion when it comes to exporting savings. In this chapter, we
study the financial returns on German foreign investment. We find that the reputation
of German households, firms, and banks for being bad foreign investors is mostly justi-
fied. German returns are substantially lower than those of other countries across asset
classes. Moreover, foreign returns are consistently lower than domestic returns and
the geographic distribution does not support the argument that the country’s foreign
investments hedge against demographic trends. The overwhelming share of German
foreign investments is located in other industrial countries with similar demographic
profiles.
We find that the underperformance of German foreign investment is particularly
pronounced for equity and foreign direct investments. Importantly, the lower returns
are not explained by a different risk profile of German investments. The correlation of
foreign returns with domestic consumption is higher, not lower, than in other countries
and higher than for domestic returns. In other words, foreign assets provide very little
consumption insurance to German households. Overall, the low returns raise serious
doubts with regard to the capacity of German households and the German financial
sector to allocate Germany’s substantial savings exports in a beneficial way.
CHAPTER 4. EXPORTWELTMEISTER 181
Appendices to Chapter 4
D1 Additional tables and figures
Figure D.1: The world’s largest net creditors, 2017
(a) Total net position (billion USD)
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(b) Net position in % of GDP
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Notes: The net position is the difference between foreign assets (assets held abroad) and foreign liabilities
(domestic assets held by foreigners). In USD terms Germany’s net position is only exceeded by Japan.
The graph excludes small oil exporting countries with large net positions in % of GDP. Data on asset
positions are from the Bundesbank and the IMF, data on GDP from the World Bank.
Figure D.2: Germany fixed effect over time (country
dummy)
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Notes: This graph plots the coefficient for the Germany dummy in each
year since 1985 (dark blue line) as well as its 90% confidence interval
(light blue lines). The regression builds on column (1) in Table 4.4 and
controls for net foreign assets, the financial account balance and year
effects. The main take away is that the underperformance of German
foreign returns has been relatively persistent over time.
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D2 Additional results for nominal and real returns
D2.1 Nominal returns on German foreign assets and domestic assets
When analyzing German returns on foreign assets and comparing them to domestic
assets in Section 4.4, we focused on real returns. Here, we also show nominal returns
over time.
Figure D.3 plots the nominal return, yield, and valuation changes (in Panel (a)) as
well as returns by asset categories (in Panel (b)). Panel (a) confirms that Germany saw
many years of valuation losses not just in real terms, as shown in the man text, but also
in nominal terms. Panel (b) reveals that average nominal returns on FDI were positive
but close to zero in contrast to the negative real returns before the 2000s. The other
patterns in returns by category are similar for nominal and real returns.
Figure D.4 shows the comparison of the return on German foreign assets to the
return on German domestic assets as measured by Jordà et al. (2019) for the nominal
case. Compared to Figure 4.8 in the main text, the gap between nominal returns on
foreign vs. domestic assets is larger than that with real returns in the 1960s and 1970s,
mainly due to higher inflation. The overall picture, however, is similar for the real and
nominal series.
Figure D.3: Nominal returns on German foreign assets, 5-year rolling means, 1950 to
2017
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Notes: Figure shows same results as Figure 4.7 for nominal returns. In addition, in nominal terms Ger-
many saw absolute losses in many periods. Rolling arithmetic averages computed over 5-year windows
and plotted at the third year of the window. Returns estimated as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1.
CHAPTER 4. EXPORTWELTMEISTER 183
Figure D.4: Nominal returns in comparison, 5-year rolling
means, 1975 to 2017
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Notes: Figure shows the same comparison as Figure 4.8 for nominal re-
turns. Given that both series are deflated using the same price index,
the same results emerge. Rolling means computed over 5-year windows
and plotted at the third year of the window. Return on foreign assets
estimated as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1. Return on German domestic
assets from Jordà et al. (2019).
D2.2 Real returns on other countries’ foreign assets
When comparing German returns to other countries’ returns in Section 4.5, we focus
on nominal returns to abstract from different inflation dynamics across countries. Our
focus on nominal returns is motivated by the idea that we want to compare investment
performance on the same global level playing field – before country-specific factors
(such as inflation) are taken into account. Using nominal returns, Germany ranked
12th among the 13 countries we consider. For completeness, we now also show results
for real returns.
Table D.1 shows that Germany ranks 9th when considering real returns. The higher
ranking is due to countries like Italy or Spain experiencing much higher rates of infla-
tion especially in the earlier part of the sample. Therefore, in terms of their own price
level, foreign returns for Italy and Spain appear lower than Germany’s real returns
abroad. Figure D.5 confirms that Germany compares more favorably when looking at
real returns, owing to the country’s relatively low domestic inflation rates.
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Table D.1: Real returns on foreign assets, 1975 to 2017
Rank 1975–2017 1999–2017 2009–2017
United States 1 6.61 5.75 7.74
Canada 2 5.21 3.01 7.40
United Kingdom 3 4.88 3.63 1.85
Sweden 4 4.63 5.22 4.60
Netherlands 5 3.77 2.95 4.55
Norway 6 3.57 3.73 5.24
Denmark 7 3.48 3.48 5.58
France 8 3.34 2.62 3.48
Germany 9 2.56 2.28 2.62
Portugal 10 2.44 0.69 1.17
Italy 11 1.88 1.50 3.18
Spain 12 1.29 -0.07 1.82
Finland 13 0.31 2.36 2.19
Notes: This table shows the same results as Table 4.1 for real returns
instead of nominal returns. Nominal domestic currency returns are
deflated using each country’s own consumer price inflation (from
Macro History Database (Jordà et al. 2017) and World Bank.) Data for
Denmark starts in 1999 and data for Portugal starts in 1993.
Figure D.5: Real returns in comparison, 5-year rolling
means, 1975 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows the same comparison as Figure 4.9 for real re-
turns instead of nominal returns. Nominal domestic currency returns are
deflated using each country’s own consumer price inflation (from Macro
History Database (Jordà et al. 2017) and World Bank.) German returns
are low compared to the other G7 members (excluding Japan due to data
availability) also in real terms. Rolling means computed over 5-year win-
dows and plotted at the third year of the window. For more details see
Section 4.2.
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D3 Comparison to earlier work on German foreign re-
turns
D3.1 Overview of the literature
Several earlier studies have computed returns on German foreign assets. In this ap-
pendix, we provide an overview of this work and compare the results to ours.
The overall take away is that all studies, including ours, use similar data sources
and methodology. Moreover, all earlier papers use a more limited time sample com-
pared to our study and no previous paper conducts decomposition exercises or inter-
national comparisons as we do. Most existing papers also focus on the return differen-
tial, i.e., the difference between the return on assets and liabilities.
Table D.2 provides a concise summary of earlier estimates. For transparency, we
compare the result of each study to our own using the exact same sample and variables
Table D.2: Results of other studies and comparison with our results
Authors Data Other valua-
tion changes
included?
Return measures
and sample used
Results Our results
with same
sample
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007a)
External Wealth
of Nations for
assets, BOP
Yes Real return on as-
sets, 1995–2000
5.4% 6.1%
Habib (2010) BOP and IIP be-
fore most recent
revision in data
Yes Real return
differential,
1981–2007
-1.07 -0.99
Bundesbank (2014),
Frey et al. (2014)1
BOP and IIP be-
fore most recent
revision in data
No Nominal re-
turn on assets,
2005–2013
4.0% 3.8%
Baldi and Bremer
(2015) (DIW Berlin)
BOP and IIP be-
fore most recent
revision in data
Yes Nominal re-
turn differential,
1993–2012
-1.5 -0.5
Bundesbank (2018) BOP and IIP
based on BPM6
No Nominal re-
turn on assets,
2008–2017
3.7% 3.3%
Fiedler et al. (2018)
(Kiel Institute)
BOP and IIP
based on BPM6
No Nominal re-
turn on assets,
2005–2016
3.9% 4.0%
Notes: This table provides an overview of studies that have produced estimates of Germany’s return on
foreign assets. It describes the data and methodology used and compares the other authors’ results to
our results. One reason for differing results is the treatment of “Other valuation changes” as discussed
in the following Appendix D3.2.
1 Frey et al. (2014) is a more extensive version of Bundesbank (2014).
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used in the respective earlier study.
The table reveals that our results are very similar overall. There are two main rea-
sons for any remaining discrepancies. The first is differences in the data, since we use
the most updated and cleaned series provided by the Bundesbank. Papers published
before 2015 use data based on the old balance of payments manual, meaning prior to
the many revisions that came with the introduction of the new manual (BPM6). The
second reason is the treatment of valuation changes due to other adjustments. In par-
ticular, the more recent studies (like Bundesbank 2018) exclude these changes, while
we include them, since there is no strong argument not to do so and since we lack a
data breakdown to exclude these changes before 2005. We discuss the impact of this
choice in more detail in the following section and conclude that the inclusion or exclu-
sion of “other valuation changes” does not affect the overall results much, especially
not for our international comparisons.
D3.2 Treatment of valuation changes due to other adjustments
As discussed in Subsection 4.2.1, one open issue in the computation of foreign returns
regards the treatment of valuation changes due to other adjustments, meaning residual
valuation changes, which can neither be attributed to exchange rate nor price move-
ments. There are basically two options. First, one can simply exclude all residual
valuation changes (see e.g., Bundesbank 2014, 2018; Frey et al. 2014). Second, one can
include all or parts of these changes. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), for example, sug-
gest including valuation changes due to other adjustments for FDI but not for portfolio
investment. For ‘other investment’, in turn, they suggest adding it to the initial asset
position.
Given that these options are pretty much arbitrary, and since the Bundesbank does
not provide a data breakdown for the period before 2005, we generally include valu-
ation changes due to other adjustments in our baseline results for Germany and other
countries alike but directly adjust for known statistical breaks and discrepancies (see
Section 4.2). We choose this option because the valuation changes due to other adjust-
ments only pose a problem as far as they are due to statistical issues instead of actual
changes in the position. However, we now check what impact the complete or par-
tial exclusion would have on our results. Specifically, using Bundesbank data on the
split of valuation changes after 2005, we can illustrate the effect of including or partly
including these other changes compared to other method.
Panel (a) of Figure D.6 shows that excluding valuation changes due to other adjust-
ments for the period after 2005 does not make much of a difference when appropriately
adjusting for known issues. The size of the change depends on the time period cov-
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Figure D.6: Robustness of estimated nominal returns, 2005 to 2017
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Figure D.7: Valuation changes due to other adjustments,
2005 to 2017
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Notes: This graph shows valuation changes due to other adjustments for
Germany and other countries. Data retrieved from the statistical insti-
tutions responsible for the IIP (Bundesbank (DE), Bureau of Economic
Analysis (US), Banco de Portugal (PT), Dutch Central Bank (NL), Banco
de Espana (ES), Office of National Statistics (UK)). The UK estimate in-
cludes financial derivatives.
ered. In the pre-crisis years 2005-2007, for example, you get lower German returns if
you exclude ‘other adjustments’, while the returns are higher in the crisis years 2008-
2010 without those changes. Panel (b) of Figure D.6 follows the recommendation of
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) of excluding ‘other adjustments’ only for some asset
categories. The takeaway is the same. In some years, the estimates are higher, while
in others, they are lower. In aggregate, for all years for which there is comparison data
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(2005-2017), Germany’s nominal returns are 0.29 percentage points lower when exclud-
ing other valuation changes (4.06% with valuation changes due to other adjustments
versus 3.77% without).
Does the choice make a difference for the international comparisons? To assess this,
we retrieved data on valuation changes due to other adjustments for several countries
and check how much their exclusion affects the results in comparison to Germany.
Figure D.7 illustrates the impact of valuation changes due to other adjustments in
percent of assets since 2005 for Germany, the US, the UK, the Netherlands and Spain.
On average, German valuation changes were slightly below zero, at -0.28%. The aver-
ages for the US and the Netherlands are positive while the average for the United King-
dom is negative. The Spanish average over the short time span available is roughly
equal to zero. Thus, taken together, the discrepancy is not large enough to explain the
observed differences between Germany and the other countries.
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D4 Data sources and classifications
This appendix lists the data sources used for (i) estimating returns across countries
(Table D.3), to compute (ii) valuation changes due to exchange rates (Table D.4), as well
as on (iii) the geographical distribution of assets (Table D.5). The tables also provide
information on data availability and country specific data issues. Finally, Table D.6
shows how our country groups are defined.
Table D.3: Data sources for return computation of other countries
Country Coverage IIP sources Notes
Canada 1970–2016 EWN until 1989; IMF
Denmark 1999–2016 IMF Earlier data available but with gaps.
Finland 1975–2016 EWN until 1989; IMF
France 1975–2016 EWN until 1993; IMF PF not part of return before 1988 (no
capital income data); capital income
on PF debt in 1993 reported in Franc
instead of Euro; jumps due to cate-
gory changes in FDI in 1999 removed
from change in assets.
Italy 1972–2016 EWN until 2003; IMF FDI and PF not part of return before
1980 (no capital income data).
Netherlands 1970–2016 EWN until 1981; IMF No PF assets data in EWN. No return
in 2003 due to break in data.
Norway 1975–2016 EWN until 2006; IMF PF not part of return before 1992 (no
capital income data).
Portugal 1993–2016 EWN until 1995; IMF Earlier data available but with gaps.
Spain 1975–2016 EWN until 2000; IMF PF not part of return before 1990 (no
capital income data).
Sweden 1970–2016 EWN until 1981; IMF PF not part of return before 1997 (no
capital income data).
United Kingdom 1970–2016 EWN until 1981; IMF PF not part of return before 1984 (no
capital income data).
United States 1970–2016 EWN until 1981; IMF PF not part of return before 1986 (no
capital income data).
Notes: EWN = External Wealth of Nations database by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b).
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Table D.4: Data sources on the currency composition of assets
Country OECD FDI CPIS (currency1) LBS Reserves
Canada 1985–2017 2014–2017 1977–2017 1999–2017, Bank of Canada,
USD
Denmark 1991–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017 2005–2017, Danmarks
Nationalbank
Germany 1985–2017 2007–2017 1977–2017 1949–2017, Bundesbank,
only USD until 1999
Finland 1992–2012, 2013–2017 1983–2017 2002–2017, Bank of Finland
2016–2017
France 1987–2017 2001–2017 2007–2017 2001–2017, IMF, (based on
Banque de France reports
assume all in USD)
Italy 1985–2017 2001–2017 2011–2017 2005–2017, Banca d’Italia
Netherlands 1985–2017 2009–2017 2014–2017 1997–2017, Dutch central
bank
Norway 1988–2017 only countries 2014–2017 1997–2017, Norges Bank
Portugal 1995–2017 2001–2017 2009–2017 2001–2017, Banco de Portu-
gal (2011–2017 data, 2001–
2010 assume 90% of re-
serves is in USD)
Spain 2000–2017 2007–2017 2014–2017 1999–2017, Banco de
Espana
Sweden 1986–2017 2003–2014 1977–2017 1999–2017, Swedish
Riksbank
United Kingdom 1987–2017 only countries 1977–20172 1997–2017, Bank of England
United States 1985–2017 2003–2017 1998–2017 1999–2017, except 2001, US
Department of the Treasury
(US International Reserve
Position report)
Notes: CPIS = Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey LBS = Locational Banking Statistics.
1 Country breakdown always available starting in 2001.
2 Data for 1982 is missing.
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Table D.5: Data sources on the geographical distribution of assets
Country OECD FDI CPIS LBS
Canada 1985–2017 2001–2017 2007–2017
Denmark 1991,1994,1998,1999–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017
Germany 1985–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017
Finland 1992–2012, 2016–2017 2001–2017 1983–2017
France 1987–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017
Italy 1985–2017 2001–2017 2014–2017
Netherlands 1985–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017
Norway 1988–2017 2001–2017 no data
Portugal 1995–2017, 2006 missing 2001–2017 no data
Spain 2003–2017 2001–2017 2014–2017
Sweden 1986–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017
United Kingdom 1987–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017, 1982 missing
United States 1985–2017 2001–2017 1977–2017
Notes: CPIS = Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, LBS = Locational Banking Statistics.
Table D.6: Country groups used for geographical distribution
Group Countries
Advanced Europe Austria Belgium Cyprus Czech Rep.
Denmark Estonia Finland France
Germany Greece Iceland Ireland
Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg
Malta Netherlands Norway Portugal
San Marino Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain
Sweden Switzerland UK
Advanced Australia Canada Japan New Zealand
Non-Europe Rep. of Korea Macao Taiwan United States
Offshore Antigua&Barbuda Bahrain Barbados Belize
Dominica Grenada Hong Kong Lebanon
Liberia Marshall Isl. Mauritius Panama
Philippines Samoa Seychelles Singapore
St. Kitts&Nevis St. Lucia Bahamas Vanuatu
St. Vincent&the Grenadines
Emerging&Developing Remaining countries
Notes: Choice of offshore countries based on Bundesbank list of offshore banking centers.
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D5 Estimation of valuation changes due to exchange rates
In this section, we compare our estimates of valuation changes due to exchange rate
movements (as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1) with official data for several countries.
In addition, we also compare our estimates to an alternative set of estimates that is
based on the currency composition data provided for total assets (not asset categories)
by Bénétrix et al. (2015). The comparisons focus on the period after 2002 when the CIPS
portfolio data become available, so that all asset classes can be included. The main take
away from this exercise is that the estimates are similar across sources.
D5.1 Germany
Figure D.8 shows the comparison of valuation changes due to exchange rates for all as-
set classes for Germany. As explained, our aggregate comparison starts in 2002 (Panel
(a)). Panels ((b)-(f)) start in 2005, which is when Bundesbank estimates by asset class
become available. Overall the results are very similar, except for the reserves category
in 2008 and 2009. This result suggests that the publicly available data on the currency
composition of reserves is not complete or that the Bundesbank uses detailed non-
public data, which allows for much more precise estimate. In any case, reserves only
make up a small part of total assets, so the effect of this mismatch is not large.
D5.2 Netherlands
The Dutch Central Bank (DNB) publishes a breakdown of valuation changes starting in
2010. Panel (a) of Figure D.9 shows that also for the Netherlands our approach delivers
fairly similar estimates despite the lack of CPIS currency data before 2009 and the lack
of any LBS data before 2014.
D5.3 Portugal
The Banco de Portugal publishes a breakdown of valuation changes since 1999. Panel
(b) of Figure D.9 shows that our approach delivers fairly similar estimates despite the
lack of any LBS data before 2009. However, in the first three years when no CPIS data is
available the estimates differ substantially since our aggregate measure includes only
FDI in this period.
D5.4 Spain
The Spanish Banco de Espana (BdE) publishes time series starting only in 2014. For the
four overlapping years our estimate is only slightly lower than the published series,
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Figure D.8: Valuation changes due to exchange rates, our estimate vs. official statistics,
Germany
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Notes: This graph compares our estimates of valuation changes due to exchange rates to those published
by the Bundesbank. We find few discrepancies. The estimates using the aggregate data on total assets
from Bénétrix et al. (2015) are also fairly similar. BLS refers to Bénétrix et al. (2015).
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see Panel (c) of Figure D.9. The result using BLS data is quite similar.
D5.5 United Kingdom
In an article titled “Analysis of the UK’s international investment position: 2016”27 the
Office of National Statistics (ONS) published estimates of the valuation changes due
to exchange rate effects for 2000 to 2014. The estimation is based only on US Dollar,
Euro and Japanese Yen exchange rates, uses country shares to approximate currency
shares and includes financial derivatives. Panel (d) of Figure D.9 shows that this yields
similar results as our more detailed approach as well as the estimates using BLS data.
D5.6 United States
For the US, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes data on the valuation
changes due to exchange rate movements since 2002. Panel (e) of Figure D.9 shows
that also the estimates for the US are very close to the published series. This is reas-
suring since we need to interpolate the US currency composition of ‘other investment’
between 1998 and 2012.
27The article is available on the ONS website: https://www.
ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/articles/
analysisoftheuksinternationalinvestmentposition/2016.
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Figure D.9: Valuation changes due to exchange rates, our estimate vs. official statistics,
other countries
(a) Netherlands, all assets, 2002 to 2016
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Notes: This graph compares our estimates of valuation changes due to exchange rates to the official
estimates published by the respective central bank or related country authority. We conduct this com-
parison for all countries for which this data breakdown is made publicly available. Overall, we find
few discrepancies. The estimates using data from Bénétrix et al. (2015) also produces similar results for
aggregate assets. BLS refers to Bénétrix et al. (2015). DNB=Dutch Central Bank, ONS=Office of National
Statistics, and BEA=Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Figure D.10: Composition of Germany’s international investment position, foreign as-
sets vs. liabilities, 1949 to 2017
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Notes: Data from Bundesbank. Detailed split of firms and households only available since 2012.
D6 Return differential between German assets and lia-
bilities
To gauge the profitability of foreign investments, many earlier studies compare the
returns on foreign assets to those earned by foreigners in the respective country (on
foreign liabilities). While we prefer the comparison to other countries’ returns and a
broader measure of domestic returns, we also want to provide estimates of liability re-
turns here. We will see that the difference between asset and liability return decreased
in recent years. Indeed, it has turned positive over the past decade. This has led some
commentators to argue that German investment performance abroad improved in re-
cent years (Bundesbank 2014, 2018). Here we show that changes in the German dif-
ferential is not the result of better foreign returns, but mainly driven by a reduction
returns on liability FDI and liability portfolio debt. Both categories saw specific devel-
opments in the past decade, which complicate the comparison further.
To set the stage, Figure D.10 shows the composition of German foreign assets and
liabilities. As can be seen, the asset composition of liabilities (Panel (b)) is rather similar
to that of Germany’s foreign assets (Panel (a)).
Panel (a) of Figure D.11 compares the returns on Germany’s assets abroad to those
on foreign liabilities since the 1950s. As can be seen, the return on assets was lower
throughout the entire post-WW2 period, and until the 2000s. The past few years are
the first time in which the difference turns (slightly) positive, on average.
For a more detailed comparison, Panels (b) and (c) of Figure D.11 show breakdowns
into yields vs. valuation changes. The graphs reveal that the most recent shift is driven
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Figure D.11: Real return, yield and valuation changes on German foreign assets vs.
liabilities, 1950 to 2017
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Notes: Rolling means computed over 5-year windows and plotted at the third year of the window.
Return on foreign assets and liabilities estimated as discussed in Subsection 4.2.1 and deflated using the
consumer price index.
by yields and not by valuation changes. Generally, there are only very few years in
which the valuation changes on assets were larger than valuation changes on liabilities.
Finally, Figure D.12 displays a breakdown by asset class. To facilitate interpreta-
tion, we show the difference between asset and liability returns instead of both returns
separately for each asset class. The figure shows that before the 2000s, the return differ-
ential was especially negative for FDI, but this differential has improved notably over
the past two decades, with German FDI abroad showing higher returns that foreign
FDI in Germany. In addition, the relative performance of portfolio debt has shifted
since the early 2000s, with German portfolio assets yielding higher returns compared
to German debt securities held by foreigners. In contrast, the differential remains neg-
ative for equity investments, often strongly so.
To understand the drivers of these differences, we now perform the same decom-
position exercise as we did for foreign returns across countries (Subsection 4.6.3). Ta-
ble D.7 shows that the differences within each asset class explain the overall difference,
both historically and today. Table D.8 also illustrates the decomposition over time. It
highlights that the difference due to composition did not decrease a lot since the 1970s
while the within-asset class differences decreased substantially and turned positive
since the 2000s. Finally, Figure D.13 shows the contribution of each type of assets,
again differentiating by differences due to asset composition and differences due to
returns within asset classes. The table shows that the negative values in the early sam-
ple are mainly driven by FDI and ‘other investment’. The recent switch to positive
differences was largely driven by FDI and portfolio debt.
To summarize, we find that the recent decrease in the gap between returns on for-
eign assets and foreign liabilities is mainly due to the relative changes in yields on
FDI and debt portfolio holdings, especially because the return of foreigners investing
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Figure D.12: Differences between real returns on foreign as-
sets and liabilities by asset class, 1960 to 2017
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Notes: This figure shows differences between real returns (or yields or
valuation changes) between German foreign assets and foreign liabili-
ties. Rolling arithmetic means computed over 5-year windows and plot-
ted at the third year of the window. Returns estimated as discussed in
Subsection 4.2.1.
in Germany went down. This finding is consistent with the observation that the out-
flows of debt and FDI investments from Germany (both gross and net) have increased
notably over the past 20 years, possibly due to a search-for-yield effect.
At the same time, there are important idiosyncratic effects that complicate the com-
parison of FDI and debt returns on assets versus liabilities. First, it is well known that,
during and after the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis, foreigners have
purchased record amounts of German Bunds and other highly rated German debt se-
curities, despite the fact that these had almost zero yields (Bundesbank 2017). This
safe-haven effect improved the differential for debt securities. Second, inward FDI in
Germany has become highly leveraged over the past two decades, mostly for tax shift-
ing reasons. Today, many foreign companies load their German subsidiaries with debt
to reduce the (high) effective tax rate on profits after interest. In comparison, German
outward FDI is significantly less leveraged (Graf and Grimme 2017). This mismatch
biases down the aggregate yields and returns reported by foreign-owned firms in Ger-
many, even if the profitability of German firms has stayed the same (Ramb and We-
ichenrieder 2005). The increased within-firm tax shifting activities makes it hard to
interpret the recent increase in relative yields on German FDI as improved investment
performance. More research is needed to examine these effects in detail, ideally using
micro-data on FDI and portfolio debt flows.
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Table D.7: Decomposition of real return differential
between foreign assets and liabilities, 1960 to 2017
Difference due to
Difference in composition returns within
returns (pp.) (asset class) asset class
1960-2017 -1.802 -0.463 -1.338
1985-2017 -0.859 -0.259 -0.600
1999-2017 0.185 -0.081 0.267
2009-2017 0.411 -0.268 0.679
1960-1969 -4.823 -1.186 -3.634
1970-1979 -3.342 -0.513 -2.826
1980-1989 -0.764 -0.331 -0.433
1990-1999 -1.642 -0.314 -1.328
2000-2009 -0.095 -0.249 0.153
2010-2017 0.266 -0.119 0.385
Notes: This decomposition splits the difference between returns
on German foreign assets and German foreign liabilities into two
parts: (1) asset class composition (using the same four broad
asset categories used above), and (2) difference in returns within
each asset classes. More details in Subsection 4.6.3.
Figure D.13: Decomposition of real return differential be-
tween foreign assets vs. liabilities, 1960 to 2017
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Notes: Decomposition splits difference between return on German for-
eign assets and German foreign liabilities into two parts: (1) different
composition of asset position in the four broad asset categories, and
(2) difference in returns within each asset classes (details in Subsec-
tion 4.6.3).
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Table D.8: Contributions of different assets to differential be-
tween foreign assets and domestic assets (IIP), 1960 to 2017
Total effect FDI Equity Debt Other inv.
Panel (a): Differences due to composition
1960-2017 -0.463 -0.108 -0.194 -0.307 0.146
1985-2017 -0.259 0.156 -0.169 -0.475 0.229
1999-2017 -0.081 0.088 -0.002 -0.303 0.135
2009-2017 -0.268 0.130 -0.108 -0.307 0.018
Panel (b): Differences due to returns within class
1960-2017 -1.338 -0.845 -0.094 0.128 -0.527
1985-2017 -0.600 -0.396 -0.167 0.244 -0.282
1999-2017 0.267 0.393 -0.290 0.393 -0.229
2009-2017 0.679 0.296 -0.238 0.516 0.105
Notes: This table shows contributions of individual asset classes to
each of the components of the return differential. Components are
(1) different composition of asset position in the four broad asset
categories, and (2) difference in returns within each asset classes (details
on decomposition in Subsection 4.6.3).
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Figure D.14: Foreign asset returns and Target2 balances: Germany
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the increasing share of Target2 balances in total foreign assets excluding financial
derivatives, i.e. the asset measure used for return computation. Panel (b) shows that the effect of Target2
balances for aggregate returns is not very large.
D7 Impact of Target2 balances on German foreign returns
Germany’s Target2 balances have been growing fast since 2007. The crisis in the euro
area led to large inflows of deposits into Germany and, thus, to higher Target2 claims.
In recent years, the asset purchases by the European Central Bank (ECB) are also be-
lieved to have contributed to the growth of Target2 balances. Many of the purchased
securities are sold by banks outside of the euro area, which tend to have their Target2
accounts registered with the German Bundesbank. If these investors sell their securi-
ties to the ECB, Target2 assets in Germany increase (see e.g., Bundesbank 2017).
Target2 balances are remunerated at a benchmark interest rate (the “main refinanc-
ing rate”) that currently stands at zero. Target2 claims enter both German foreign assets
as well as the financial account. Therefore, they do not lead to any valuation changes
or yields. However, they do lower the returns (in absolute terms) by increasing the
denominator.
Figure D.14 plots the share of Target2 balances in total assets, and total returns,
yields and valuation changes including and excluding Target2 balances. We plot re-
turns since 2008 because 2007 is the first year Target2 balances amounted to more than
1% of total assets. This share increased to 11.5% of total assets (excluding financial
derivative) in 2017 with some fluctuations, see Panel (a) of Figure D.14.
Taken together, including Target2 lowers the yearly nominal return on total German
foreign assets by 0.23 percentage points, on average, since 2008. The return effect was
largest in 2014, with -0.62 percentage points. In the remaining years it varied between
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Figure D.15: Detailed composition of FDI assets, 1999 to 2017
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Notes: Composition of German FDI assets. Data from Bundesbank.
0.2 and -0.36 percentage points.28
D8 Book values for FDI assets
As discussed in Subsection 4.2.2, German FDI assets are recorded at book value be-
fore 2004, which could bias our results. This is mainly relevant for equity in listed
companies because for equity in non-listed companies there is no direct estimate of
market prices available anyways. Figure D.15 shows that equity in listed companies
only makes up a small part of German FDI assets. Instead, the equity assets are roughly
equally split between equity in non-listed companies and other equity, which includes
real estate. Since market prices are less relevant for the non-listed shares and are ap-
plied to real estate assets, the valuation at book values should not affect our results too
much.
Nevertheless, we now check our results for sensitivity to these valuation effects
for FDI. For this purpose, we consider the counterfactual where there are only val-
uation changes due to exchange rates. Technically when assets are recorded at book
value there can be no price adjustments, this means that if we record valuation changes
other than those due to exchange rate movements these must be write-offs or due to
mismeasurement. Now we can assume that all other changes observed are due to mis-
measurement and set total valuation changes before 2005 to the estimated valuation
28The positive difference occurs in 2008 when the nominal return was negative because excluding
Target2 increases the absolute size of the returns.
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Table D.9: FDI returns with adjusted valuation changes
Standard return Adjusted return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Val. FX Risk Geo. Baseline Val. FX Risk Geo.
Germany dummy -3.34*** -3.61*** -3.23** -2.90** -2.44** -2.71*** -2.24** -1.91*
(1.25) (1.27) (1.30) (1.36) (1.02) (1.00) (1.06) (1.12)
Valuation ch. due 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.38***
to ex. rates, FDI (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
3-year rolling std. 0.15 0.13
dev., FDI (0.20) (0.21)
3-year rolling std. 0.14 0.12
dev. adj. return (0.19) (0.20)
Advanced Europe -0.12 -0.13
(0.15) (0.15)
Advanced -0.10 -0.12
Non-Europe (0.18) (0.18)
Emerging -0.10 -0.12
&Developing (0.15) (0.14)
Constant 9.83 11.69** 10.56** 21.33 9.97* 11.88** 10.93** 23.44
(5.98) (5.18) (5.09) (17.06) (5.93) (5.12) (4.89) (16.71)
Observations 339 339 328 328 339 339 328 328
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.19
No. countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Columns (1) to (4) reproduce the results of Table 4.8 in Section 4.5. These are compared
to the results using adjusted returns in columns (5) to (8) (excluding any valuation changes not due
to exchange rates). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Net
foreign assets and financial account balance included in the regressions, but not shown.
changes due to exchange rates. To get a conservative estimate we do this only for
Germany.
Table D.9 shows the regression using the returns on FDI as dependent variable from
Section 4.5. We compare results with the standard return measure to those with the
adjusted return, measured as described above. While the difference between Germany
and the other countries becomes smaller in absolute terms with the adjusted returns,
it is still negative and significant. Thus, our results hold up even if we exclude all
valuation changes except for those due to exchange rate movements. It should be
noted that this analysis only adjusts the German returns. If other countries also report
book values, their returns are likely to be underestimated as well.
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Jarociński, Marek and Peter Karadi (2020). “Deconstructing Monetary Policy Surprises
– The Role of Information Shocks”. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, forth-
coming.
Jia, Chengcheng (2019). “The Informational Effect of Monetary Policy and the Case
for Policy Commitment”. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No.
19-07.
Jordà, Òscar (2005). “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projec-
tions”. American Economic Review 95 (1), 161–182.
Jordà, Òscar, Katharina Knoll, Dmitry Kuvshinov, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Tay-
lor (2019). “The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870-2015”. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 134 (3), 1225–1298.
Jordà, Òscar, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor (2017). “Macrofinancial History
and the New Business Cycle Facts”. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2016. Ed. by Mar-
tin Eichenbaum and Jonathan A. Parker. Vol. 31. University of Chicago Press, 213–
263.
Kamdar, Rupal (2019). “The Inattentive Consumer: Sentiment and Expectations”. mimeo.
Keynes, John M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Orlando,
Florida: Edition Harvest/Harcourt Brace 1964.
Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). “The Effects of Quan-
titative Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy”. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 2011 (FALL), 215–287.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 211
Krugman, Paul R. (1998). “It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity
trap”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1998 (2), 137–205.
(2017). “Germany’s Real Sin”. New York Times Opinion Pages, 27.05.2017.
Kumar, Saten, Hassan Afrouzi, Olivier Coibion, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2015). “In-
flation Targeting Does Not Anchor Inflation Expectations: Evidence from Firms in
New Zealand”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2015 (FALL), 151–208.
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott (1982). “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations”. Econometrica 50 (6), 1345–1370.
Lamla, Michael J. and Sarah M. Lein (2014). “The role of media for consumers’ inflation
expectation formation”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 106, 62–77.
Lamla, Michael J. and Thomas Maag (2012). “The Role of Media for Inflation Forecast
Disagreement of Households and Professional Forecasters”. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 44 (7), 1325–1350.
Lamla, Michael J. and Dmitri V. Vinogradov (2019). “Central bank announcements: Big
news for little people?” Journal of Monetary Economics 108, 21–38.
Lane, Philip R. (2001). “Do International Investment Income Flows Smooth Income?”
Review of World Economics 137 (4), 714–736.
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2003). “International Financial Integra-
tion”. IMF Third Annual Research Conference. Vol. 50. IMF Staff Papers. International
Monetary Fund, 82–113.
(2007a). “A Global Perspective on External Positions”. G7 Current Account Im-
balances: Sustainability and Adjustment. Ed. by Richard H. Clarida. University of
Chicago Press. Chap. 2, 67–102.
(2007b). “The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended Esti-
mates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004”. Journal of International Economics
73 (2), 223–250.
(2009). “Where Did All the Borrowing Go? A Forensic Analysis of the U.S. Ex-
ternal Position”. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 23 (2), 177–199.
Lane, Philip R. and Jay C. Shambaugh (2010). “Financial Exchange Rates and Interna-
tional Currency Exposures”. American Economic Review 100 (1), 518–540.
Lechner, Michael (2001). “Identification and estimation of causal effects of multiple
treatments under the conditional independence assumption.” Econometric Evalua-
tion of Labour Market Policies. Ed. by M. Lechner and F. Pfeiffer. Heidelberg: Physica,
1–18.
Lechner, Michael, Ruth Miquel, and Conny Wunsch (2011). “Long-Run Effects of Pub-
lic Sector Sponsored Training”. Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (4),
742–784.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 212
Lewis, Daniel J., Christos Makridis, and Karel Mertens (2019). “Do Monetary Policy
Announcements Shift Household Expectations?” FRB of New York Staff Report No.
897.
Lewis, Michael (2010). The Big Short. W. W. Norton & Company.
Lorenzoni, Guido (2009). “A Theory of Demand Shocks”. American Economic Review 99
(5), 2050–2084.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. (1972). “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money”. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 4 (2), 103–124.
(1973). “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs”. American
Economic Review 63 (3), 326–334.
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